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ORIGINS OF FEDERAL COMMON LAW: PART ONE*
STEWART JAYt
"Federal courts, unlike state courts, are not general common-law
courts and do not possess a general power to develop and apply their
own rules of decision." 1 Appearing in Milwaukee v. Illinois, this is
about as axiomatic a statement concerning federal jurisdiction as can be
found. Although it would be difficult to deny that the scope of modern
federal jurisdiction is enormous, there nevertheless remains a sense that
a radical difference exists between the nature of the state and federal
judiciaries. The demarcation is usually expressed by noting that federal
courts, in contrast to their state counterparts, are of "limited jurisdic-
tion."' This is a venerable maxim, which can be found in American
cases from as early as the eighteenth century. Chief Justice Ellsworth,
in a 1799 opinion, used the idea of "limited jurisdiction" to mean that a
federal court "has cognisance, not of cases generally, but only of a few
specially circumstanced, amounting to a small proportion of the cases
which an unlimited jurisdiction would embrace."' And, in Milwaukee
v. Illinois itself, the Court reached back to the 1812 decision of United
States v. Hudson4 as authority for its description of what is surely the
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central conception of federal jurisdiction.
There are a number of interrelated ideas associated with the pro-
position that federal courts have only a limited jurisdiction. One of
these was articulated, albeit not for the first time, by Chief Justice
Marshall in a companion case to the prosecution of Aaron Burr.5 As
part of a judiciary "created by written law, and whose jurisdiction is
defined by written law," federal courts "cannot transcend that jurisdic-
tion."6 Put somewhat differently in a later case, "[c]ourts created by
statute can have no jurisdiction but such as the statute confers.1
7
Actually, this explanation of limited jurisdiction is an odd basis for
differentiating federal and state courts. After all, state judicial jurisdic-
tion is defined by statute or constitution, and we would be surprised to
find state courts asserting a power not traceable to one of these sources.
Still, state jurisdictional statutes for courts of general jurisdiction are
very different from those for federal courts. The former appear to as-
sume the ability of the court to hear any claim recognized by law,
whatever the source of that law may be.' Exceptions occur only when
some specific limitation in the statute applies-such as a requisite
amount in controversy-or when the matter is within exclusive federal
jurisdiction.
Federal courts, by contrast, are not presumed to have authority
over every case presenting a claim as defined by some law. Indeed, the
presumption is precisely the opposite: federal jurisdiction is regarded as
nonexistent unless the party invoking it can demonstrate authorization
grounded in constitutional and statutory origins. One consequence is
that the federal pleading rule requires specific invocation of the juris-
dictional base in the complaint.9 Behind this principle is a still more
fundamental notion, applicable to all branches of the federal govern-
ment. Justice Iredell made the point (as have countless others in our
history): "[T]he United States have no claim to any authority but such
as the states have surrendered to them: of course, the part not surren-
dered must remain as it did before." 0
Nevertheless, to say that federal powers are derived from the con-
cessions of sovereign states does not explicate the opening statement.
Federal courts may be of limited jurisdiction in the same sense that all
federal authority is in theory specially delegated. But why are they not
I See Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807).
6 Id. at 93.
7 Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 449 (1850).
8 See, e.g., CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973); MD. CTS. & JUD.
PROC. CODE ANN. § 1-501 (1984); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 2-a (McKinney 1983).
9 See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
10 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 435 (1793) (Iredell, J., dissenting).
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'"general common-law courts," at least with respect to any subject po-
tentially within federal legislative competence? And what does it imply
to deny them "a general power to develop their own rules of decision"?
One response to these queries has been to invoke Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins,11 which in fact was the other decision besides Hudson cited
by the Milwaukee court to establish its proposition. Erie is frequently
used to support the principle that possession of subject matter jurisdic-
tion does not imply authority for a federal court to construct indepen-
dently a rule of decision for a case."2 Yet that is also true of any Ameri-
can court. We routinely find a court in one state applying the law of
another sovereign, even that of a foreign country, despite the forum
court's possessing a general common-law jurisdiction. Something else,
much more basic, must be involved.
When a state court decides if it will choose the law of another
sovereign, it does so largely as a matter of comity, with few limitations
imposed by the federal Constitution." Two or more states might, with
equal claims of right, apply their own law to identical fact situations.1 "
That this may happen is a consequence of the states being sovereign
equals. If a question of law is not preempted by superior federal law,
the issue is potentially resolvable by the law of several jurisdictions,
including foreign ones. States will not insist on applying their own law
unless they have an interest in doing so. When interests among states
collide, however, resolution almost always depends on whether the fo-
rum considers its own concerns sufficiently important to ignore the as-
serted stake of another sovereign.15
As every harried law student knows, the question of choice of law
becomes more complicated when it is a federal court making the selec-
tion. We resolve these issues according to "the source of the right sued
upon." 6 When the source is federal, whether it be the Constitution, a
a 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
12 See, e.g., Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 531 (1981); Walker v. Armco Steel
Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 744-45 (1980); United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co.,
412 U.S. 580, 591 (1973).
13 See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 313 (1981) (Brennan, J.,
plurality opinion) (state interests need only be "such that choice of [the state's] law is
neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair").
24 See id. at 307 ("[A] set of facts giving rise to a lawsuit, or a particular issue
within a lawsuit, may justify, in constitutional terms, application of the law of more
than one jurisdiction.").
15 See id. at 313-20.
16 Flexitized, Inc. v. National Flexitized Corp., 335 F.2d 774, 781 (2d Cir. 1964).
See also P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHS-
LER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 766 (2d ed. 1973) [herein-
after cited as HART & WECHSLER] ("Erie applies . . . to any issue . . . which is
governed by state law operating of its own force.").
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treaty, a statute, or federal common law, the answer is, of course, that
this law entirely displaces conflicting state law. Federal law may "bor-
row" from a preexisting body of state law when such appears conven-
ient, but this depends on the discretionary judgment of the federal au-
thority. On the other hand, if the rule of decision is based on state law,
the federal court attempts to apply the choice of law rules of the state
in which it is located. In these situations the federal court is "only an-
other court of the State,"1 and, as a surrogate for the state judiciary of
the forum, it acts for an entity that is a sovereign among other equals.
This all follows from another basic element of American federalism: the
federal and state establishments are not co-equal sovereigns. As Justice
Iredell explained in the course of making his earlier noted observation,
"[tihe United States are sovereign as to all the powers of government
actually surrendered: each state in the Union is sovereign, as to all the
powers reserved.""8
The federal government cannot purport to make law in all of the
areas that a state might regulate. A federal court could not have "gen-
eral" common-law powers since its scope of operation is inherently lim-
ited by the nature of federal sovereignty.19 One might now pose an
objection. Under this use of the term "general," neither do state courts
possess such jurisdiction: many areas are beyond their authority due to
federal preemption. It could be added that given the ever-expanding
claims of federal interests, the zones of preemption have become so sig-
nificant that no state has a "general" lawmaking authority.
If this seems confusing, it is a consequence of a deep ambiguity
concerning the respective natures of federal and state common law. A
standard account of state law is that "a state legislature acts against the
background of the common law, assumed to govern unless changed by
legislation.12 0 Notice how casually the term "the common law" appears
in this proposition. It brings to mind the image of a body of law, simi-
lar to the way in which courts once referred to the English common
law as a corpus of specific rules and principles. Usually, however, the
"common law" is taken by us to be a convenient expression for the
process by which judges make binding judgments based on nonstatutory
17 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945). An immense complica-
tion is interjected into this simple scheme because of Congress's constitutional authority
to establish federal courts. While federal courts are authorized to determine questions
of state law, they are also empowered to act according to federal procedure, which on
occasion may affect the outcome of a case.
, Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 435 (1793) (Iredell, J., dissenting).
19 Cf. Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640-42 (1981) (stat-
ing that federal common law only exists in narrow areas of unique federal interests).
20 HART & WECHSLER, supra note 16, at 471.
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rules. By focusing on the scope of judicial power, we ordinarily argue
about such lawmaking authority in terms of the relationship between
courts and other branches of government. In each jurisdiction, and in
every epoch, there are different and evolving conceptions of the extent
to which courts should fashion rules without legislative direction.
Nonetheless, at base the Anglo-American tradition makes an assump-
tion that is captured by the reference to the "background" nature of
common law. That is, there are rights and duties that exist notwith-
standing the lack of action by a legislative body with respect to the area
in question. When these rights and duties are nonconstitutional in their
origin, a legislature may override what the court declares; but that
merely alters the particular rule, not the general authority to make
rules.
The common-law power of federal courts-as the opening quota-
tion implies-is usually thought to be of a different genus than that of
state judiciaries. Again, a standard account of federal law is implicated:
"Congress acts .. .against the background of the total corpus juris of
the states in much the way that a state legislature acts against the back-
ground of the common law, assumed to govern unless changed by legis-
lation."21 Readers will notice that the second part of the last sentence
was quoted above in describing state common law. And here is the root
of our puzzle. It is understandable to hold that state law is a "back-
ground" jurisprudence if one merely means that all federal power is
derived from state delegations. Once we are in an area in which the
federal government has undisputed authority, though, we might also
claim something along these lines: "the federal legislature acts against
the background of the federal common law, assumed to govern unless
changed by legislation."
To make this contention would be to swim against a strong doctri-
nal current, which denies that "the existence of congressional authority
under Art. I mean[s] that federal courts are free to develop a common
law to govern those areas until Congress acts."22 Apart from cases in
which Congress has conferred authority on courts to develop substan-
tive rules of decision, the modern Supreme Court has restricted federal
common law to "such narrow areas as those concerned with the rights
and obligations of the United States, interstate and international dis-
putes implicating the conflicting rights of States or our relations with
foreign nations, and admiralty cases."2 Federal common law is often
21 Id.
22 Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981).
22 Id. (footnotes omitted).
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referred to as "specialized." '24 It is invoked as a "necessary expedi-
ent,''25 in a "few and restricted" instances, 26 and only if the federal
court feels "compelled"' 7 to do so.
In short, the difference between the "general" jurisdiction of state
judiciaries and the "limited" jurisdiction of federal courts lies in the
conception of the common law appropriate for the respective systems.
Both levels of government harbor some enmity toward the process of
common-law adjudication itself, which largely stems from the belief
that judicial lawmaking encroaches upon the province of the other
branches of government. For federal courts, there is yet another aspect
of the matter, which is an apparent preference-shared by many in the
federal and state judiciaries-for maintaining power and responsibility
at the state and local levels. Like the separation of powers issue just
raised, this federalism concern is partly inspired by the attitude that
diffusion of decisionmaking is more likely to promote democratic val-
ues. It also reflects the traditional notion that numerous sources of law
will produce a greater diversity of doctrines, with all of the concomitant
advantages that are supposed to spring from such experimentation.
But this explanation is problematic. The exercise of power by
Congress (not to mention the Executive) can intrude pervasively on
state and local institutions. Looking only at the values of federalism,
why should it make any difference if a federal court were to make a
common-law rule in an area over which Congress has competence?
What requires it to await specific authorization from the national legis-
lature? Usually the response to these types of inquiries is along the
following lines: "[T]he political structure . . . gives the states per se
very significant power in the Congress-to a degree hardly paralleled
in the judicial structure."2 One might doubt that the "states" as such
are inevitably potent forces in Congress, or that Congress is even an
institution especially responsive to popular will. Those issues will be
put aside, as this is not the place to rehearse the sizeable literature on
the question of congressional and executive autonomy.29 Even assuming
24 See, e.g., Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law,
39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 405 (1964).
5 Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 314 (1981) (quoting Committee for Con-
sideration of Jones Falls Sewage Sys. v. Train, 539 F.2d 1006, 1008 (4th Cir. 1976)
(en banc)).
2 Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963).
1 Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 314 (1981).
28 Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence and Discretion in
the Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 797, 800
n.12 (1957).
29 For an example of this debate, see J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE
NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 12-47 (1980).
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that the people in fact control their elected representatives, in a more or
less direct fashion, why should that affect the federal common law?
The same relationship, we may notice, exists at the state level; the pri-
mary popular check on state courts' common-law powers are the legis-
latures. Do the people inherently have a lesser ability to control Con-
gress than they do their state legislatures? Offhand, answering that
question seems impossible. A variety of variables would figure in deter-
mining how completely legislators can be insulated from popular pres-
sures, and surely these variables must fluctuate over time. Moreover, if
we were really serious about this business of popular control, why
should the system permit any federal common law not expressly au-
thorized by Congress?
There is plainly a difference between the political structure upon
which state legislatures are erected and the itructure supporting the
Congress. Legislatures must be apportioned more or less equally by
population, a feature absent in the Senate by virtue of the Great Com-
promise. Perhaps this is a justification for restricting federal common
law, but it is hardly one that rests upon a commitment to majoritarian-
ism. A greatly expanded federal common law would remain subject to
congressional control (and the disproportionate influence of some states
in the Senate). Nevertheless, it is undeniable that relatively weaker
forces in Congress would lose a measure of power if they were required
to marshal a legislative majority to override a common-law decision. It
is far easier generally to block legislation than to enact it.
Further muddying the waters is the necessity to factor judicial re-
sponsiveness to popular will into the analysis. And at some point one
has to contemplate why "accountability," in the sense of following the
people's dictates, is the appropriate ideal. In any event, why would we
not expect federal courts to be sympathetic to the need for local law-
making? Indeed, the last question is ironic since the limitations on fed-
eral common law largely have been imposed by the federal judiciary
itself.
When all is said and done, the answer to these questions is not
going to be found in a logical construction of federal jurisdiction.
Rather, the matter has a great deal to do with the balance of political
forces in the society, the degree of attention that courts wish to devote
to certain areas, and a range of other elements that form the judicial
personalities of an era.
This essay is composed of two parts (this being the first part) that
begin an inquiry into the early evolution of federal common law. It
examines how our current understanding of the constrained nature of
federal common law came into being by investigating the context of its
1985]
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origins. To this end, we will concentrate on the period leading up to
and surrounding the Supreme Court's decision in the case that has
come to be viewed as the earliest expression of the principle that federal
courts have only limited common-law powers: United States v. Hud-
son.30 Hudson, we shall see, is a strange decision to support such a
broad implication. It is not merely that the case dealt with the narrow
area of federal common-law crimes (more specifically, seditious libel).
The Milwaukee Court is quite right in thinking that the majority be-
hind Hudson meant its principles to apply to all areas in which federal
courts fashioned common law. But in the process of employing those
principles, the Court takes Hudson very much at face value, without
examining the peculiar historical period in which it arose and the ideo-
logical assumptions that informed its premises.
That Hudson is read as support for such a central conception of
federal court power is not the only reason for focusing on the case and
its times. Few would care to alter a fundamental legal principle merely
because it is shown that its initial appearance was in some manner
questionable. What can be demonstrated by Hudson, and more partic-
ularly the legal history of the years before it, is that a very basic aspect
of our constitutional structure was largely defined by the results of a
bitter partisan contest. In the course of the long argument, which
stretched over approximately twenty years, the debate over the com-
mon-law powers of federal courts took some rather dramatic turns.
Even the concept of what was in dispute-the definition of "common
law"-was distorted and manipulated by political actors. This will be-
come clearer in the second half of this essay, and we will see how the
term "common law" meant various things depending on what a given
speaker was attempting to accomplish with its use.
There was no coherent concept in the early nineteenth century of
"federal common law" as we now make use of that expression. A great
deal of verbal effort was expended then in discussing the "common
law" in relation to the powers of federal courts. Nonetheless, the idea
of what "common law" entailed corresponded to the ideological orienta-
tions of particular advocates, and more generally, was colored by natu-
ral law conceptions. Throughout the first three Administrations of the
United States, fierce controversy surrounded the actual and purported
authority of federal courts. Although the various contestants in this
30 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812), cited in Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 531
(1981); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 38 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Keeble v.
United States, 412 U.S. 205, 215 (1970) (Stewart, J., dissenting); United States v.
Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 313 (1947); D'oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315
U.S. 447, 469 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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struggle produced an assortment of theories to justify their respective
versions of federal jurisdiction, a cogent explanation of federal common
law (as nonconstitutional, judicially-created law that was binding on
states and subject to authoritative review by the Supreme Court) never
emerged in the Hudson era. This is not simply a reflection of differing
terminology. Instead, the linguistic departures between their age and
ours are indicative of fundamental incongruities. Compounding the an-
alytic difficulties is the fact that various public figures in the early
nineteenth century provided answers to questions about federal judicial
authority in forms that seem directly applicable to our own arguments
over federal common law. For the most part, however, they were asking
entirely different questions, and if we employ their answers it should be
with an awareness that a kind of game is being played.
The aim of the Part One of this essay is to place the matter of
federal common-law powers within the context of the larger political
history of the Hudson era. By the end of the 1790's, the issue had
become one of furious contention between the two major political par-
ties. Rather than simply an interesting exchange of scholarly perspec-
tives on a technical point of law, the disagreement between the Repub-
licans and the Federalists over the common law reflected very different
visions of government and society. For both sides, resolving the dispute
depended upon what they considered to be some of the most basic in-
gredients of constitutional theory. To appreciate this dimension of the
problem, we must have some impression of the constitutional discourse
carried on before Hudson-and how sharply it diverges from today's
dialogue.
Part One of this essay starts the inquiry, in section I, by analyzing
the peculiarities of the Hudson decision itself. This analysis scrutinizes
various aspects of the case and should cause us to begin questioning the
reliance on Hudson for the broad principle that federal courts have
only limited common-law decisionmaking powers. In section II the dis-
cussion turns to a sketch of the political history in the two decades prior
to Hudson. We will see how the partisan clashes of this time directly
influenced the intellectual and social atmosphere in which the debate
over the appropriate role of the national courts took place. It will be-
come evident that political interests and ambitions were inseparable
from the efforts to distill a principled reading of the Constitution. Fi-
nally, section III of Part One discusses chronologically the political
events of the time as they related to the question of federal courts' com-
mon-law authority. First, it examines the early cases in which federal
courts asserted common-law criminal jurisdiction. Then we will see
how the argument extended beyond the courts to other settings-in
19851
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particular, the legislative activity surrounding the Alien and Sedition
Acts, and the debates over the enactment and subsequent repeal of the
Judiciary Act of 1801. By viewing the issue in these contexts, we ex-
amine how the topic of federal common-law powers evolved and the
way in which the controversy over the extent of such power matured.
After Part One has related the extent to which the issue of federal
common-law powers was associated with other political affairs of the
period prior to Hudson, Part Two looks at the question of why specific
arguments concerning federal courts were formulated in the way that
they were. The partisan clashes of the 1790's were not just petty fights
among aspiring politicians. Rather the struggles over federal common
law reflected aspects of wider ideological differences.
Part Two presents a series of developments that shaped the dis-
pute over common-law adjudication by the federal courts. Some of these
developments are analyzed at the level of the political philosophies and
legal theories that informed contemporary constitutional discourse.
These include the analytic confusion surrounding prepositivist concep-
tions of law and the awkward fit of older ideas about territorial sover-
eignty into a federal system. Others relate to the Constitution itself,
particularly the history of its framing and the positions that its propo-
nents took to achieve ratification. Although the inquiry cannot provide
a complete explanation of the development of constitutional principles
of this period, the idea is to demonstrate that the theory of federal com-
mon-law jurisdiction underlying Hudson was essentially incomplete.
To urge that the Hudson doctrine lacked in ultimate coherency is
not to deny that people of the period thought they saw something im-
portant and persuasive in its mandate. Yet if we are to use Hudson
today to support principles relevant to our own decisions about federal
common-law jurisdiction, it ought to be with an awareness that the
Hudson Court confronted entirely different problems than we face to-
day. In the end, then, this essay is not so much about history itself as it
is the use of history by the courts. Part Two concludes by addressing
this theme and questioning the coherency of modern renditions of the
common-law functions of federal courts. The modern understanding of
federal common law, as expressed in judicial decisions, is little more
than a disconnected assortment of bits from a little understood past.
I. United States v. Hudson: THE DECISION
By the time Hudson was decided in 1812,31 a majority of the Su-
Si Cranch's report of the case gives the date of decision as February 13, 1812,
with Justice Washington recorded as being absent. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 32. The
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preme Court consisted of Republican appointees. Identifying the party
affiliations of Justices may seem odd to those who are aware that Presi-
dents have come to learn about the unpredictable consequences of life-
time judicial tenure. The simple but accurate explanation is that the
period before Hudson was unlike our own. Judicial independence did
play a role in affairs, as is demonstrated by the Supreme Court's re-
fusal in the summer of 1793 to answer Washington's questions on criti-
cal foreign policy issues. 2 For much of this time, however, the mixture
of judicial activity with partisan politics provided cause for genuine
concern on the part of the party in opposition, and was not merely the
product of paranoid perceptions.
Hudson arose out of indictments brought in 1806 and 1807 before
the federal circuit court for the District of Connecticut. Indicted by a
grand jury picked by a Republican marshall 3 were a Federalist state
judge, ministers, and newspaper editors, all of whom had made various
statements derogatory of Jefferson." In charging the grand jury, the
Republican federal district judge, Pierpont Edwards, advised that the
common law of seditious libel could form the basis of an indictment.35
This was especially peculiar conduct for the judge since, as is developed
below,36 Republicans had spent a great deal of political effort in the
prior ten years denying the existence of federal common-law crimes.
News of the indictments caused a stir among certain Republican circles
since there was more than a small appearance of hypocrisy."
minutes of the Court for that date, however, show no record for Hudson; instead, the
minutes for March 14, 1812 indicate that on that day judgment was entered and that
all Justices were present. Likewise, Cranch's report says that the "opinion was deliv-
ered (on the last day of the term, all the judges being present)," 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at
32, which would have been March 14.
32 See C. THOMAS, AMERICAN NEUTRALITY IN 1793: A STUDY IN CABINET
GOVERNMENT 145-50 (1967) (describing the refusal of the Supreme Court to give ex-
trajudicial advice to the President).
33 Jefferson himself admitted as much. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Wil-
son Cary Nicholas (June 13, 1809), reprinted in 11 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFER-
SON 111 (P. Ford ed. 1905).
"I See 2 W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF
THE UNITED STATES 771-72 (1953).
.5 See id. at 771 (citing-the Witness (Litchfield, Conn.), Apr. 30, 1806).
36 See infra text accompanying notes 371-93, 420-37, 477-505 & 530-33.
37 See, e.g., 20 ANNALS OF CONG. 75-89 (1809) (discussion on the House Floor
over a motion by Representative John Randolph to appoint a committee to investigate
the prosecution). Randolph noted his astonishment that the cases "had created so little
sensation in the House or in the nation." Id. at 86. Though there was talk about the
apparent political motivations behind the prosecutions-with Randolph observing that
"such is the difference between men in power and men out of power," id. at 76-the
speakers were unwilling to blame Jefferson or then President Madison for instigating
the indictments. What Randolph could not understand was why the President "should
permit an attorney for the United States to hold his office one second after having
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That Republicans were bringing common-law criminal actions in
federal court was only one of the strange aspects of the case. The usual
account of Hudson is that Jefferson, upon hearing of the prosecutions,
ordered them dismissed at once.3" Evidently this is not wholly accurate
since two of the prosecutions-against Barzillai Hudson and George
Goodwin-were taken to the Supreme Court (no trial was ever held)
on a certificate of division between the District Judge and the Circuit
Justice, Brockholst Livingston.39 Moreover, there is considerable evi-
dence indicating that Jefferson ordered some of the dismissals only after
news of the nature of the alleged libel reached him, and he realized that
the defendants could probably prevail on a defense of truth.40 In any
event, the charges against Hudson and Goodwin-their newspaper had
claimed that Jefferson had conspired to grant Napoleon two million
commenced a prosecution in a court of common law for libel." Id. at 77.
Federalists did not make the case into a major issue; they did, however, point out
the obvious partisan overtones. The district judge, the marshall, Joseph Wilcox, and
one of the prosecutors, Alexander Wolcott, were all prominent members of the Repub-
lican establishment in Connecticut. Edwards and Wolcott had been principal organizers
of the 1800 Jeffersonian presidential campaign in that state, and both received their
federal appointments during Jefferson's Administration. On the role of these individu-
als in Republican politics, see G. CLARK, A HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT 344, 347, 350
(1914); R. PURCELL, CONNECTICUT IN TRANSITION 217, 232, 241, 273-74 (1918).
11 See G. HASKINS, FOUNDATIONS OF POWER: JOHN MARSHALL, 1801-1815
(PART ONE) 355 (1981); 1 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES
HISTORY 435-36 (1932). In an 1809 correspondence, Jefferson asserted his lack of
involvement: "Certain it is, that the prosecution had been instituted, and had made
considerable progress, without my knowledge, that they were disapproved by me as
soon as known, and directed to be discontinued." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
Wilson Cary Nicholas (June 13, 1809), supra note 33. Professor Crosskey has demon-
strated, however, that a letter from Jefferson on February 11, 1807 indicates the Presi-
dent's knowledge and approval of the prosecutions. 2 W. CROSSKEY, supra note 34, at
772-73. Crosskey suggests that the prosecutions started as a means to harass prominent
Connecticut Federalists. The state was still in Federalist hands, and only recently sev-
eral Republicans had been subjected to criminal actions under Connecticut's sedition
act. Id. at 770-71. Subsequently, the Jeffersonians saw Hudson as a vehicle for an
authoritative repudiation of federal common-law jurisdiction . A series of unusual post-
ponements in the case does offer some evidence that the proceedings were delayed until
the Republicans had a safe majority on the Supreme Court. See id. at 775-82.
" See 2 W. CROSSKEY, supra note 34, at 781.
40 One of the indictments related to a statement made from the pulpit by Rever-
end Azel Backus, who had brought up the "Walker affair," which involved Jefferson's
alleged attempt to seduce the wife of his former best friend, John Walker. As the evi-
dence compiled by William Crosskey tends to establish, Backus had a good chance of
proving his remarks to be truthful; further, the sequence of events in the Backus prose-
cution indicates that the dismissal was probably prompted by Jefferson's realization of
what the slander entailed. See 2 W. CROSSKEY, supra note 34, at 779-81; see also L.
LEVY, JEFFERSON AND CIVIL LIBERTIES: THE DARKER SIDE 65-66 (1963). Jefferson
claimed that "the clergyman ...solemnly declar[ed] he had never uttered the words
charged." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Wilson Cary Nicholas (June 13, 1809),
supra note 33.
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dollars41-went before the Court with all the appearances of a feigned
controversy. No oral argument was held as Attorney General William
Pinkney and defense counsel Samuel W. Dana declined to proceed. 42
Instead of dismissing the case for failing to present a live dispute, the
Court proceeded to a summary decision announced by Jefferson's first
appointee, William Johnson.'3
One might cynically conclude that Hudson was written deliber-
ately to mislead later generations. Whatever the majority intended, in
some respects Hudson did accomplish that end. At a minimum, Justice
Johnson evidently tried to produce a sweeping decision. In Johnson's
own words, he "broadly"'44 stated the question presented as "whether
the circuit courts of the United States can exercise a common-law juris-
diction in criminal cases. . . . [the resolution of which would] apply to
every case in which jurisdiction is not vested in those Courts by stat-
ute.'14 5 This was a "simple, obvious" issue, Johnson wrote, one "long
since settled in public opinion.' 46 Readers were advised that "[i]n no
other case, for many years, has this jurisdiction been asserted; and the
general acquiescence of legal men shows the prevalence of opinion in
favor of the negative of the proposition.' 7
At least some have taken Hudson to state accurately the history
41 See J. McCLELLAN, JOSEPH STORY AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 171
n.31 (1971). Jefferson had asked Congress in 1805 to appropriate a secret fund to bribe
the French government into pressuring the Spanish to relinquish West Florida. See J.
BROUSSARD, THE SotHrERN FEDERALISTS 1800-1816, at 70 (1978).
42 See 2 W. CROSSKEY, supra note 34, at 782. An odd note on Pinkney's involve-
ment with the case was rrcorded by Henry Wheaton: "I am told that Mr. Pinkney had
formed, and frequently expressed, a very decided opinion that the courts of the Union
possessed a common law jurisdiction; though I have not been able to learn what were
the grounds of this opinion, or the limitations he would have admitted . . . ." H.
WHEATON, SOME ACCOUNT OF THE LIFE, WRITINGS, AND SPEECHES OF WILLIAM
PINKNEY 114 (Philadelphia 1826).
43 See 2 W. CROSSKEY, supra note 34, at 782. It is possible that Justice Johnson
did not actually write the opinion. In the early years of the Marshall Court, opinions
typically were delivered by the most senior Justice present-even if he was not the
author. See White, The Working Life of the Marshall Court 1815-1835, 70 VA. L.
REV. 1, 36 (1984). If the seniority system were operating, however, it would at least
imply that Marshall and Washington dissented since both were senior to Johnson. As
Johnson was the most senior of the remaining justices and was surely in the majority, it
appears reasonable to think that Johnson may have been the author, especially since
the reasoning in Hudson accorded with his overall philosophy. An interesting feature of
the Marshall Court's processes is that the other Justices in the majority would not
necessarily have endorsed the specific opinion delivered by Johnson. See id. at 38-39.
But this is all quite speculative as it is difficult to determine how well the seniority
principle was operating in 1812 or how it was modified in the rare cases of
nonunanimous results. See id. at 37.
44 Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 32.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 32-33.
47 Id. at 32.
19851 1015
1016 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
involved-that "the United States has never had a federal common law
of crime." '48 The matter of the status of federal common-law crimes
was actually much more involved than Johnson's opinion indicates. For
one thing, the decision was not unanimous-although the vote was not
reported, it was most likely a four-to-three split."9 More critically,
prior to the Republican ascension to the federal judiciary beginning in
the first Jefferson Administration, the virtually unanimous opinion of
federal judges-all of whom were Federalists-was that indictments
could be sustained in federal court under the common law for crimes
against the United States.5" According to Justice Story, "every Judge
that ever sat on the Supreme Court Bench, from the adoption of the
Constitution until 1804," with one exception, looked favorably upon
federal courts assuming this jurisdiction."1 Three of the Justices who
endorsed federal common-law jurisdiction, Wilson, Ellsworth, and Pat-
erson, had been prominent members of the Convention; in fact, the lat-
ter two served on the Senate committee that drafted the Judiciary Act
of 1789.5' Only the notorious Justice Samuel Chase is known to have
4 G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 245 n.39
(1982).
" See 2 W. CROSSKEY, supra note 34, at 782 (identifying the dissenters as Mar-
shall, Story, and Washington). The opinion indicates that a "majority" accepted its
views. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 22. A year after Hudson, a judge sitting on
circuit in Charleston wrote about the case: "I am confident that Judge Washington
alone, if any one, at that time dissented from the opinion." Trial of William Butler for
Piracy 12 (1813) [original pamphlet in Harvard Law School Library; copy on file with
the University of Pennsylvania Law Review]. Although the publication actually has no
author indicated, Morton Horwitz attributes authorship of this otherwise unreported
opinion to Justice William Johnson. See M. HoRwrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860, at 271 n.39 (1977). While Charleston was part of John-
son's circuit assignment, the district judge could have held the proceedings by himself.
Extensive research, including a reading of all extant Charleston newspapers from the
period, has failed to uncover any records for the case. In any event, the statement about
Hudson is unreliable. For example, Justice Story's views are not even mentioned; as
will be developed in Part Two, he almost surely supported jurisdiction in Hudson.
See Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 114-15 (1925); M. HORWTZ, supra
note 49, at 9; L. LEVY, supra note 40, at 201 n.72; 1 C. WARREN, supra note 38, at
433-34; Von Moschzisker, The Common Law and Our Federal Jurisprudence (pt. 1),
74 U. PA. L. REV. 109, 123 (1925). The district court in Hudson charged the grand
jury that it was "the sentiment of a great majority" of the Supreme Court that indict-
ments for common-law libel could be brought in federal court. Reprinted in The Wit-
ness (Litchfield, Conn.), Apr. 30, 1806, quoted in 2 W. CROSSKEY, supra note 34, at
771. 71 1 LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY 299 (W. Story ed. Boston 1851).
See Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal judiciary Act of 1789,
37 HARV. L. REV. 49, 50 (1923). According to Warren, "[un the early years of the
Court, Chief Justices Jay and Ellsworth, and Judges Cushing, Iredell, Wilson, Pater-
son and Washington had each delivered opinions or charges in support of the existence
of such jurisdiction." 1 C. WARREN, supra note 38, at 433; See, e.g., Ex parte Gross-
man, 267 U.S. 87, 115 (1925). On the views of Wilson, Jay and Iredell, see infra text
accompanying notes 181-193; for a discussion of Marshall's position, see Part Two of
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thought the contrary.53
Evidence exists showing that Jefferson's Administration utilized
federal common-law prosecutions aside from Hudson-for instance,
when it enforced the embargo." For the most part, however, Republi-
cans had opposed such federal proceedings for years, and this was not
simply because those in their camp were the subjects of the indictments.
Pragmatism of a different sort played a leading role in their reaction to
the Federalist assertions about the legality of federal common-law
crimes. The issue of federal common-law powers implicated the much
larger question of how much power was possessed by the national gov-
ernment. The Republican viewpoint on that issue had been forged
while they were an emerging opposition. Justice Johnson's opinion in
Hudson, appearing years after Jefferson's party became dominant, suc-
cinctly expressed the partisan Republican stance about federal power
that had been developed in the political wars of the 1790's.
Justice Johnson made no pretense that his opinion in Hudson fol-
lowed from an analysis of precedents or a study of the Framers' intent.
It was pure assertion, based largely on what he referred to as "public
opinion" and "the general acquiescence of legal men."55 Viewed in
this Article, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 1231, Appendix B. Like Charles Warren, Leonard
Levy has claimed that Paterson "accepted jurisdiction of common law crimes," L.
LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERI-
CAN HISTORY 241 (1960); but after reviewing the evidence, John E. O'Connor was
unable to find "incontrovertible proof of [Paterson's] action on a common-law indict-
ment in a federal jurisdiction." J. O'CONNOR, WILLIAM PATERSON, LAWYER AND
STATESMAN 1745-1860, at 330 n.55 (1979). Nevertheless, O'Connor surmised from
"Paterson's broad interpretation of federal authority in his grand jury addresses ...
[and the Justice's] defence of the common law in New Jersey [that he] would have
admitted common law indictments had they been presented to him." Id. While it is true
that no records have been found showing Paterson as the judge in a federal common-
law prosecution, he did record his firm acceptance of the jurisdiction. See infra text
accompanying notes 400-403. For an illustration of Ellsworth's philosophy in support
of common-law jurisdiction, see his Grand Jury Charge reprinted, infra, in the Appen-
dix. Finally, Justice Washington is the clearest case: "I have often decided," he wrote,
"that the federal courts have a common-law jurisdiction in criminal cases . ..."
United States v. McGill, 26 F. Cas. 1088, 1090 (C.C.D. Pa. 1806) (No. 15,676). This
encompassed "many crimes and offences against the authority of the United States,
which have not been specifically defined by law." Id.
53 See United States v. Worrall, 28 F. Cas. 774 (C.C.D. Pa. 1798) (No. 16,766)
(Chase, J., dissenting); see also infra notes 324-32 and accompanying text.
" See H. JOHNSON, FOUNDATIONS OF POWER: JOHN MARSHALL, 1801-1815
(PART Two) 638-39, 640-41 (1981). In 1802 Jefferson's Attorney General Levi Lin-
coln ordered common-law prosecutions against individuals in Kentucky who allegedly
forcibly rescued from jail a man accused of Indian murders. After the United States
Attorney protested to the Administration, averring to "the public heat [the Republican]
party had raised about the common law," the indictment was dismissed. See M.
TACHAU, FEDERAL COURTS IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC 130-131, 131 n.27 (1978)
(quoting the memoirs of the United States Attorney, Joseph H. Daveiss).
" Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 32. See also Presser, A Tale of Two Judges:
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light of the political transition that had occurred with the success of the
Jeffersonian campaign, those remarks can be construed as a thinly dis-
guised reminder of which side had won-in the public's eyes-a long-
standing political struggle. Nonetheless, Johnson's opinion has the for-
mal appearance of an easy deduction from first principles, starting with
what may seem an uncontroversial observation: "The powers of the
general Government are made up of concessions from the several
states-whatever is not expressly given to the former, the latter ex-
pressly reserve."" 6 From this view of the vertical distribution of power
in a federal structure, Hudson proceeds to quite a different contention,
one that modern readers would see as rooted in the separation of pow-
ers at the federal level:
The judicial power of the United States is a constituent part
of those concessions; that power is to be exercised by courts
organized for the purpose; and brought into existence by an
effort of the legislative power of the Union. Of all the courts
which the United States may, under their general powers,
constitute, one only, the supreme court, possesses jurisdiction
derived immediately from the constitution, and of which the
legislative power cannot deprive it. All other courts created
by the general government possess no jurisdiction but what is
given them by the power that creates them, and can be
vested with none but what the power ceded to the general
government will authorize them to confer.
57
A two-step delegation is envisioned: certain powers were trans-
ferred by the original compact from the states to the federal govern-
ment; the federal courts were recipients of the judicial aspects of those
powers, but the lower federal courts actually received only so much as
Congress granted them. Regarding "cases similar to the pre-
sent"-probably a reference to the crime of seditious libel-"it is
enough that such jurisdiction has not been conferred by any legislative
act. .... "58 Johnson did not specifically address whether the Judiciary
Act of 1789 had in fact conferred on the circuit courts jurisdiction over
common-law crimes by virtue of granting them "exclusive cognizance of
all crimes and offences cognizable under the authority of the United
States, . . .except where this act otherwise provides, or the laws of the
Richard Peters, Samuel Chase and the Broken Promise of Federalist Jurisprudence,
73 Nw. U.L. REv. 26, 71-72 (1978) (explaining that the federal common law of crimes
was more a political than a legal problem).
" Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 22.
57 Id.
8 Id.
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United States shall otherwise direct."159
Even assuming that the first step in Johnson's reasoning is correct
(that all federal powers are derived from the states, as opposed to the
American people), the separation of powers conclusion does not neces-
sarily flow from it. One could maintain, as Justice Story did four years
later in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,60 that article III's grant-utilizing
the language "shall be vested"-was meant to be mandatory on Con-
gress.6" Although Story's interpretation no longer commands adher-
ents,62 and was implicitly rejected by the first Congress in drafting the
1789 Act,63 it reminds us of a now accepted distinction between argu-
ments based on federalism and others springing from intergovernmental
relations at the federal level. That Johnson would blur the two was a
natural product of the way in which the matter of federal common-law
powers had been played out in the years prior to Hudson.
II. THE SETTING FOR DECISION: POLITICS OF THE EARLY
REPUBLIC
A. The Political Climate of the Immediate Post-Confederation
Period
For any political history of the early Republic, the issue of the
common-law powers of the federal judiciary is an indispensable chap-
ter, a part of the turbulent years dominated by the partisan contest
between entrenched Federalists and the emerging Republican party.
" The Judiciary Act of 1789, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 79 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §
1652 (1982)). An early authority thought the Act had conferred such jurisdiction, see
W. RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
271 (2d ed. Philadelphia 1829) (1st ed. Philadelphia 1825), as did Justice Story, see
United States v. Coolidge, 25 F. Cas. 619, 619-20 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 14,857).
Charles Warren also supported the existence of common-law criminal jurisdiction
under the Act, noting that Congress had eliminated the qualifying clause, "and defined
by the laws of the land," from the provision in § 11 quoted in the text. Warren, supra
note 52, at 77. Julius Goebel, on the other hand, considered this issue open to doubt
and thought that the Congress's excision was explainable on other grounds. See J.
GOEBEL, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ANTECEDENTS
AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 495-96 (1971).
60 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
61 Id. at 351-54. While Justice Story was writing for a majority, his view on
mandatory article III jurisdiction was dictum, which he appeared to repudiate shortly
thereafter. See White v. Fenner, 29 F. Cas. 1015 (C.C.D. R.I. 1818) (No. 17,547).
Nevertheless, this view has had supporters at various times. See 1 W. CROSSKEY, supra
note 34, at 615-17; Warren, supra note 52, at 68.
6 See Sager, Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to
Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REv. 17, 25 n.22
(1981).
63 See C. WRIGHT, supra note 2, at 4.
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Hudson was a piece in an elaborate mosaic of issues. While numerous
elements comprised the overall picture, there was an essential image on
the minds of everyone with an interest in America's political and social
future. That image was the nature of the Union itself. But it was an
image of associated concerns, not a defined portrait of the new nation,
and the form of the image depended very much on the mind of the
viewer. One cannot read the pamphlets, letters, recorded speeches, and
other writings from this period without being left with the sense that
the United States was a concept in formation, not an agreed-upon state
of affairs. Vehement disagreements existed over what the Constitution
meant, and though traces of the clash persist, they bear little resem-
blance to their origins. The question of the federal judiciary's relation
to the common law took on a definite cast due to the character of the
political clashes in this country during the first twenty years of its
existence.
A key aspect of political life was a constitutional argument over
the relationship between the new federal government and the existing
states. Americans were entirely unaccustomed to the idea of dominance
by a central government formed from the populace living on their own
soil. Most had long associated remote government with tyranny, and
political office with personal ambition. Nevertheless, it would be wrong
to assume that "democracy" in our modern sense of popular control of
the state was uniformly seen as the antidote for excessive government.
To the American elite of the Revolutionary period, democracy usually
signified "the lowest order of society . . .[which] was generally associ-
ated with the threat of civil disorder and the early assumption of power
by a dictator."" From the time of ratification to the close of the century
American politics were "peculiarly violent."'6 5 Our longstanding fasci-
nation with the leading actors of the era tends to gloss over the fact that
the vast majority of the people lived a simple, isolated rural life hardly
varying from that of a century before.6 Few wanted any government at
all, much less a federal one. George Haskins succinctly describes their
social world: "[Liarge sectors of the population were improvident and
antisocial; they did not take kindly to any form of authority, which to
them inevitably meant order, limitations on freedom of action, mutual
obligations, and worst of all, taxes."1
8 7
" B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 282
(1967).
" See Howe, Republican Thought and the Political Violence of the 1790s, 19
AM. Q. 147, 147 (1967).
88 See G. HASKINS, supra note 38, at 42-43.
67 Id.
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We need to be conscious of the rudimentary level of eighteenth
century American society when thinking of the constitution planned by
the Framers, who were hardly typical representatives of the people
whose government they charted. For most of the Framers, the events of
the Confederation had brought the young country to the brink of pre-
mature death, primarily because power had been placed in the hands of
those who were thought not competent to wield it." State constitutions
of the post-Revolutionary period, they believed, shared a uniform defect
"in that the balance of power was destroyed through a preponderance
in favor of the legislature."6 9 Yet it was not so much the constitutional
structures then in place that were seen as being at fault. Rather, in
Gordon Wood's words, it was "the large number of obscure, ignorant
and unruly men,"70 who had obtained positions in the state legislatures
after the Revolution.71 This new leadership had introduced a host of
popular measures abhorrent to the sensibilities of the dominant classes,
including property confiscations, issuance of paper money, tender laws,
and a variety of devices to prevent debt collections.7 In addition to
these problems, America's history of extra-governmental action,
through various forms of mob activity, was continuing with vigor.73
The fresh memory of Shay's Rebellion was not the least of the weights
that the Framers carried with them to Philadelphia."4
What came from the Convention in the form of our Constitution
was, in the context of those days, an "intrinsically . . . aristocratic
document. " 75 Throughout its main parts, power was distributed-as
the Antifederalists bitterly recognized 6-so as to locate federal author-
Is See G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at
424-25 (1969).
'9 W. CARPENTER, THE DEvELOPMENT OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT 71
(1930).
70 G. WOOD, supra note 68, at 507.
71 See id. Prior to the Revolution, political power was largely monopolized by
small groups of aristocratic men. During the post-Revolutionary War period, elections
became more important, and individuals perceived as demagogues were able to obtain
positions of power. See R. ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS: COURTS AND PoLrIcs
IN THE YOUNG REPUBLIC 268-69 (1971).
72 See G. WOOD, supra note 68, at 404.
73 See id. at 319-28. As Wood explains, riots motivated by both economic and
political concerns were common occurrences during the colonial period and the early
years of the Republic. State governments were often too weak to respond, and thus
counter-mob organizations were formed, escalating the public disorders of the Confed-
eration. Id. at 320.
74 See Corwin, The Progress of Constitutional Theory Between the Declaration of
Independence and the Meeting of the Philadelphia Convention, 30 AM. HIsT. REv.
511, 533-34 (1925).
71 G. WooD, supra note 68, at 513.
78 See, e.g., Letters of Cato MV, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLEFE ANTI-FEDERAL-
IST 116-19 (H. Storing ed. 1981). As Cato complained, "It is a very important objec-
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ity in the hands of a few. What the Antifederalists failed to perceive
was that the Framers were well imbued with an ideological distrust of
concentrated power, and accordingly "adopted every conceivable device
to protect the people from their rulers."7 Federal power would be
dominated by a minority, but their power was dispersed and checked.
These were checks born of pragmatic compromises at every turn,78 a
process unlikely to produce a system of government whose principles of
operation would be obvious and uncontroversial. Large areas of critical
importance were deliberately left to later resolution by the imprecision
of the language employed.
Virtually from the moment the Constitution was released by the
Convention, conflicting views emerged over its essential elements.
When the new government formed, it was immediately apparent that
there were fundamental rifts in opinion as to the powers that had been
transferred to the central government.7 ' An opposition gradually arose,
not always sharing a set of program objectives, but dominated by the
obsession that the seemingly inevitable tendency of power to corrupt
was at work in many who were a part of Federalist Administrations. 0
As the key events of the 1790's unraveled-associated with, in succes-
sion, Hamilton's economic program, the neutrality debate, Jay's
Treaty, and the crisis powers assumed by Federalists in 1798 and
1799-the Republican position became a cohesive ideology.81 By the
end of the decade, even moderates such as Madison and Jefferson
would be pushed into the more extreme camp of Republican partisans.
Republicans differed on numerous issues, and there were clear dif-
ferences among the diverse groups that eventually would be associated
with the figure of Thomas Jefferson. 2 Uniting them ideologically were
beliefs in inalienable personal rights, equality of participation in gov-
ernment, and above all, the principle that government must rest on con-
sent." In practice, these principles translated into a decided preference
for legislative authority over the other branches of government. By
tion to this government, that the representation consists of so few; too few to resist the
influence of corruption, and the temptation to treachery, against which all governments
ought to take precautions." Id. at 119. Although Paul Leicester Ford identified Cato as
George Clinton, the Governor of New York, there continues to be dispute over the true
author of Cato's letters. See 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra, at 102-03.
17 L. BANNING, THE JEFFERSONIAN PERSUASION: EvoLUTION OF A PARTY IDE-
OLOGY 116 (1978).
78 See C. WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTrrTION 733-34 & 733 nn.1-2
(1928).
7 See L. BANNING, supra note 77, at 115-23.
80 See id. at 117, 126-29.
81 See id. at 246-47.
8' See Teton, The Story of Swift v. Tyson, 35 ILL. L. REv. 519, 521 (1941).
88 See G. HASKINS, supra note 38, at 65-66.
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stressing majority rule, many Republicans had taken a strange
turn-quite a few in their ranks had helped construct a constitution
inspired by a fear of excessive democracy and legislative domination.
Behind the opposition lay an older view rooted in revolutionary ideol-
ogy, that saw "[h]istory . . . as comprising a continuing struggle be-
tween liberty and tyranny, between liberty and power."'" Attack fo-
cused on "the motives of the governors, not [on] the government
itself,"85 and "[m]en were quick to attribute to their enemies the
darkest of purposes." ' Jefferson set the tone in correspondence to
Washington, calling Hamilton's programs "adverse to liberty" and
charging him with "calculat[ing] to undermine and demolish the repub-
lic."187 Federalists generally were accused by Jefferson of attempting to
"accomplish a monarchy peaceably, or force a resistance which with the
aide of an army may end in monarchy.""
For their part, Federalists were equally capable of seeing a con-
spiracy in every move of their rivals. Among other things, they labeled
Republicans as "Jacobin[s]," "foreign intriguers," "ambitious popular
Demagogues," "vicious and corrupt,""9 and associated them with "fac-
tion, intrigue, private ambition and desparate fortunes."90 These ex-
changes were unlikely to produce a climate of rational discussion. In-
stead, America's first political parties formed themselves in an
atmosphere of often intense personal animosities. Alexander Dallas re-
minded a jury in a 1799 sedition prosecution that "there are many gen-
tlemen in this country who, from the occasion of the times, and the
combination of circumstances . . . wear sword-canes. . . . [T]he spirit
of party yet preserves a disposition to assassination .. "..",91 Jefferson
lamented that "[m]en who have been intimate all their lives, cross the
street to avoid meeting, and turn their heads another way lest they
'4 Howe, supra note 65, at 160; see also G. STOURZH, ALEXANDER HAMILTON
AND THE IDEA OF REPUBLICAN GOvERNMENT 124-25 (1970) (describing the themes
of the literature of the period as the lust for power and corruption).
s5 L. BANNING, supra note 77, at 284.
86 Howe, supra note 65, at 149.
87 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Washington (Sept. 9, 1792), re-
printed in 6 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 102 (P. Ford ed. 1895). The
personal element was unmistakable: "I was duped . . . by the Secretary of State and
made a tool for forwarding his schemes .... ." Id.
" Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Charles Pickering (Oct. 29, 1799), reprinted
in 9 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 87 (P. Ford ed. 1905).
8" Letter from Stephen Higginson to Timothy Pickering (Aug. 29, 1795), re-
printed in 1 AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION, ANNUAL REPORT 794 (1897).
90 Letter from John Quincy Adams to Abigail Adams (May 16, 1795), reprinted
in I THE WRITINGS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 340 n.1 (W. Ford ed. 1913).
91 Closing Argument, Trial of Duane, Reynolds, Moore and Cuming (Pa. Ct.
Oyer & Terminer 1799), reprinted in F. WHARTON, STATE TRIALS OF THE UNITED
STATES 376 (Philadelphia 1849).
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should be obliged to touch their hats." 2 One commentator put it well
in saying that, by the middle of the 1790's, "American political life had
reached the point where no genuine debate, no real dialogue was possi-
ble for there no longer existed the toleration of differences which debate
requires. Instead there had developed an emotional and psychological
climate in which stereotypes stood in the place of reality." 3
Aside from the earliest portion of the first Washington Adminis-
tration, this was not a period in which constitutional principles were
worked out through a process of reasoned articulation, persuasion, and
accommodation. Nevertheless, this was the time when important issues
of constitutional interpretation were initially exposed to the public con-
sciousness. Some were to be resolved in a manner that would affect the
development of our law for years to come. One of these was the ques-
tion that we now refer to as federal common law.
B. Politics and Constitutionalism
It would require considerable space and take us far beyond the
immediate purpose to detail all of the events of America's first decades
as they related to the federal judiciary. This was a complicated period,
and it resists easy generalization. In great part that is due to the inter-
twining of disputes over personalities, national policy, and constitu-
tional interpretation. Distrust of the characters designing and con-
ducting a national program would be related to assessments of its merit
(and vice-versa), and those opposing-or supporting-a given policy
might use any argument available. A constitution replete with open-
ended phrases, deliberately reserving resolution of many matters to the
political processes, was a particularly likely place to turn for authority,
albeit an unlikely source of authoritative resolution. When questions
reached the federal courts, they were often resolved by strongly partisan
Federalist judges, whose opinions frequently incensed their Republican
opponents."
By carrying the discussion to the level of constitutionality, the
stakes were raised along with the rhetorical heat. While the issues
arose in the context of specific policy disputes, Americans ordinarily
understood them in relation to their larger quest for societal definition.
All sides spoke in terms of dedication to a "republican" form of society,
a word that for many went beyond government to embrace the habits
92 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Rutledge (June 24, 1798), reprinted
in 2 THE LIFE OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 24 (G. Tucker ed. 1873).
• Howe, supra note 65, at 150.
See R. ELLIS, supra note 71, at 14.
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and virtues of the people. Although the members of the new national
polity were required by events to formulate theories to justify their po-
litical positions, the development of constitutional principles occurred
amidst the intellectual torrents of the remarkable late eighteenth cen-
tury. Gerald Stourzh has commented on the difficulties they faced:
The Founders' quest for the principles and the form of
good government in America derives much of its poignancy
from the fact that they were exposed to the conflicting claims
of ancient and modern ways of thought and, even more baf-
fling, to the ideas of those thinkers who made a last, desper-
ate attempt to bridge the cleavage between antiquity and mo-
dernity. There was no agreement, and much groping in the
dark among the Americans of the first generation of the Re-
public with respect to the substance of the liberty that was
the object of their search. To the theoretical intricacies of the
issue, there were added the problems of persuasion inherent
in a democracy-the need for simplifying issues less than
clear even to the most learned and brilliant.
95
Hamiltdn's economic program, which was viewed by many as a
danger to farm interests, raised simultaneously the basic issue of the
federal government's (or any government's) involvement with economic
planning.96 It came to be discussed as an issue of states' rights under
the Constitution, although it also had significant ties to the rift between
generally Federalist mercantile concerns and their agrarian oppo-
nents.97 More fundamentally, contrasting visions of the society were
implicated. Jefferson cast the dispute as one between those like himself,
who he said saw "no definite limits . . . to . . . progress," and others
("enemies of reform") inclined toward "steady adherence to the princi-
ples, practices, and institutions of our fathers.""
If nothing else, Jefferson's stated ambition for the society is strik-
ing in its simplicity. His expression displays easy confidence in the ide-
ological dichotomy it presents, as if a choice of societies had been
presented, and the people were thereby given a short menu of possibili-
ties. For Jefferson the spirit of republican virtue could persist only
while the society remained "chiefly agricultural. . . . When [people]
get piled upon one another in large cities, as in Europe, they will be-
" G. STOURZH, supra note 84, at 74.
See G. HASKINS, supra note 38, at 66-68.
97 See id.
s Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (June 15, 1813), reprinted in 2
THE ADAMS-JEFFERSON L=TR.s 332 (L. Cappon ed. 1959).
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come corrupt as in Europe." ' Disagreeing, Hamilton and his support-
ers imagined the United States following Britain's model of a great in-
dustrial and trading society.' 0 0 Whether one or the other was more
inclined toward some abstract notion of progress is rather beside the
point. What is important is the difference between the two men in their
evaluation of the potential for change in society and the role the na-
tional government should play. At a time when modem technology such
as steam power had scarcely arrived in America,10 1 Hamilton was more
astute in recognizing the inevitability of industrialization, and that
"[c]ommerce and industry will still increase the disparity"'0 2 in wealth
among the population. He realized that these circumstances would cre-
ate tensions, testing the national commitment to a free society; Hamil-
ton warned the ratifying convention in New York:
As riches increase and accumulate in few hands; as luxury
prevails in society; virtue will be in a greater degree consid-
ered as only a graceful appendage of wealth, and the ten-
dency of things will be to depart from the republican stan-
dard. This is the real disposition of human nature: It is
what, neither the honorable member nor myself can
correct.' o3
For Hamilton, the answer to the dangers presented by a society at
once increasing its wealth, while moving away from a traditional eco-
nomic base, was to actively shape its future. Government in the
Hamiltonian scheme could play an integral part in helping the culture
adjust to the strains of yet unimagined growth. Hamilton was not
thinking in terms of a modern state with a vast and intricate interrela-
" Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), reprinted in
12 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 442 (J. Boyd ed. 1955). Jefferson wrote:
Those who labour in the earth are the chosen people of God, if ever he
had a chosen people, whose breasts he has made his peculiar deposit for
substantial and genuine virtue .... Corruption of morals in the mass of
cultivators is a phaenomenon of which no age nor nation has furnished an
example.
T. JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA, reprinted in THOMAS JEFFER-
SON, WRITINGS 290 (M. Peterson ed. 1984).
100 See G. STOURZH, supra note 84, at 7, 168.
101 See 1 H. ADAMS, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DURING
THE ADMINISTRATION OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 71 (1889).
1o2 A. Hamilton, Speech at the Federal Convention (June 26, 1787), reprinted in
I THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 432 (M. Farrand ed.
1911) (notes taken by Robert Yates).
103 A. Hamilton, Speech at the New York Ratifying Convention (June 21, 1788),
reprinted in 5 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 42 (H. Syrett ed. 1962). For
an analysis of these remarks, see G. STOuRZH, supra note 84, at 70-71.
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tionship of government and economy, but he did envision America be-
coming an empire that would rival the powers of Europe.'" Judged by
the standards of his own day, he was decidedly more inclined toward
state intervention in the economy than was Jefferson, and favored ex-
pansive readings of executive authority.
Again, however, attitudes depended to a large extent on whether
the person actually had the responsibilities of office. Jefferson's first
inaugural address reads as if it were a libertarian manifesto, advocating
ca wise and frugal government, which shall restrain men from injuring
one another, shall leave them otherwise free to regulate their own pur-
suits of industry and improvement, and shall not take from the mouth
of labor the bread it has earned. '10 5 We may not entirely agree with
Hamilton's famous assessment of his rival: "Nor is it true that Jeffer-
son is zealot enough to do anything in pursuance of his principles
which will contravene his popularity, or his interest. He is as likely as
any man I know to temporize-to calculate what will be likely to pro-
mote his own reputation and advantage . . ."0 But unquestionably
the purity of Jeffersonian ideology suffered from the necessity of being
implemented in a real world of political crisis and international in-
trigue.107 A longstanding obsession of Republicans was undue executive
influence on the legislative branch. Yet Jefferson turned out to be a
more active and forceful President than either Washington or Adams,
even at the price of alienating some of his Republican followers. As a
result of events like the Embargo of 1807, and the subsequent efforts to
strengthen its enforcement, Americans found government intruding into
their lives to an unprecedented degree.108 Although Jefferson never
abandoned his commitment to the primacy of agriculture, his Adminis-
104 See G. STOURZH, supra note 84, at 192-201.
105 Inaugural Speech of President Jefferson (Mar. 4, 1801), reprinted in 1
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS 57 (W. Lowrie & M. Clarke eds.
Washington, D.C. 1832).
106 Letter from Alexander Hamilton to James A. Bayard (Jan. 16, 1801), re-
printed in 25 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 320 (H. Syrett ed. 1962).
Hamilton added that Jefferson was "crafty & persevering in his objects, that he [was]
not scrupulous about the means of success, nor very mindful of truth, and he [was] a
contemptible hypocrite." Id. at 319. Nevertheless, Hamilton acknowledged that there
was "no fair reason to suppose him capable of being corrupted, which is a security that
he will not go beyond certain limits." Id. at 320.
107 Jefferson reflected after the experience of Presidency was past, "To lose our
country by a scrupulous adherence to written law, would be to lose the law itself, with
life, liberty, property and all those who are enjoying them with use; thus absurdly
sacrificing the end to the means." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John B. Colvin
(Sept. 20, 1810), reprinted in THOMAS JEFFERSON, WRITINGS, supra note 99, at
1231.
108 See L. BANNING, supra note 77, at 280.
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tration came to encourage manufacturing, 0 9 which Jefferson later
characterized "as necessary to our independence as [it is] to our
comfort."1 l
To a large extent Jeffersonians were the heirs of the radical Whig
tradition that demanded that rulers be the mere instruments for execut-
ing the will of the people; at the same time they believed that the power
of office necessarily corrupted the politician.1 When combined with
Jefferson's conviction that virtue could be fostered only in an agrarian
culture, the resulting philosophy stressed the necessity of a minimalist
government as a prerequisite to liberty. This explains Jefferson's advo-
cacy of Western expansion, which would assure-"with room enough
for our descendants to the thousandth and thousandth genera-
tion" 112-a seemingly limitless territory for the cultivation of an egali-
tarian society in which the individual could be left alone by the state. It
was not so much an appeal to some innate goodness of humans, as it
was a belief that social conditions could raise insurmountable obstacles
to virtue-or be instrumental to their attainment. 1 A cornerstone of
Jefferson's vision was the independence of the individual: "Dependence
begets subservience and venality, suffocates the germ of virtue, and
prepares fit tools for the designs of ambition." 1 4 Use of credit, particu-
larly when the government was involved, was to Jeffersonians a potent
engine for personal destruction and a sure avenue to disproportionate
wealth in the hands of "paper men"-an expression used frequently by
Jefferson, who spent much of his life entangled in debts to distant cred-
itors.1 5 Moreover, legislators would become holders of the public debt
109 See G. HASKINS, supra note 38, at 68.
110 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Benjamin Austin (Jan. 9, 1816), reprinted
in 10 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 387 (P. Ford ed. 1899); see also A.
KOCH, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 172-74 (1943) (explaining that Jef-
ferson's encouragement of manufacturing was motivated by his desire to ensure the use
of domestic raw materials).
"I1 See G. STOURZH, supra note 84, at 184.
11. Inaugural Speech of President Jefferson (Mar. 4, 1801), supra note 105, at
57.
118 Gerald Stourzh writes: "The Jeffersonian conception of human nature predi-
cated the possibility of human goodness on the equality not of legal rights only, but of
material conditions and social status as well. Jeffersonian political theory had no rem-
edy for a stratified society except the advice to do away with stratification." G.
STOURZH, supra note 84, at 181. An example of Jefferson's philosophy in practice
would be his advocacy of public education, which had particular meaning to one whose
home state's population was "uneducated to a degree that shocked their own native
leaders." I H. ADAMS, supra note 101, at 137.
114 T. JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA, supra note 99, at 290-
91.
11 See D. MALONE, JEFFERSON AND THE ORDEAL OF LIBERTY 176-79, 529-30
(1962).
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and directors of the national bank, leading inexorably to a corrupt affil-
iation with executive officers.11
Hamilton, on the other hand, was not unduly troubled by what he
perceived as the tendency of "[mien [to] pursue their interests," since
"[a] wise legislator will gently divert the channel, and direct it, if possi-
ble, to the public good." 1 7 Individuals were "neither ...actuated by
generosity nor reasons of state," and thus "to their interest alone we
must appeal."""' A system of public credit, the establishment of a na-
tional bank, and the assumption of debts would play upon the self-
interest of "the monied interest of every State" '119 and foster support of
the government upon which their investments depended.' 20 Without
harboring illusions about the character of "men of property," Hamilton
believed they were nonetheless "enlightened about their own inter-
est, ' 1 2 ' and better candidates for leading the society:
Look through the rich and the poor of the community; the
learned and the ignorant. Where does virtue predominate?
The difference indeed consists, not in the quantity but kind
of vices, which are incident to the various classes; and here
the advantage of character belongs to the wealthy. Their
vices are probably more favorable to the prosperity of the
state, than those of the indigent; and partake less of moral
depravity.'
22
Pronouncements of this sort did little to dampen Hamilton's repu-
tation as an aristocrat who held the common person in high con-
tempt-surely an irony in light of Hamilton's humble origins. He was
prone to call democracy "our real disease, ...the poison of which, by
a subdivision, will only be the more concentrated in each part, and con-
116 See L. BANNING, supra note 77, at 168, 170-71.
117 A. Hamilton, Speech at the New York Ratifying Convention (June 25, 1788),
supra note 103, at 85.
118 CONTINENTAL CONGRESS REPORT ON A LETTER FROM THE SPEAKER OF
THE RHODE ISLAND ASSEMBLY (Dec. 16, 1782), reprinted in 3 THE PAPERS OF AL-
EXANDER HAMILTON, 216 (H. Styrett ed. 1962); see also G. STOURZH, supra note 84,
at 188 (noting Hamilton's regard for the force of private interests).
119 Notes on the Advantages of a National Bank, reprinted in 8 THE PAPERS OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 223 (H. Syrett ed. 1962).
110 See L. BANNING, supra note 77, at 138-39.
121 Letter from Alexander Hamilton to Robert Morris (Apr. 30, 1781), reprinted
in 2 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 621 (H. Syrett ed. 1962); see also G.
STOURZH, supra note 84, at 90-94 (explaining that Hamilton's desire to place "men of
property" at the top of the political and social pyramid can be partly understood in
terms of Hamilton's belief that these individuals were fairly rational).
122 Speech at the New York Ratifying Convention (June 21, 1788), supra note
103, at 43.
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sequently the more virulent."12 Examined in light of the typical Fed-
eralist association of democracy with mob rule, Hamilton's view was
not meant as a denial of any representative voice to the people. Rather
it reflected a social conservatism that preferred a stable society to an
open one, a state of affairs that was believed to be impossible to attain
if the illiterate rabble were included directly in governance. Federalism
in many parts of the United States-especially New England-was
closely (although not invariably) associated with social class. 24 The ex-
cesses of the French Revolution struck the reactionary Federalists as a
grim reminder that the rude, gullible masses were easily susceptible to
the lead of derdagoguery.
However significant the Federalist contribution was in setting the
country on course, maintaining the peace, and establishing the public
credit, the party lost touch with the farmers and laborers that Jeffer-
sonians artfully courted.12 5 Odd as it was for a slave-holding landed
gentleman to become the champion of the ordinary person, the emer-
gence of Republicanism itself was natural in a predominantly agricul-
tural society whose people prided themselves in their presumed equality
as vehemently as they opposed Federalist taxes.
These observations on the divisions in American society that re-
sulted in the country's first great political parties may seem irrelevant
to a study of an issue that is now almost exclusively the province of the
legal community. Understanding the early relationship between the
common law and the federal government involves an exercise in consti-
tutional history, a field that professional historians have disparaged on
12 Letter from Alexander Hamilton to Theodore Sedgwick (July 10, 1804), re-
printed in 10 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 458 (H. Lodge ed. 1904).
124 The reaction to Jefferson's election amongst those in the upper classes in New
England illustrates the connection between class and politics. As the Beards noted,
upon hearing of Jefferson's election: "Federalist ladies . . . shuddered with horror as
they spoke of the 'atheist and leveler from Virginia.' Federalist politicians and con-
servative gentlemen stood aghast: all the grace and dignity of life, everything founded
on knowledge and morals seemed destroyed in a flash." 1 C. BEARD & M. BEARD,
THE RISE OF AMERICAN CIVILIZATION 380-81 (1927).
But the issue of class and politics was complex as was shown by the South. See J.
BROUSSARD, supra note 41, at 5-9. Professor Broussard notes that, in that region,
"[o]pposed to the conservatives was a 'radical' or 'democratic' element, led often by
persons of wealth but supported by small farmers in the Piedmont and mountains and
occasionally by urban artisans and mechanics." Id. at 9.
2' Henry Adams's description of the politics in the early 1800's is still valid:
Federalism was already an old-fashioned thing; a subject of ridicule to
people who had no faith in forms; a half-way house between the Euro-
pean past and the American future. The mass of Americans had become
democratic in thought as well as act; not even another political revolution
could undo what had been done.
2 H. ADAMS, supra note 101, at 76.
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occasion as "'sterile and meaningless.' "126 To avoid that criticism we
must, at a minimum, approach the constitutional questions with an eye
toward the manner in which the subject was treated by the first genera-
tion to live under the Constitution. As a process, constitutional inquiry
assumed quite a different meaning in those days than it does now. Not
only were constitutional arguments phrased in terms of a debate over
the concept of republicanism, and presented by individuals who con-
sciously identified themselves as revolutionaries; they were also fre-
quently made for the sake of winning immediate political prizes.
For example, most of the important domestic issues that arose in
the twenty years after 1794 were involved in one way or another with
international affairs, and both parties exhibited a crude tendency to
further "the popular image of the political struggle as a contest between
'French' and 'British' interests." ' And in the fashion of their times,
each side characterized the events as an intricate interlocking web of
conspiracy allegedly masterminded by their rivals. Federalists typically
were accused of seeking national consolidation or, worse yet, a return to
the British fold. Their constitutional arguments about national powers
were portrayed, in the words of Albert Gallatin, as a move
to assimilate our government to a monarchy. Every measure
seems to squint towards this darling object, and hence irre-
deemable debts, excise systems, national banks, loans, federal
cities, reports for raising revenue by an officer unknown to
the Constitution and dependent on the executive-hence the
plan to excite the Western Insurrection to increase the na-
tional debt, to furnish a pretext for a standing army, and to
supply arguments against the cause of republicanism. 28
That Federalists engaged in similar reveries of free association by
discerning French plotting behind various domestic events did little to
cool the air. Federalists did not stop with strong language; they were
capable of taking such measures as bringing treason charges, prosecut-
ing for the common-law offenses of sedition and violating neutrality,
and enacting the despised Alien and Sedition Acts."2 9
Once in power, however, most Republicans proved quite flexible
when it came to previously sacrosanct constitutional positions. Jefferson
126 Cannadine, No Entrance (Book Review), N.Y. Rv. BooKs, Dec. 20, 1984, at
64 (quoting Lawrence Stone).
127 See L. BANNING, supra note 77, at 233.
128 A. GALLATIN, AN EXAMINATION OF THE CONDUCT OF THE EXECUTIVE OF
THE UNITED STATES TOWARDS THE FRENCH REPUBLIC 41 (Philadelphia 1797),
quoted in L. BANNING, supra note 77, at 242 (footnote omitted).
129 See Presser, supra note 55, at 94-95.
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himself was prepared to deal with the British in order to temper Napo-
leon's influence over Louisiana. When this proved unnecessary due to
France's decision to sell Louisiana, Jefferson then agreed to the
purchase, notwithstanding the fact that it violated "every canon of in-
terpretation [of the Constitution] by the Virginia Republicans."13" The
Constitution did not specifically authorize what was then a massive ex-
penditure. The doctrine of enumerated powers was at the core of the
Republican creed; to concede authority beyond those powers specifically
listed in the Constitution would allow for open-ended federal absorp-
tion of state sovereignty."' Republican prognostication on the last point
turned out to be right, even if the full implications for federal power
would not be realized until more than a century later. In the meantime,
the Louisiana Purchase threatened to alter radically the political com-
position of the nation and heightened the convictions of certain New
England Federalists who urged secession from the Union." 2 These
Federalists defended their move on the ground that the Constitution
was a compact of states, united by a federal government of limited pow-
ers-not terribly different than the theory underlying the Virginia and
Kentucky Resolutions. Even less extreme Federalists in New England
held to some version of "interposition," under which a state might in-
sist ii various ways on its own constitutional interpretation.133
130 1 S. MORISON & H. COMMAGER, THE GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN REPUB-
LIC 1703-1805, at 392 (1942) (footnote omitted). Jefferson originally urged a constitu-
tional amendment to obtain the purchase, explaining: "The general government has no
powers but such as the constitution has given it; and it has not given it a power of
holding foreign territory, & still less of incorporating it into the Union. An amendment
of the Constitution seems necessary for this." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John
Dickinson (Aug. 9, 1803), reprinted in 8 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 262
(P. Ford ed. 1897). Shortly thereafter, he relented, telling a correspondent:
I confess, then, I think it important, in the present case, to set an example
against broad construction, by appealing for new power to the people. If,
however, our friends shall think differently, certainly I shall acquiesce
with satisfaction; confiding, that the good sense of our country will correct
the evil of construction when it shall produce ill effects.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Wilson Cary Nicholas (Sept. 7, 1803), reprinted in 4
THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 507 (H. Washington ed. New York 1856).
Putting the constitutional obstacle aside, Jefferson had good reason to move without the
amendment: "Jefferson abandoned scruple . . with reluctance and because there
seemed some danger that the Emperor of France might change his mind about a bar-
gain that could guarantee the nation's peace while promising indefinite postponement
of the day when overcrowding and development might put an end to its capacity for
freedom." L. BANNING, supra note 77, at 279.
131 See G. HASKINS, supra note 38, at 66-68.
132 See J. BANNER, To THE HARTFORD CONVENTION: THE FEDERALISTS AND
THE ORIGINS OF PARTY POLITICS IN MASSACHUSETTS, 1789-1815, at 111-21 (1970)
(discussing some Federalists' belief that the nation would, and should, divide at the
Appalachians).
133 See id. at 118-19.
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It is one thing to point out inconsistencies in legal or philosophical
stances, and quite another to claim that the asserted doctrines were con-
scious subterfuges for advancing a political program. Honest people
have been known to change their minds in the face of experience and
reasonable rebuttals. In any event, it would take a great deal more evi-
dence than is presently available to show that the issue of common-law
authority for federal courts was purely a creature of partisan politics.
Nonetheless, in assessing the first decades of American constitutional
development, a principled account of the Constitution's key provisions
cannot be separated from the public affairs of the day. Those in and
out of office were formulating a view of the Constitution as the realities
of the federal experiment unfolded.
This last statement is not meant as merely another version of
Chief Justice Marshall's oft-quoted expression, "we must never forget
that it is a constitution we are expounding."1 ' At the time under dis-
cussion, nothing resembling our present nation was in place. At best the
country remained a "loose federation of States,"1 5 whose future as a
functioning unit was largely open to question. Particularly when Hud-
son was decided, a breakdown of the federal system was a distinct pos-
sibility. 36 Constitutionalism in 1812 was not remotely similar to the
process we now experience. No established national society existed that
would lend stability to a course of constitutional construction. Dissatis-
fied players might well go home and remain there. And this was a real
threat 137-the position of actual strength enjoyed by states is difficult
for Americans of today to imagine.
These were not abstract disputes or arguments based on accumu-
lated experience in a federal system. Preciously little from the past
could be relied upon in resolving the chief dilemmas. English common
law might afford clues to the meaning of some terms in the Constitu-
tion,"13 but the absence of any close federal model was recognized even
' McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 159, 200 (1819).
135 G. HASKINS, supra note 38, at 15.
138 See L. BANNING, supra note 77, at 296-97. Dissenting Federalists were not
the only ones who were equivocal in their support of the existing nation. Jefferson
wrote in 1804 that it was "not very important" if "we remain in one confederacy, or
form into Atlantic and Mississippi confederacies." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
Joseph Priestley (Jan. 29, 1804), reprinted in 8 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFER-
SON 295 (P. Ford ed. 1897).
M See G. HASKINS, supra note 38, at 313. As Haskins explains, "In the early
national period, arguments on behalf of the States could be made from a position of
real strength; the new government was unsure of itself, and the States exercised a great
deal more de facto power than they could after the 1820s." Id.
138 Many provisions of the Constitution employed common-law terms, and com-
mon-law principles were expected to provide guidance, as is indicated by various state-
ments made during the ratification process. See, e.g., 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL
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at the Convention. 3 9 Nor would models have been particularly useful.
State sovereignty was a historical reality, not merely a philosophical
theory. 4 State governments were the primary political focus, and
many recalled the established wisdom of the Revolution, that a republic
could flourish only in a limited territory among people who shared
common interests.141 States may have been perceived as "the accursed
thing[s] which will prevent our being a nation," 42 but recognition of
their sovereign power had been the price paid for the Union.143
Similarly, on the most important disputes over separation of pow-
ers, the infant nation had little guide save the lessons of revolutionary-
era state constitutions, which generally were thought defective by the
Framers in their allocation of dominant authority to the legislatures.
Nothing in the colonial experience would have informed the Framers of
the appropriate division of authority in a tripartite system distributing
power among three independent functional units.
1 44
With respect to the role of the federal judiciary, lawyers such as
Attorney General Edmund Randolph were well versed in the ambigui-
ties permeating article III. Randolph was also aware that the judici-
STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONsTrrUTION 530-31
(J. Elliot ed. 1836) (James Madison, Virginia Convention) [hereinafter cited as EL-
LIOT'S DEBATES]; 4 id. at 210 (Richard D. Spaight, North Carolina Convention).
English common law has been turned to throughout our history as a source of constitu-
tional meaning. See, e.g., Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 478-79 (1888) ("The inter-
pretation of the Constitution of the United States is necessarily influenced by the fact
that its provisions are framed in the language of the English common law, and are to
be read in light of its history."); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 167
(1874) (Since the Constitution is silent as to who shall be natural-born citizens, the
meaning of the term must be found in the common law, "with the nomenclature of
which the framers of the Constitution were familiar."). Moreover, in some places, the
Framers deliberately avoided language that might invoke a common-law construction of
terms. See, e.g., 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 316 (M.
Farrand ed. 1911) (statement of James Madison objecting to using the term "felony"
because it was vaguely defined in the common law).
139 See Coker, Commentary, in FEDERAUSM AS A DEMOCRATIC PROCESS 79, 81-
82 (1942).
140 See J. GoaBEL, supra note 59, at 723.
141 See G. WOOD, supra note 68, at 356-57.
142 Letter from General Henry Knox to Rufus King (July 15, 1787), reprinted in
1 THE LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF RuFus KING 228 (C. King ed. 1894) (stating
that acceptance of the Constitution by the small states rested on the assurance that
states' rights would be protected).
143 See W. CARPENTER, supra note 69, at 95-96.
144 See B. BAILYN, supra note 64, at 70-73. The colonists had greatly admired the
English model of separated powers, which envisioned the best State as one comprised of
a mixture of three types-monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy-represented in their
respective estates in society-royalty, nobility, and the commons. See id.; G. WOOD,
supra note 68, at 197-202. The American Constitution's system of separated powers,
however, had "no place in the common law." Radin, The Doctrine of the Separation of
Powers in Seventeenth Century Controversies, 86 U. PA. L. REV. 842, 844 (1938).
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ary's role was more than a question of power distribution among fed-
eral branches; it implicated states' rights, and the lack of jurisdictional
clarity was a source of ire for state judges.'4" The fit of common law in
'article III's framework and its relation to state law will be explored in
Part Two of this essay. For our present purposes, the use of highly
generalized language concerning the role of federal courts is what is
important. 146 Article III came about through a process of known com-
promises;1 47 still, few aspects of the debate (if any) on federal jurisdic-
tion are documented.148 Probably the language chosen was deliberately
vague, as many have suspected since, 49 and to which Gouverneur
Morris essentially confessed. 5 ' An independent judiciary was undoubt-
145 Randolph told Washington by letter of August 5, 1792: "So crude is our judi-
ciary system, so jealous are State judges of their authority, so ambiguous is the lan-
guage of the constitution, that the most probable quarter, from which an alarming
discontent may proceed, is the rivalship of these two orders of judges." Letter from
Edmund Randolph to President Washington (Aug. 5, 1792), reprinted in 10 THE
WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 513 (J. Sparks ed. Boston 1836). During the
Virginia ratification debates, Randolph complained that article III should have "been
more clearly expressed. What do we mean by the words arising under the Constitu-
tion? What do they relate to? I conceive this to be very ambiguous .... [T]he word
arising will be carried so far that it will be made use of to aid and extend the federal
jurisdiction." 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 138, at 572.
148 One commentator has noted:
[W]e must remember that there was a substantial amount of uncertainty
in regard to the specific content of American law in the first half of the
century of national existence. What is legal? What may the courts do?
What are the limits of their powers and initiative? The vagueness of the
judiciary article in the Constitution served to increase the frequency and
heighten the seriousness with which these questions, natural to any new
nation and new legal system, were asked.
L. KERBER, FEDERALISTS IN DISSENT 138 (1970).
147 See J. SCHMIDHAUSER, THE SUPREME COURT AS FINAL ARBITER IN FED-
ERAL-STATE RELATIONS 1789-1957, at 7-8 (1958). According to Schmidhauser, the
wording of article III was a result of a series of compromises between strong national-
ists and states' rights advocates. One such compromise was the placing of lower federal
court jurisdiction under congressional control. This was a compromise between states'
rights interests who wanted to rely solely on state courts, and nationalists who wanted.
the lower federal judiciary defined in the Constitution. See id. at 13.
148 See C. WRIGHT, supra note 2, at 2.
"4 See, e.g., D. Sharpe, The Origins of American Admiralty and Maritime Law
268 (1969) (unpublished S.J.D. thesis, Harvard Law School); Forrester, The Nature of
a "Federal Question," 16 TUL. L. REV. 362, 367 (1942).
"'0 That instrument [the Constitution] was written by the fingers, which
write this letter. Having rejected redundant and equivocal terms, I believe
it to be as clear as our language would permit; excepting, nevertheless, a
part of what relates to the judiciary. On that subject, conflicting opinions
had been maintained with so much professional astuteness, that it became
necessary to select phrases, which expressing my own notions would not
alarm others, nor shock their selflove, and to the best of my recollection,
this was the only part which passed without cavil.
Letter from Gouverneur Morris to Timothy Pickering (Dec. 22, 1814), reprinted in 3
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edly supported; the Framers knew that state courts had suffered in the
Confederation period from legislative dominance.1 51 In terms of provid-
ing a system to implement such independence, however, they went into
more uncharted waters. Judicial power had long been associated with
the executive. 52 Explaining-much less forecasting-the eventual role
of the judiciary in a constitutional order giving it co-equal status with
the other branches of the government, while cabining the courts
through vague jurisdictional grants subject to ultimate political control
by Congress, was simply not possible.15
Given the ambiguities of the Constitution and the overall fragility
of the political setting in the years under consideration, it was virtually
inevitable that the federal judiciary would become entangled in the par-
tisan exchange. During the 1790's a series of important disputes be-
tween the two camps came to the Supreme Court or before Justices on
circuit. In addition to the important issue of whether the English com-
mon law was a part of federal law under article III, federal courts took
on such questions as the constitutionality of the Alien and Sedition
Acts, 1" various controversies concerning American neutrality,1 55 and a
number of matters directly implicating states' rights. 56 From the Re-
publican perspective, these disputes were virtually always decided
wrongly, and the decisions thus revealed the tendencies of federal
judges toward national consolidation, invasion of states' rights, and fa-
voritism for the British at the expense of the French.
1 57
Federalist judges were also directly implicated in Administration
policies. Chief Justice Jay's negotiation of the treaty that bears his
name is the best instance of this. From the very beginning of Jay's
THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 420 (M. Farrand ed.
1911).
151 See F. AUMANN, THE CHANGING AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM: SOME SE-
LECTED PHRASES 161-65, 171-72 (1940); G. WOOD, supra note 68, at 155-56;
Corwin, supra note 74, at 515-16.
152 See G. WOOD, supra note 68, at 159-60 (discussing the coincidence of judicial
and executive responsibilities and the review of colonial courts by the English Privy
Council operating in the colonies).
115 See Eliot, The Common Law of the Federal Courts, 36 AM. L. REv. 498, 503
(1902) (noting that participants in the Constitutional Convention lacked a clear view of
what the Constitution's effect would be with respect to judicial power). As Julius Goe-
bel pointed out, "[tihe experience of most of the lawyers present [at the Convention]
was not such as to stir an awareness of the import of what had been done." J. GOEBEL,
supra note 59, at 244.
14 See G. HASKINS, supra note 38, at 190.
155 See H. JOHNSON, supra note 54, at 456-66.
156 A leading example of this was Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419
(1793). As Charles Warren related it, Chisholm "fell upon the country with a profound
shock." 1 C. WARREN, supra note 38, at 96.
157 See G. HASKINS, supra note 38, at 126, 159.
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mission to England, his role as emissary was widely attacked as violat-
ing the principle of separation of powers. Republican newspapers sug-
gested that the President was making the judiciary an arm of the exec-
utive, and noted that Jay might have to construe as a judge the very
treaty he negotiated. Others darkly reminded readers that without the
Chief Justice's presence, impeachment charges against the President
could not be tried. When the terms of the treaty were made known by
leaks in the Republican Aurora, the reaction among the opposition was
vehement, and the treaty was rebuked in the press and at popular
meetings as a surrender of national honor to British insolence.
Throughout the entire episode the character of Jay was thoroughly vili-
fied, and Republicans repeatedly portrayed him as aristocratic and bi-
ased toward England.158
Republicans related almost every issue regarding the federal courts
to some overall conspiracy. The Federalists' claim of a French threat
was seen as a pretext to justify increased expenditures for the military
during the Adams Administration, which in turn was linked to the per-
sonal aspirations of Hamilton. 59 An increased defense establishment
required massive sums, a permanent bureaucracy (with Federalist pa-
tronage), and a federal court system to augment collection efforts. Op-
position could then be stifled by actions brought in federal court under
the common law or the Sedition Act.' 6"
Many of these apprehensions were plausible. Under the Sedition
Act, the mere "bad tendency" of an utterance was punisha-
ble e6 -including published criticism of the Administration or its
laws.16 2 Prosecutions under the Act were aimed at leading Republican
newspapers, causing a number to close.163 Membership in a Demo-
cratic Society was considered criminal because meetings were secret and
the organizations lambasted the government." One man was prose-
cuted for simply claiming that the Federalists had created a standing
army, 65 and others were indicted for petitioning to repeal the Sedition
Act. 66 No deportations occurred under the Alien Acts, yet their threat,
18 See D. STEWART, THE OPPOSITION PRESS OF THE FEDERALIST PERIOD 177-
235 (1969).
189 See id. at 281-83.
160 See L. BANNING, supra note 77, at 255-62, 264-67; Turner [now Preyer],
Federalist Policy and the Judiciary Act of 1801, 22 WM. & MARY Q. 3, 7-8 (1965).
161 See J. SMITH, FREEDOM'S FErERS: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION LAWS AND
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 145 (1956).
16" See N. SCHACHNER, THE FOUNDING FATHERS 465-66 (1954).
163 See L. BANNING, supra note 77, at 256-57.
164 See N. SCHACHNER, supra note 162, at 465.
165 See J. SMITH, supra note 161, at 380.
166 See L. BANNING, supra note 77, at 257.
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coupled with the seemingly real possibility of a declaration of war,
caused numerous French immigrants to leave the country.""
Further engendering hostility over the sedition actions was the
conduct of federal judges in those cases and others with political over-
tones. Charges of overt prejudice abounded against judges said to be
"[o]ften rude, frequently partisan or intemperate." ' Compounding the
animosity was the use by federal judges of grand jury charges as a
device to educate the public on matters they viewed as embracing com-
munity morality. Although the practice was not out of the ordinary for
this period, Federalist jurists took the opportunity in charges to voice
strong opinions on a variety of controversial subjects, and did not hesi-
tate to excoriate partisan rivals from the bench.169 Some openly partici-
pated in the campaigns of candidates for public office,170 and one sitting
federal judge was elected to the Massachusetts Senate.1 ' John Sulli-
van, the "President" of New Hampshire, refused to resign that post
after being appointed a federal district judge.'
7 2
Not all federal judges can fairly be accused of playing politics with
their offices.17 A sizeable amount of the berating that they received
reflected animosities toward courts in general.' 4 Other watchers of the
16 See id. at 255-56.
168 G. HASKINS, supra note 38, at 140; see also H. FORD, THE RISE AND
GROWTH OF AMERICAN POLrrIcs 112 (1898) (describing the actions of Federalist
judges as "an amazing exhibition of headlong and reckless partisanship").
169 See G. HASKINS, supra note 38, at 140, 160, 221-22. See also Charge to the
Grand Jury for the District of Virginia (Nov. 23, 1798) (Cushing, J.), reprinted in
Federal Gazette (Baltimore), Dec. 6, 1798 (protesting "the clamors of faction, the un-
accountable rage of PRETENDED PATRIOTS to subvert the government and general in-
terest of this country, . .. slandering all REAL PATRIOTS with whom the constitution
and the people have entrusted the management of their affairs . . . ."); Charge to the
Grand Jury for the District of North Carolina (June 1, 1798) (Iredell, J.), reprinted
in State Gazette of North Carolina (Edenton), July 4, 1798 (warning that "[w]e have a
government formed and calculated to cherish, and with the best Intentions to preserve
[peace and independence;] but in vain are all the efforts of the government if the people
do not co-operate each in his several station in its support.").
170 See G. HASKINS, supra note 38, at 161.
1I See D. STEWART, supra note 158, at 454. The Massachusetts Senate refused
to seat the judge-senator, David Sewall, after Republicans denounced a man serving
"two masters." Id.
'72 See id. at 453-54. Sullivan made matters worse in his case by claiming that the
New Hampshire Constitution was no longer in force after ratification of the federal
Constitution. Republicans attacked Sullivan's conclusion that the state was no longer
"sovereign and independent." Id.
171 See Presser, supra note 55, at 38 (noting Judge Richard Peters's "unwilling-
ness to embroil his district court in issues that would inflame popular opinion"). But
Peters was only partially successful, as his role in United States v. Worrall, see infra
text accompanying note 333, and the Bache libel cases, see infra text accompanying
note 352, demonstrate.
17, See F. AUMANN, supra note 151, at 173-189; G. HASKINS, supra note 38, at
156-57.
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judiciary rightly reacted against what Edmund Randolph called the
crudeness of the federal judiciary system. 1 " The practice of Supreme
Court justices riding circuit, for example, produced interminable de-
lays, cancellations, ana expenses to suitors.17 6 Still, the antipathy was
in large measure personal to the judges themselves and to the class they
represented. A man like Jefferson, long an advocate of a vigorous and
independent judiciary,17 7 would come, through observation of federal
judges in office, to call them "the subtle corps of sappers and
miners.1
17 8
III. A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE EARLY DEBATE OVER
FEDERAL COMMON-LAW AUTHORITY
Hostility to the invocation of common-law criminal jurisdiction by
federal courts became increasingly acute as the decade of the 1790's
unfolded. In the early years, there was little if any public notice of
these prosecutions.'7 In part, the lack of attention paid to these cases
was probably a function of the scarcity of criminal cases that were even
arguably within federal competence.1 80 Those that were, such as brib-
ery, counterfeiting, and piracy, would not have implicated defendants
who enjoyed public sympathy.
A review of grand jury charges by Justices on circuit reveals a
minimum of overt effort, until the middle of 1793, to push for indict-
ments without a statutory foundation. These charges were usually very
general, and the Justices often spent most of their effort on indoctrinat-
ing the citizenry about the political theory of America's new Constitu-
tion. Cast in extravagant language, the charges were also reminders of
the need for patriotic support of the national government.""
175 See Letter from Edmund Randolph to George Washington (Aug. 5, 1792),
reprinted in 10 THE WRITNGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 513 (J. Sparks ed. Boston
1836).
176 See G. HASKINS, supra note 38, at 161.
177 See R. ELLIS, supra note 71, at 26.
178 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Ritchie (Dec. 25, 1820), reprinted
in 12 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 177 (P. Ford ed. 1905).
179 See Presser, supra note 55, at 53-57.
180 During this period, federal judges often remarked on the scarcity of criminal
business for the grand juries. See Charge to the Grand Jury for the District of Pennsyl-
vania (Apr. 12, 1790) (Wilson, J.), reprinted in Pennsylvania Gazette (Philadelphia),
Apr. 14, 1790; Charge to the Grand Jury for the District of Georgia (Apr. 26, 1792)
(Iredell, J.), reprinted in Georgia Gazette (Savannah), May 3, 1792; Charge to the
Grand Jury for the District of Massachusetts (Oct. 12, 1792) (Iredell, J.), reprinted in
Columbian Centinel (Boston), Oct. 20, 1792.
181 See J. GorFL, supra note 59, at 620-21. Justice Jay's charges were usually
relatively short, and were accompanied by stern reminders of patriotic duty:
It cannot be too strongly impressed on the minds of us all how greatly our
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Justice Jay's charges spoke sweepingly of "all offences committed
against the law of the United States in this District, or on the high seas
by persons now in this District.1182 He instructed the jury to "[d]irect
your attention also to the conduct of the national 6fficers & let not any
corruptions, frauds, extortions or criminal negligences . . .pass unno-
ticed."18 In using such broad charges he apparently was including
common-law offenses; at the time he gave this charge, there were few
statutory crimes. Moreover, Jay voiced the expression that would soon
become the centerpiece of nonstatutory prosecutions: "[T]he laws of na-
tions make part of the laws of [the United States], and of every other
civilized nation."'" The jury responded with indictments for piracy,
which was not then a statutory offense."8 5
In contrast with Jay's approach, Justices Wilson and Iredell
would read or paraphrase the texts of criminal statutes to the juries.188
Nevertheless, Wilson did charge a grand jury on the law of treason
prior to the passage of the first treason statute.1 "' Like Jay, Justice
Wilson discussed the universal obligation imposed by the law of na-
tions, including maritime law, and stated that much of the law of na-
tions could not be altered by legislation or treaty because it was
individual prosperity depends on our national prosperity; and how greatly
our national prosperity depends on a well organized, vigorous government,
ruling by wise and equal laws, faithfully executed .. .[and] irrefutably
bearing down arbitrary power and licentiousness .....
Charge to the Grand Jury for the District of New York (Apr. 4, 1790), reprinted
in New Hampshire Gazette (Portsmouth), June 3, 1790. Both Iredell and Wilson, on
the other hand, were inclined toward lengthy and rather scholarly charges-with dis-
cussions of political theory and legal history, illustrated with numerous cites and quota-
tions. See, e.g., Charge to the Grand Jury for the District of Virginia (May 23, 1791)
(Wilson, J.) [original at Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.; copy on file with the
University of Pennsylvania Law Review]; Charge to the Grand Jury for the District of
Georgia (Oct. 17, 1791) (Iredell, J.), reprinted in Augusta Chronicle, Oct. 22, 1791;
Charge to Grand Jury for the District of Maryland (May 7, 1793) (Iredell, J.), re-
printed in 2 LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES IREDELL 386-94 (G. McRee ed.
New York 1857).
18 Charge to Grand Jury for the District of New York (Apr. 4, 1790), supra
note 181.
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 The defendants were convicted, whipped and imprisoned. See J. GOsEL,
supra note 59, at 622-23. Justice Cushing and Judge James Duane sat with Jay. See
id. at 622.
18 See, e.g., Charge to the Grand Jury for the District of Pennsylvania (Feb. 21,
1791) (Wilson, J.), reprinted in General Advertiser (Philadelphia), Mar. 15-17, 1791;
Charge to the Grand Jury for the District of Georgia (Oct. 17, 1791), supra note 181.
167 See Charge to the Grand Jury for the District of Pennsylvania (Apr. 20,
1790), supra note 180. Treason was codified in An Act for the Punishment of Certain
Crimes against the United States on April 30, 1790, 1 Stat. 112, § 1.
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grounded "in principles of natural law." 8' Wilson further noted that
to obtain the definitions of particular statutory crimes, the jurors should
refer to the "pre-existing law . . . the COMMON LAW" by which they
could "ascertain, with precision, the true nature and qualities of such
facts and transactions as shall become the objects of your consideration
and research."18 9
Of the grand jury charges preserved from this period, only those of
Justice Iredell appear expressly to exclude the use of nonstatutory pros-
ecutions in federal courts. He pointedly told the grand jurors that
"crimes committed against the United States . . . are defined, and the
punishments prescribed, in certain Acts of Congress, passed in virtue of
powers contained in the Constitution of the United States."' 90 In an-
other charge he asserted that "it is peculiarly proper that the right of
defining, and prescribing the punishment of such crimes should be
vested in the Legislature . *...""' ' He even applied this "same obser-
vation . . . to other violations of the Law of Nations as well as the
particular instances of piracies and felonies committed on the high
seas .... "192
Justice Iredell would soon change his tune on this matter." 8
Whatever reservations his colleagues on the federal bench may have felt
on the question of federal common-law crimes, most would put them
aside and endorse this type of prosecution. Not coincidentally, they
would do so in cases that implicated hotly contested political issues.
Debate over the common-law powers of the federal judiciary intensified
after 1797 when the question came to be associated with the Sedition
18 Charge to Grand Jury for the District of Virginia (May 23, 1791), supra note
181, at 16.
189 Id. at 13-14. Wilson gave the jurors numerous references to English authori-
ties and cases to describe the elements of certain offenses. See also Charge to Grand
Jury for District of Pennsylvania (Feb. 21, 1791), supra note 186 ("To the Common
Law, then, recourse must be had for the definition and description of those crimes
which have been mentioned . . . ."). In both charges, Wilson called the question of
what law to refer to as "of immense importance and extent" and said that he could not
"assign [his] reasons for [his] answer . . . to the COMMON LAW." Id., reprinted in
General Advertiser (Philadelphia), March 16, 1791; Charge to Grand Jury for the
District of Virginia (May 23, 1791), supra note 181, at 13.
190 Charge to the Grand Jury of the District of Massachusetts (Oct. 12, 1792),
supra note 180.
19' Charge to Grand Jury for the District of Maryland (May 7, 1793), supra
note 181.
192 Id.
... See Charge to the Grand Jury of the District of South Carolina (May 12,
1794), reprinted in Gazette of the United States (Philadelphia), June 12-14, 1794 (ex-
plaining that although he once had doubts, he was now convinced that federal courts
could exercise jurisdiction over common-law prosecutions); infra notes 248-50 and ac-
companying text.
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Act and the expansion of the federal court system under the short-lived
1801 Judiciary Act. But the origin of the controversy is earlier than
these events. It first emerged as a rallying point for the nascent opposi-
tion when the Washington Administration used nonstatutory prosecu-
tions to further foreign policy objectives.
A. Beginning the Debate on Federal Common Law
1. The Neutrality Controversy
During 1793, Washington was struggling to maintain America's
neutrality in the ongoing European war, a goal shared by many leaders
of the opposition."" Americans were generally inclined to be sympa-
thetic to France and hostile to Great Britain, sentiments manifested by
activities ranging from street protests to active assistance for the
French. Republican newspapers raged against American impotence in
the face of British naval transgressions and the purported incitement by
the British of Indian attacks on the frontier. 9
Although Washington formally declared the country's noninvolve-
ment on April 22, 1793,198 the French Minister to the United
States-the outrageous Edmond 0. ("Citizen") GeriEt-actively en-
listed Americans for the new Republic's cause. Among other schemes,
Gent commissioned privateers out of Charleston to cruise against ves-
sels of France's rivals in the war,' and he authorized the local French
consul to hold proceedings against captured prizes.'98 Reacting quickly,
Britain's minister to the United States, George Hammond, wrote
Thomas Jefferson (then Secretary of State) on May 8 to complain of
the privateering. 19 Although Hamilton advised Washington on May
15 that under the law of nations "[f]oreign recruiters are hanged im-
mediately, and very justly," the Secretary of Treasury recommended
19 For accounts of the neutrality controversy and the Washington Administra-
tion's handling of relations with the European powers, see generally G. LYCAN, ALEX-
ANDER HAMILTON & AMERICAN FOREIGN PoLIcY 206-25 (1970), and C. THOMAS,
supra note 32, at 13-52.
195 See D. STEWART, supra note 158, at 143-58, 177-87.
1 For the text of the proclamation, see 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN
RELATIONS, supra note 105, at 140.
197 See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Gouverneur Morris (Aug. 16, 1793),
reprinted in 4 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 32-33 (H. Washington ed.
New York 1856); C. THOMAS, supra note 32, at 118-20.
198 See G. LYCAN, supra note 194, at 146; C. THOMAS, supra note 32, at 206-07.
Gen~t also recruited Americans for military action against the Spanish in Louisiana
and Florida. See G. LYCAN, supra note 194, at 146; C. THOMAS, supra note 32, at
180.
19 See Letter from George Hammond to Thomas Jefferson (May 8, 1793), re-
printed in Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099, 1100 n.1 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6360).
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only that restitution of seized vessels be ordered and appropriate assur-
ances be given to the British.200 The same day Jefferson sent two let-
ters, one of which was a note to the United States Attorney in Philadel-
phia that was accompanied by reports of prizes being taken to that
city.2' Referring to alleged participation of American citizens in the
Gent-instigated captures, Jefferson expressed "the desire of the gov-
ernment, that [the United States Attorney] would take such measures
for apprehending and prosecuting them as shall be according to
law."20 2 He also replied to Hammond that the United States
condemns in the highest degree the conduct of any of our
citizens, who may personally engage in committing hostilities
at sea against any of the nations, parties to the present war,
and will exert all the means with which the laws and consti-
tution have armed them to discover such as offend herein
and bring them to condign punishment. 03
Despite Jefferson's partiality for the French cause, his correspon-
dence evidently was more than the mere fulfilling of the President's
bidding. He wanted noninvolvement, yet he was uncomfortable with
this position. Remaining neutral played directly into Hamilton's hand
since his economic program depended upon vigorous trade with Britain,
and implied a weakening of American support for France ..04 Mean-
while, Federalists were making much of Gent's plottings, and accused
those criticizing the neutrality declaration of attacking the widely ven-
erated figure of Washington. Actually many were attacking Washing-
200 See Letter from Alexander Hamilton to George Washington (May 15, 1793),
reprinted in 4 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 410, 415 (H. Lodge ed.
1904); see also C. THOMAS, supra note 32, at 168-69.
201 See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Rawle (May 15, 1793), re-
printed in Henfield's Case, 11 F. Gas. 1099, 1101 n.1 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6360).
202 Id.
20 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Hammond (May 15, 1793), re-
printed in 6 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 252-53 (P. Ford ed. 1895). That
day Jefferson sent Hammond's complaint to Jean de Ternant, Gent's predecessor as
French Minister to the United States; Jefferson cautioned the French ambassador:
"[w]e will exert all the means with which the laws and constitution have armed us, to
discover such offenders and bring them to condign punishment." Letter from Thomas
Jefferson to Jean de Ternant (May 15, 1793), reprinted in 1 AMERICAN STATE PA-
PERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 105, at 147-48. He also warned against
French consuls exercising prize jurisdiction, stating that this "could not be deemed an
act of indifference." Id. at 147.
204 See D. MALONE, supra note 115, at 69-73. Although Jefferson questioned the
propriety of a "neutrality" declaration, which he thought was Congress's responsibility,
he was nevertheless satisfied by the omission of the word "neutrality" from the procla-
mation. See id. at 69-70; see also G. LYCAN, supra note 194, at 164-67 (explaining
Jefferson's fears that strong action against the French might lead to war with that
nation).
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ton, in the form of demonstrations organized by Democratic Clubs that
assembled in the open air of Philadelphia in 1793 and 1794 to de-
nounce the Administration. Years later, when almost an octogenarian,
John Adams reminisced (and exaggerated) to Jefferson that, according
to friends in Philadelphia, only the outbreak of yellow fever in the cap-
ital "saved the United States from a fatal revolution." ' 5
Recognizing that Gen& "will sink the republican interest if they
do not abandon him,"20 6 Jefferson wanted to disassociate himself and
the country from Americans privateering for France. He realized, how-
ever, that no statute in this country prohibited such activities. Gen&
told him so directly in a letter of June 22, 1793: "Do not punish the
brave individuals of your nation, who arrange themselves under our
banner, knowing perfectly well, that no law of the United States gives
to the Government the sad power of arresting their zeal by acts of
rigor. '20 7 Disregarding the French minister's request, Jefferson wrote
James Monroe on July 14 that "the case is punishable, and that, if
found otherwise, Congress ought to make it so ... "208 Explaining
his position, Jefferson said to Monroe:
Treaties are law. By the treaty with England we are in a
state of peace with her. He who breaks that peace, if within
our jurisdiction, breaks the laws, and is punishable by them.
And if he is punishable he ought to be punished, because no
citizen should be free to commit his country to war.209
25 Letter from John Adams to Thomas Jefferson (June 30, 1813), reprinted in
10 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, SECOND PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 47
(C. Adams ed. Boston 1856). For an account of the various street disturbances in Phila-
delphia, see generally G. LYCAN, supra note 194, at 173-74. Adams wrote that
"Washington's house was surrounded by an innumerable multitude, from day to day,
hurraing, demanding war against England, cursing Washington, and crying success to
the French Patriots and virtuous republicans." CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN HON.
JOHN ADAMS AND THE LATE WM. CUNNINGHAM, ESQ. 36 (E. Cunningham ed. Bos-
ton 1823), quoted in F. WHARTON, supra note 91, at 5 n.*. Francis Wharton com-
mented that, based on statements of William Rawle, "it appears that, so far as the
'innumerable multitude' is concerned, Mr. Adams' memory had failed him, yet there is
no doubt that in the material point involved, the great party violence of the day, the
statement was correct." See F. WHARTON, supra note 91, at 5 n.*; see also Howe,
supra note 65, at 147-48 & n.4 (noting a letter from John Adams to Thomas Jefferson
in which Adams recalled that Washington smuggled arms into his home in response to
the presence of mobs in the streets).
'0' Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Aug. 3, 1793), reprinted in
7 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 464 (P. Ford ed. 1904); see also L. BANNING,
supra note 77, at 217-18.
207 Letter from Edmond C. Gen~t to Thomas Jefferson (June 22, 1793), re-
printed in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 105, at 156.
208 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe (July 14, 1793), reprinted in
4 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 19 (H. Washington ed. New York 1856).
209 Id. at 18.
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This stance, he remarked, "coincided with all our private opinions; and
the lawyers of this State [Pennsylvania], New York and Maryland,
who were applied to, were unanimously of the same opinion. "210
The Administration's posture on neutrality violations outlined in
Jefferson's correspondence had already been enunciated by Chief Jus-
tice Jay, who had charged a federal grand jury in Richmond on May
22 that the United States was bound under the law of nations to honor
its treaty commitments and that these required the country to remain
uninvolved in the European conflict. 211 It would be "criminal and
wicked," he declared, for Americans to engage in hostilities: "[T]hey
who commit, aid, or abet hostilities . . .offend against the laws of the
United States, and ought to be punished . *.".., Included in the
"laws" of the United States, he stressed, were treaties, the law of na-
tions, the Constitution, and statutes of the United States.2"3 The thrust
of Jay's remarks was that violators of neutrality harmed the nation it-
self, since "[t]he peace, prosperity, and reputation of the United States,
will always greatly depend on their fidelity to their engagements.1
21 4
The High Federalist Jay was certainly aware that the Republican
press had been railing against the Neutrality Proclamation; the Na-
tional Gazette, only a week before, had accused the Administration of
deserting the cause of liberty (and went on to urge an invasion of Can-
ada).215 In part, Jay's grand jury charge appears to be an answer to
these critics:
[I]n every nation individuals will always be found who, im-
pelled by avarice or ambition, or by both, will not hesitate to
210 Id. at 19. Jefferson wrote Genet on June 17, 1793:
For our citizens then to commit murders and depredations on the members
of nations at peace with us, or to combine to do it, appeared to the Execu-
tive, and to those whom they consulted, as much against the laws of the
land, as to murder or rob, or combine to murder or rob, its own citizens;
and as much to require punishment, if done within their limits, where
they have a territorial jurisdiction, or on the high seas, where they have a
personal jurisdiction, that is to say, one which reaches their own citizens
only ....
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmond C. Gen~t (June 17, 1793), reprinted in 1
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 105, at 155.
211 Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099, 1102-03 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6360)
(Grand Jury Charge of Jay, Circuit Justice C.C.D. Va. 1793).
212 Id. at 1103-04.
212 See id. at 1100-01.
214 See id. at 1101. See also id. at 1103 (" 'If a sovereign who might keep his
subjects within the rules of justice and peace, suffers them to injure a foreign nation,
either in its body or its members, he does no less injury to that nation than if he injured
them himself'" (quoting a "celebrated writer on the law of nations")).
215 See L. BANNING, supra note 77, at 212 (quoting National Gazette (Philadel-
phia), May 15, 1793).
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gratify those passions. at the expense of the blood and tears
even of those who are free from blame. Such men are to be
restrained only by fear of punishment. . . . It is not certain
that the irritability of the belligerent powers, combined with
some indiscretions on our part, will not involve us in war
with some of them. Prudence directs us to look forward to
such an event, and to endeavor not only to avert, but also to
be prepared for it. Among our preparations, there can be
none more important than union and harmony among our-
selves. It is very desirable, that such an event do [sic] not find
us divided into parties, and particularly into parties in fa-
vour of either foreign nation. Should this be the case, our
situation would be dangerous as well as disgraceful. . . . [I]t
is sincerely to be wished that our citizens will cheerfully and
punctually do their duty to every other nation, but at the
same time carefully avoid becoming partisans of any of them.
There is not a history of any nation which does not record
the mischiefs they experience from such parties, and they
rarely present us with an instance of a nation being con-
quered and subjugated, without the detestable aid of its own
degenerate or deluded citizens. [I]f such parties should arise
among the people, they will find their way into every depart-
ment of government, and carry distrust and discord with
them-dark and dreary would then be the prospect before
us, and we should in vain look for the speedy return of those
happy days, when the government was peacefully, wisely
and prosperously administered, under the care and auspices
of a patriot, in whom the United States have by repeated
unanimity in their suffrages, manifested a degree of confi-
dence, no less reputable to their own wisdom and virtue than
to his. 216
Some decoding is needed to catch the full spirit of these words. A
reference to "parties" was aimed at those disparaging the "patriot"
who had pronounced the neutrality. More basic was a concern for par-
tisan division, which during the Revolution had been acknowledged re-
peatedly as a disease on the polity.217 Jay would have also reminded
listeners that faction and dissension were widely perceived as prime
flaws in the Confederation. 21 8 Similarly, John Adams had warned that
2 Henfield's Case, 11 F. Gas. 1099, 1104-05 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6360).
217 See G. WOOD, supra note 68, at 58-59.
218 As Gordon Wood explains:
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republics must always be wary of the inevitable tendency for parties to
rise."" In short, Jay triply accused Republicans-whose political
strength in Congress was substantial by now-of disloyalty to the
Revolution, the Constitution, and to Washington himself. And he insin-
uated that partisan division would find its "way into every department
of government"- an undisguised reference to the rift between Hamil-
ton on the one hand, and Jefferson and Madison on the other.
22 0
Many were now prepared to conclude that the great danger to republican-
ism was not magisterial tyranny or aristocratic dominance but "faction,
dissension, and consequent subjection of the minority to the caprice and
arbitrary decisions of the majority, who instead of consulting the interest
of the whole community collectively, attend sometimes to partial and local
advantages." Indeed, it was this factious majoritarianism, an anomalous
and frightening conception for republican government, . . . that was at
the center of the Federalist perception of politics.
Id. at 502 (quoting Francis Corbin, Virginia Convention, 3 ELLOT'S DEBATES, supra
note 138, at 107).
2 9 See 3 J. ADAMS, A DEFENCE OF THE CONSTrrUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 432-33 (Philadelphia 1787). As a revolutionary,
Adams had led his generation in espousing hopes for the "regenerative effects of repub-
lican government" on public virtue. See G. WOOD, supra note 68, at 570. Though he
then thought that education and spirited leadership could bring out the best in a repub-
lican people, by the late 1780's he was convinced "of the viciousness of his country-
men." Id. at 571. Adams spoke increasingly on the inherent division in society between
the interests of the few and the many, a view that was steadily gaining adherents. See
id. at 576. In the Defence, Adams wrote that "[tihe people, in all nations, are naturally
divided into two sorts, the gentlemen and the simplemen," the distinction being based
on whether the person had obtained a "liberal education," as opposed to knowledge of
"trades or pursuits." 3 J. ADAMS, supra, at 458. Although education was not the ex-
clusive province of the wealthy, "generally those who are rich, and descended from
families in public life, will have the best education in arts and sciences, and therefore
the gentlemen will ordinarily . . . be the richer, and born of more noted families." Id.
at 457-58. This division "produces resentments and jealousies, contempt, hatred, and
fear . . . . [T]he common people endeavour to make friends, patrons, and protectors,
among the gentlemen. This produces parties, divisions, tumults, and war .... Id. at
459.
Adams argued that social division was desirable in a properly constructed state,
and he perceived the British system as such a state: "[W]hen the three natural orders in
society, the high, the middle, and the low [monarchy, aristocracy, commons], are all
represented in the government, and constitutionally placed to watch each other, and
restrain each other mutually by the laws, it is then only that an emulation takes place
for the public good, and divisions turn to the advantage of the nation." 2 J. ADAMS,
supra, at 130; see also Corwin, supra note 74, at 520 (observing that Adams' work is
both an "exhortation to constitutional reform," and a warning of the dangers presented
to the republic by the "rise of parties").
220 A more fundamentally divisive issue lay in Jay's commentary. Even Adams
had acknowledged the inevitability of partisan politics-the question was what to do
about it. Madison's solution, expressed at the Convention, was "to enlarge the sphere"
of government and "thereby divide the community into so great a number of interests &
parties," such that no majority would "have a common interest separate from that of
the whole," or "be apt to unite in the pursuit of it." 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 136 (M. Farrand ed. 1911) (June 6, 1787). While Madison
would later view "states' rights" as the primary vehicle for achieving such pluralism,
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Meanwhile, preparations were underway for prosecutions in Phil-
adelphia. In May, two Americans-Gideon Henfield and John Single-
tary-were arrested in that city's port while on board the Genat-com-
missioned privateer, Citoyen Gent. They allegedly had served on the
vessel (Henfield as prize master) while it brought a British prize into
Philadelphia. Gent promptly protested that the "crime laid to their
charge, the crime which my mind cannot conceive, and which my pen
almost refuses to state, is the serving of France, and defending with her
children the common and glorious cause of liberty." '221 Jefferson re-
sponded to Gen&t's plea for "the immediate releasement of the .. .
officers" 222 by coolly (and disingenuously) observing that the matter
was in the hands "of the civil magistrate, over whose proceedings the
Executive has no control." 223 Only the day before, Jefferson had re-
ceived Attorney General Edmund Randolph's formal opinion on the
case:
Henfield is punishable, because treaties are the supreme law
of the land; and by treaties with three of the Powers at war
with France, it is stipulated, that there shall be a peace be-
tween their subjects and the citizens of the United
States. . . .He is indictable at the common law, because his
conduct comes within the description of disturbing the peace
of the United States.224
Henfield's Case225 had evidently been slated as the Administration's
Federalists were inclined to see the solution in a strong, united federal government. As
Jay had written in The Federalist, an efficient federal government, which attracted the
"best men in the country" to participate in it, "will be more wise, systematical and
judicious, than those of individual States, and consequently more satisfactory with re-
spect to other nations, as well as more safe with respect to us." THE FEDERALIST No.
3, at 15 (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
22 Letter from Edmond C. Genet to Thomas Jefferson (June 1, 1793), reprinted
in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 105, at 151.
22 See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmond C. Genet (June 1, 1793), re-
printed in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 105, at 151.
Jefferson subsequently wrote Genet on June 5 relaying the President's request that the
privateers "depart from the ports of the United States." Letter from Thomas Jefferson
to Edmond C. Genet (June 5, 1793), reprinted in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS, supra note 105, at 150. He advised "that it is the right of every
nation to prohibit acts of sovereignty from being exercised by any other within its lim-
its, and the duty of a neutral nation to prohibit such as would injure one of the warring
Powers." Id.
22 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmond C. Genet (June 1, 1793), reprinted
in I AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 105, at 150.
224 Opinion of the Attorney General (May 30, 1793) (submitted to the Secretary
of State), reprinted in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note
105, at 152.
225 11 F. Cas. 1099 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6360).
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test case for neutrality prosecutions.226
On July 27, 1793, Justice Wilson called a special federal grand
jury to investigate the matter. His charge was in form a learned, rather
disconnected discourse, which among other things outlined the develop-
ment of the common law throughout English history. Wilson also man-
aged to answer some of these questions that Washington had put to the
Court only nine days earlier,22 and which Chief Justice Jay would
formally decline to answer on August S.22'
No offense was detailed as to its elements, but Wilson indicated
that capturing British prizes was an infraction against the law of na-
tions (which he said was based on natural law) and a violation of a
citizen's duty to the United States. Under the former the United States
was obligated not to lend the use of its ports to privateers, and this law
of nations was binding on country and citizen alike. If the United
States refused to prosecute violators, reprisals might be expected, war
would be probable, and millions of people would be affected. No citizen
could be allowed to place the country at this risk: "The constitution of
the United States says no," inasmuch as the powers of war and grant-
ing letters of marque and reprisal were lodged exclusively in
Congress. 229
Five days after Wilson's charge, Henfield was indicted. The in-
228 See C. THOMAS, supra note 32, at 173. The Administration had planned in
advance to use prosecutions for the implementation of the policies behind the Neutrality
Proclamation. Jefferson wrote Attorney General Randolph on May 8, 1793, two weeks
after the Proclamation was issued:
The Judges having notice of the proclamation, will perceive that the oc-
currence of a foreign war has brought into activity the laws of neutrality,
as a part of the law of the land. This new branch of the law they will
know needs explanation to the grand juries more than any other. They
will study & define the subjects to them & to the public. . . . It will be
easy to suggest this matter to the attention of the judges, & that alone puts
the whole machine into motion.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmund Randolph (May 8, 1793), reprinted in 7
THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 318 (P. Ford ed. 1904). Julius Goebel com-
mented that this passage gives "reason to believe that the content of [Jay's] charge had
been the result of some conferring with members of the executive department." J. GoE-
BEL, supra note 59, at 624.
2217 See Henfield, 11 F. Cas. at 1105-09; see also J. GOEBEL, supra note 59, at
626 ("Iredell's general charge of June 2, 1794, was even more responsive" to the ques-
tions on neutrality submitted to the Court.)
'2 See J. GOEBEL, supra note 59, at 626 n.68 (explaining that Jay's refusal was
"grounded in the separation of powers and in the impropriety of extrajudicial decision
of the questions proferred"); Letter from Chief Justice John Jay and Associate Justices
to George Washington, Aug. 8, 1793, reprinted in 3 THE CORRESPONDENCE AND
PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY 488-89 (H. Johnston ed. 1891).
229 See Henfield, 11 F. Cas. at 1108 (Grand Jury Charge of Wilson, Circuit
Justice).
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dictment appears to have been drawn by the United States Attorney,
William Rawle, the Attorney General, Edmund Randolph, and the
Secretary of Treasury, Alexander Hamilton.23 0 It asserted that
Henfield had violated various treaties that the United States had with
France's European enemies; he was charged several times with infring-
ing the law of nations, and each count ended by claiming that his deeds
were in violation of the laws and Constitution of the United States, as
well as "against the peace and dignity of the said United States." '
Henfield was tried before Justices Wilson and Iredell, and District
Judge Richard Peters. After listening to the defense (financed by Ge-
nei)23 2 presented by three prominent lawyers associated with Republi-
can causes-Peter Du Ponceau, Jared Ingersoll, and Jonathan Dickin-
son Sergeant 2"--the judges instructed the jury of their unanimous
opinion that the defendant's "acts of hostility . . . [were] an offence
against this country, and punishable by its laws." 2 In regard to the
defense's contention that there was no law defining the crime, Wilson
gave the court's conclusion to the jury:
It has been asked by his counsel, in their address to you,
against what law has he offended? The answer is, against
many and binding laws. As a citizen of the United States, he
was bound to act no part which could injure the nation; he
was bound to keep the peace in regard to all nations with
whom we are at peace. This is the law of nations; not an ex
post facto law, but a law that was in existence long before
Gideon Henfield existed. There are, also, positive laws, ex-
isting previous to the offence committed, and expressly de-
clared to be part of the supreme law of the land. The consti-
tution of the United States has declared that all treaties
made, or to be made, under the authority of the United
States, shall be part of the supreme law of the land. I will
state to you, gentlemen, so much of the several treaties in
force between America and any of the powers at war with
France, as applies to the present case.2' 5
Summarizing the various treaties involved, the court stressed that these
230 A draft of the indictment appears in the handwriting of Randolph, with mar-
ginal corrections "apparently" by Hamilton. See Henfield, 11 F. Cas. at 1115 n.3.
231 Id. at 1109-15.
282 See C. THOMAS, supra note 32, at 171.
23 See D. MALONE, supra note 115, at 120. At the time, Ingersoll was Attorney
General of Pennsylvania.
234 Henfield, 11 F. Gas. at 1120.
235 Id.
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"'were in the most public, the most notorious existence, before the act
for which the prisoner is indicted was committed."'2 3
Henfield was acquitted by the jury, much to the chagrin of the
Administration, which worried that the verdict would be taken by the
English as a sign that private Americans could aid the French with
impunity. Gen& indeed proclaimed exactly that, while he busily contin-
ued to recruit Americans to the French cause-even to the point of
taking out advertisements in newspapers.23 7 On August 16, 1793, Jef-
ferson wrote Gouverneur Morris, the American Minister to England,
in part to rebut the claims being made by Gen&t that "no law of the
United States authorizes their government to restrain either its own cit-
izens or the foreigners inhabiting its territory, from warring against the
enemies of France. '23 ' He enclosed copies of Jay's and Wilson's grand
jury charges and gave an account of Randolph's "official opinion" on
the case, all of which established that these actions were "punishable by
law. ' 2 9 With respect to the acquittal, Jefferson ventured that Henfield
was absolved on the facts-arguably the defendant had "been ignorant
of the unlawfulness of his undertaking," and in any event he was a
man who "had rendered meritorious services during the late war" and
now showed "real contrition" for his actions.240
236 Id. The conduct of the Henfield judges in declaring the defendant guilty was
not an isolated occurrence. In one of the Whiskey Rebellion trials, for example, Justice
Paterson summarized the evidence against one John Mitchell for the crime of high
treason; he then concluded: "Upon the whole, . . .the prisoner must be pronounced
guilty. The consequences are not to weigh with the jury: it is their province to do
justice; the attribute of mercy is placed by our constitution in other hands." United
States v. Mitchell, 26 F. Cas. 1277, 1282 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795) (No. 15,788). Mitchell
was then convicted, but subsequently pardoned. See id.
237 See G. LYCAN, supra note 194, at 163-64.
238 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Gouverneur Morris, reprinted in 4 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 38 (H. Washington ed. New York 1856).
239 See id.
240 See id. There is some plausibility to Jefferson's account as Henfield appar-
ently testified that his motive for service on the privateer was to gain passage to Phila-
delphia-where the prize was brought. When he went before the magistrate in Phila-
delphia, Henfield declared his lack of knowledge of Washington's proclamation and
protested that he would not have served if he knew it was contrary to the President's
wishes; he professed to being "an American, that as such he would die." See Henfield,
11 F. Cas. at 1116. On the other hand, there is evidence that the jury may have been
swayed by the possibility that Henfield had relinquished his American citizenship prior
to the capture. See id. at 1122. A month after his first appearance before the magis-
trate, Henfield "declared he had espoused the cause of France, that he now considered
himself as a Frenchman, and meant to move his family within their dominions." Id. at
1116. Throughout the trial, Gent referred to Henfield and John Singletary, who was
captured with him, as "officers in the service of the Republic of France," id. at 1123
n.7, and Henfield promptly re-enlisted for privateering duty after his acquittal. See G.
LYCAN, supra note 194, at 163. Henfield was then captured by the British. See
Henfield, 11 F. Cas. at 1123 n.7.
It is also possible that the jurors were coerced into making their decision, see 1 C.
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Whatever the actual explanation for the jury's decision, the Re-
publican press greeted the acquittal with what John Marshall later
called "extravagant marks of joy and exultation. '241 Federalists were
accused of "introducing motives of policy" into "the decisions of our
courts," and as Marshall recorded, the Republican newspapers "uni-
versally asked, 'what law had been offended, and under what statute
was the indictment supported?' ",242 This was distinctly a party reac-
tion. Francis Wharton's account of the case notes that, although the
case "was not reviewed by the court in banc, . . . the ruling of the
court at the trial . . .received the assent . . .of all the judges of the
Supreme Court but one. Chief Justice Jay . . .announce[d] the juris-
diction in advance with great solemnity, in a charge which exhibit[ed]
grave deliberation.12 4 Nevertheless, Washington's address to Congress
the following December contained a plea to extend federal jurisdiction
over Americans acting in violation of the country's neutrality.2 44 By
June of 1794 Congress had complied with Washington's request,
24 5
WARREN, supra note 38, at 144 n.1; Presser, supra note 55, at 55; alternatively, the
jurors may have been influenced by French sympathizers who were on the jury, see id.
at 55-56.
241 Henfield, 11 F. Cas. at 1123 n.7 (quoting J. MARSHALL, LIFE OF WASHING-
TON 273-74 (Philadelphia 1807)).
242 Id. Marshall thought that prosecutions of this sort were constitutional. See
infra appendix.
I F. WHARTON, supra note 91, at 87 n.*, reprinted in Henfield, 11 F. Cas. at
1122 n.6. Wharton did not document his conclusion about the Justices' near unanimous
opinion-beyond the obvious that Jay, Iredell and Wilson were in favor of jurisdiction.
Nor was Wharton alive at the time to have received direct accounts of the case. We do
know, however, that Justice William Cushing had already participated with Jay in a
trial for piracy, in which the charges were justified in part under the law of nations.
See supra note 185. As for Justice William Paterson, there is an undated entry in a
section of his papers entitled "Opinions on the Bench" that reads:
Suppose the U[nited] States to be at peace with G[reat] Britain and
'France, while they are at war with each other; and that, during such a
state of things, a citizen of the U[nited] S[tates] should enlist in the army
of G[reat] Britain and faight ag[ains]t France. This is an offence-How?
By the law of nations, or, in other words, by the common law, which
comprehends the law of nations. It is too an offence arising under the
const[itutio]n, as distinct from an offence arising under the law of the
U[nited] States; because we have no stat[ute] on the subject. How is it to
be proceeded ag[ainsit and punished? By indict[men]t at com[mon] law,
which, on conviction, annexes a sanction or penalty of a fine and
imprisonment.
W. Paterson, William Paterson Papers 1783-1804, at 563 [original in New York Pub-
lic Library; copy on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review]. This must
have been written prior to June 1794 when the neutrality statute was passed, see infra
note 245.
244 See 2 P. SMrrH, JOHN ADAMS 842-43 (1963).
243 See Act of June 5, 1794, ch. 50, 1 Stat. 381, repealed by Act of April 20, 1818,
ch. 88, 3 Stat. 450.
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and prosecutions soon followed.2 6
2. The Common Law and the Nature of Judicial Power
Henfield represents an important dividing point in the history of
the federal common law. Cases had previously been entertained by fed-
eral judges without statutory basis, but Henfield was the first that re-
quired extensive justification. Furthermore, the prosecution drew the
approval of a wide range of important political figures, from Hamilton
and Jay to Jefferson and Randolph. For some supporters, the neutral-
ity cases would require a reformulation of previously held beliefs on
federal judicial power. A good example is Justice Iredell, who had been
insisting to grand juries as late as May 1793 that federal criminal in-
dictments be supported by statute.""7 One year later, Iredell informed a
grand jury in Columbia, South Carolina, that citizens were indictable
under the law of nations for acting in violation of the Neutrality Proc-
lamation. After confessing to having doubted at one time the propriety
of such actions, he advised that in light of the "very able arguments in
an important case," prosecutions are "maintainable for such of-
fences . . ., though no act of Congress expressly prescribes
it . . ,248
Iredell was undoubtedly referring to Henfield. The events sur-
rounding that case had exposed for him "the ridiculous and contempti-
248 See, e.g., United States v. Guinet, 26 F. Cas. 53 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795) (No.
15,270). In Guinet two individuals were found guilty of "fitting out and arming" a
vessel for use against the British. Justice Paterson's jury charge interpreted the evidence
in a manner heavily favorable to the prosecution. See id. at 57-58. In its argument, the
defense alluded to a Boston grand jury's refusal to indict persons for similar acts in
service to France; it is not clear from the report whether this refusal to indict occurred
before Congress authorized neutrality violation prosecutions. See id. at 55.
247 See supra text accompanying notes 190-92.
248 Charge to Grand Jury for the District of South Carolina (May 12, 1794),
reprinted in Gazette of the United States (Philadelphia), June 14, 1794. Iredell
continued:
Consequently, if there be a principle in the Common Law (as there un-
questionably is) which subjects a man to a public prosecution for a con-
tempt of his duty to the community, this must be understood as one of
those cases comprehended within that class of public offences, and may be
proceeded against accordingly.
Id. Iredell repeated this position in a 1796 charge. See Charge to the Grand Jury for
the District of Pennsylvania (Apr. 12, 1796), reprinted in Claypoole's American Daily
Advertiser (Philadelphia), Apr. 18, 1796. But he preferred legislatively declared crimes;
he told a grand jury in 1797 that the neutrality act had "substitute[d] a precise and
positive direction as to punishments" for the common-law offence, which was "too
vague and indefinite to be regarded with equal confidence and respect." Charge to the
Grand Jury for the District of Pennsylvania (Apr. 11, 1797), reprinted in Philadelphia
Gazette, Apr. 17, 1797.
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ble spectacle"2 49 of citizens betraying the neutrality policy of the coun-
try. Iredell described the issue as simply a question of "what reason
dictates, that attribute which the Almighty has bestowed upon all man-
kind for the ultimate guide and director of their conduct."25 This ex-
pression, however, was a perfectly ordinary way for judges in the mid-
dle 1790's to characterize their activity. Iredell and the other judges
associated with Henfield were involved in a situation that required
them to formulate and defend constitutional principles about judicial
power while carrying out an immediate political task.
The subsequent history of federal common-law jurisdiction before
Hudson is an interplay of political motivations and theoretical constitu-
tional arguments. To appreciate the essential forces that would shape
the controversies in the years to come, it is necessary to pause momen-
tarily from the chronological account to discuss how the issue of the
common law was related to the subject of federal judicial power in
Henfield.
Wilson's grand jury charge in Henfield reveals a theory of law
that would prove to be remarkably resilient in American legal thought.
The case technically did not involve a "common-law" crime-if that
expression is taken to mean the nonstatutory law of Great Britain.
25 1
Wilson's charge should be read as enunciating a theory of common-law
adjudication, a means by which judges-who were usually unguided by
statutes-would arrive at a conclusion. He saw the common law as a
"social system of jurisprudence," which "receives other laws and sys-
tems into a friendly correspondence."25 After reciting this passage,
Wilson turned to the law of nations, which he labeled "[t]he law of
nature when applied to states or political societies."2 5 Sandwiched in
between these two statements is a telling observation on the sources of
law and their proper choice:
Does a contract bear a peculiar reference to the local laws of
any particular foreign country? By the local laws of that for-
eign country the common law will direct the contract to be
2. See Charge to the Grand Jury of the District of South Carolina (May 12,
1794), reprinted in Gazette of the United States (Philadelphia), June 12, 1794.
250 Id.
251 See J. GOEBEL, supra note 59, at 626-27; Anonymous, The Extent to Which
the Common Law is Applied in Determining What Constitutes a Crime, and the Na-
ture and Degree of Punishment Consequent Thereupon (pt. 2), 6 AM. L. REG. 129,
131-32 (1867). The prosecution in Henfield did contend, however, that the defendant
was indictable at common law. See infra note 433.
15' Henfield, 11 F. Gas. at 1107 (citing Calvin's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 7 COKE
1 (1608)).
253 Id.
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interpreted and adjusted. Does a mercantile question occur?
She determines it by the law of merchants. Does a question
arise before her, which properly ought to be resolved by the
law of nations? By that law she will decide the question. For
that law in its full extent is adopted by her. The infractions
of that law form a part of her code of criminal
jurisprudence. 2"
Most of us would find this a strange appendage to a grand jury
charge. That Wilson apparently saw relevance to its inclusion reflects
some of the differences between his view of the law and our more mod-
ern assumptions. His instructions basically followed Blackstone's sys-
tem of division for the English common law. According to Blackstone,
each part of the common law was a form of established custom. Black-
stone first identified "general customs, or the common law properly so
called," as the "universal rule of the whole kingdom," which formed
the foundation of the jurisprudence 'for "the king's ordinary courts of
justice"-Chancery, King's Bench, Common Pleas, and the Excheq-
uer.255 Second, "particular customs" were those used by "particular
counties, cities, towns, manors, and lordships" in departure from gen-
eral customs. 256 Finally, there were "those peculiar laws, which by cus-
tom are adopted and used only in certain peculiar courts . . . [as with]
the civil and canon laws. 257 This separation of laws into those of gen-
eral applicability and others that relate to particular local circumstances
would pervade American legal thought for years, as is illustrated by
Swift v. Tyson's 258 use of a similar demarcation.
259
To describe the common law as containing a significant branch of
general law, derived from principles of natural justice, however, was
not to claim the existence of a uniformly recognized body of legal prin-
ciples. Julius Goebel has pointed out that Americans hardly "were be-
254 Id. (citing 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 67 (7th ed. Oxford 1775).
255 See I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, supra note 254, at 63, 67, 68; R.
BRIDWELL & R. WHrrEN, THE CONSTrrUTMON AND THE COMMON LAW: THE DE-
CLINE OF THE DOCTRINES OF SEPARATION OF POWERS AND FEDERALISM 16 (1977).
2 See 1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 255, at 74.
257 Id. at 79.
2" 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
259 This will be discussed in Part Two. See also T. FREYER, HARMONY & Dis-
SONANCE: THE SwxFr & ERIE CASES IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM 37-38 (1981);
Heckman, The Relationship in Swift v. Tyson to the Status of Commercial Law in the
Nineteenth Century and the Federal System, 17 AM. J. LEGAL HiT. 246, 247-48
(1973); Hollingsworth, Comments on Charles A. Heckman's Paper "The Relationship
of Swift v. Tyson to the Status of Commercial Law in the Nineteenth Century and the
Federal System," and Donald Roper's Paper, "'James Kent and the Emergence of
New York's Libel Law," 17 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 256, 258 (1973).
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guiled into believing that they lived by a hierarchy of customs that was
law the world over."2 60 For one thing, the various states differed
greatly in the degree and manner to which they adopted the English
common law.2 ' Furthermore, hostility to English institutions was suf-
ficiently intense to make it highly unpopular in many areas to contend
that English law had been incorporated as a body of recognizable
rules.
262
Notwithstanding these sentiments, Americans of this time did not
generally reject that part of their English heritage of law that, in Ber-
nard Bailyn's words, consisted of a belief in "God-given, natural, inal-
ienable rights, distilled from reason and justice," and was expressed
partially "in the common law of England."26 Discovering the princi-
ples of this natural law required an investigation of inherited custom.
James Kent in his Commentaries would quote Matthew Hale as saying
that natural law was "'not the product of the wisdom of some one
man, or society of men, in any one age; but of the wisdom, counsel,
experience, and observation of many ages of wise and observing
men.' C2, ases were merely the best evidence of the principles of the
common law,265 the same point made years later in Swift.266
Morton Horwitz has demonstrated that this attitude toward law
260 Goebel, Ex Parte Clio, 54 COLuM. L. REv. 450, 457 (1954).
261 Justice Jay said in a 1790 grand jury charge that at the time the nation was
formed, "[o]ur jurisprudence varied in almost every State, and was accommodated to
local, not general convenience-to partial, not national policy." Charge to the Grand
Jury for the District of New York (Apr. 4, 1790), reprinted in New Hampshire Ga-
zette (Portsmouth), June 3, 1790.
282 See L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 94 (1973); see also A.
HOWARD, THE ROAD FROM RUNNYMEDE: MAGNA CARTA AND CONSTITUTIONAL-
ISM IN AMERICA 260 (1968) (discussing various American attitudes towards English
common law); Pound, The Place of Judge Story in the Making of American Law, 48
AM. L. REv. 676, 681-82 (1914) (examining popular hostility to English law); Water-
man, Thomas Jefferson and Blackstone's Commentaries, in ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY
OF EARLY AMERICAN LAW 451, 453 n.12 (D. Flaherty ed. 1969) (describing the hos-
tility felt with regard to English law). As will be explained in Part Two, however, in
practice most American courts in this period followed English law rather closely.
283 B. BAILYN, supra note 64, at 77.
28 1 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 439-40 (New York 1826).
285 See, e.g., Hunter v. Blodget, 2 Yeates 480, 481-82 (Pa. 1799) (recognizing that
opinions of English judges since the Revolution are received as evidence of the law,
although not authoritative of themselves). This "best evidence" principle has been rec-
ognized by many commentators. See, e.g., 1 J. KENT, supra note 264, at 473; 1 Z.
SWIFT, A SYSTEM OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 40-41 (Windham,
Conn. 1795). See also Kempin, Precedent and Stare Decisis: The Critical Years, 1800
to 1850, 3 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 28, 30-31 (1959) (discussing the "best evidence" prin-
ciple as the classical English view); Pope, The English Common Law in the United
States, 24 HARv. L. REV. 6, 7 (1910) (examining the two views of common
law-judge-made and judge-discovered).
286 See 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842) ("[Djecisions of courts . . . .are, at most,
only evidence of what the laws are, and not, of themselves laws.").
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was under attack in Wilson's time and would eventually be replaced by
a view of judges as instrumental decisionmakers who were making
rules, not discovering them.26 Still, the older conception of objectively
discernible principles underlying judicial decisions persisted in many
circles throughout the next century.268 It did so despite its being at odds
with the fundamental ideological shift occasioned by the Revolution.
The Revolution had not merely been a series of battles culminating in a
peace treaty; rather, it was more an alteration of consciousness. John
Adams wrote that "the real American revolution [was the] radical
change in the principles, opinions, sentiments, and affections of the
people ... .,2" Ideologically, this was a new world: gone was the
sovereignty of Kings and in its stead was placed the sovereignty of pop-
ular consent.270 Applied to the judiciary, this new attitude required a
complete reformulation of the foundation for judicial authority.2"1 The
trial court's charge in Henfield illustrates a preoccupation with justify-
ing the court's power-specifically the authority of judges to declare
criminal offenses.
"Judges have no power to frame laws-they can only expound
them,' 27 2 maintained Zephaniah Swift, a Federalist who would later
become the Chief Justice of Connecticut. The point he made in this
1795 writing was the same one that pervaded the political thinking at
the time: liberty must be eternally guarded from the designs of those
claiming power. Hamilton said that "[t]o avoid an arbitrary discretion
in the courts, it is indispensable that they should be bound down by
strict rules and precedents, which serve to define and point out their
duty in every particular case that comes before them ....
These were old views-extending well back into the colonial pe-
riod-that judges should have limited discretion and not purport to be
legislators.27 4 Much the same rhetoric persists today, and one occasion-
267 See M. HoRWrrz, supra note 49, at 1-30.
28 See Bowman, The Unconstitutionality of the Rule of Swift v. Tyson, 18
B.U.L. REV. 659, 662 n.9 (1938). By the first half of the 19th century, however, the
view of cases as evidence of law was coming under increasing attack. See Kempin,
supra note 265, at 36.
269 Letter from John Adams to Hezekiah Niles (Feb. 13, 1818), reprinted in 10
THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, SECOND PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 283 (C.
Adams ed. Boston 1856).
270 See W. CARPENTER, supra note 69, at 34-36.
271 See J. GOEBEL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE DEvELOPMENT OF LEGAL
INsTrrTIONS 432 (1937).
272 1 Z. SwiFr, supra note 265, at 93-94.
272 THE FEDERALST No. 78, at 529 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
274 See M. HORWITZ, supra note 49, at 12-13. Horwitz argues that the distin-
guishing feature of the earlier American period was the lack of a perception that the
common-law process "endowed judges with the power to be arbitrary." Id. at 13.
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ally doubts whether real theoretical advancement has been made since
the days of the early Republic. The problem is inherent to the judicial
process in a liberal democracy, and was appreciated then as now. At
least in nonconstitutional cases, judges are purportedly controlled by
the force of legislative superiority and-in the words of Guido Gala-
bresi-"[t]he incremental nature of common law adjudication.
'
1
7 5
Concerned with justifying judicial decisionmaking, Republican
James Sullivan (whose career included being Attorney General, Gover-
nor, and Associate Justice of Massachusetts) wrote in 1801:
And who is to decide on the question, whether a principle,
urged as law, has heretofore been in practice? The judges
are to decide; but yet not in an arbitrary manner. The
records of the courts of law will generally witness whether a
principle has been in practice in the country; tradition comes
in with its aid, and the judges are at all times surrounded
with men conversant in the courts of justice, and whose hab-
its start at every new theory that is proposed. In addition to
this, the Supreme Judicial Court is always composed of
learned, wise and prudent men, who have but one common
interest with their fellow citizens, and who have no tempta-
tion to do wrong, in a matter of general practice.1
7
1
Adhering to principles is not the same as acting according to the dic-
tates of the people, who may have expressed themselves through demo-
cratic processes. With this in mind, jurists of the late eighteenth century
began articulating a new justification, one that, as Horwitz details, was
exhibited in diverse writings of the period. Judicial legitimacy was
asserted to rest on popular consent to the process of common-law deci-
sionmaking; in Sullivan's words, the common law was "adopted and
established by the common consent of the people.
'2 s7
Consent is a slippery concept, and this is especially the case when
one is using it to legitimize the role of the judiciary. Consent cannot
mean popular acceptance of particular decisions. Rather, the consent is
to a system that develops principles over time. Recognizing judges as
lawmakers-which was being done with increasing frequency in the
275 See G. CALABRESI, supra note 48, at 4.
216 J. SULLIVAN, THE HISTORY OF LAND TITLEs IN MASSACHUSETTS 340 (Bos-
ton 1801).
7" See M. HORwrrz, supra note 49, at 19-22.
28 J. SULLIVAN, supra note 276, at 17. See also 1 Z. SwIFT, supra note 265, at
40 ("The Common Law derives its force and authority, from the universal consent and
immemorial practice of the people.").
[Vol. 133:1003
ORIGINS OF FEDERAL COMMON LAW
early nineteenth century279 -is not at all inconsistent with the older
view that the decisions of the past have an enormous and influential
impact on judges making decisions in the present. After becoming a
judge, Swift wrote in 1810:
It is impossible for the wisest Legislature, or ablest Prince,
to frame statutes, or edicts, adapted to the circumstances of
every case that will occur in the various changes of society.
But by this mode, the law grows out of the case, and must be
adapted to similar cases. A Legislature must establish a gen-
eral, unbending rule: Courts possess a discretion of shaping
their rules to every possible variety of circumstance. Here
then is a vital principle, -inherent in the constitution of the
judiciary, perpetually operating on cases as they occur, cor-
recting the errors of past ages, borrowing improvements from
all countries, and furnishing remedies according to the grow-
ing wants, and varying circumstances of men, in their pro-
gress from the rudest, to the most civilized stages of society,
without waiting for the slow progress of Legislative
interference.280
Some might read this as a flat endorsement of the instrumental
role of judges;2 " Swift, however, was still very much a man of the past,
as evidenced in this next passage:
Though in some cases at first view, it might seem that a
more perfect rule than the Common Law might be adopted;
and this has sometimes seduced Courts to depart from it; yet
when such new rule came to be traced through all its conse-
quences, and applied to the various cases that occurred, the
wisdom of the Common Law has been soon discovered, and
generally acknowledged.
282
Swift was referring to
[t]he Common Law, [which] has usually been called the
278 See M. HoRwrrz, supra note 49, at 1-30.
280 Z. SWIFT, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
CASES, AND A TREATISE ON BILLS OF EXCHANGES AND PROMISSORY NOTmS, at v-vi
(Hartford 1810).
281 See, e.g., M. HORWrrz, supra note 49, at 23. Horwitz stresses Swift's appar-
ent acceptance of the overruling of precedents, an acknowledgement that had also ap-
peared in Swift's 1795 treatise on Connecticut law. See id. at 25 (citing 1 Z. SwIFT,
supra note 265, at 41, 46). Nevertheless, Swift thought that precedents should rarely be
overruled, and that judicial opinions were evidence of what the law is. See infra text
accompanying notes 282-84.
282 Z. SWIFT, supra note 280, at viii.
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Common Law of England, to designate its origin; but it may
with equal propriety be called the Common Law of
America: for our progenitors brought it with them from
England, and made it, by adoption, their own, as much as
the language they spoke."8 3
As for the process of developing that common law, Swift invoked the
traditional idea of law as subject to discovery:
The opinion of able Judges, who have devoted their
lives to the study and practice of the law, may be deemed
good evidence of what the law is; and it is but truth to say,
that the Courts of Westminster Hall have long been adorned
by the most eminent characters; and that few cases occur
where their descisions [sic] will not be found, on the fullest
examination, to be correct deductions from the Common
Law, and conformable to the principles adopted in both
Countries.2
In a broad sense, the ambiguity in Swift's formulation parallels
the dilemmas now confronted by writers in legitimizing judicial author-
ity. For example, a popular assertion today is that the judicial process,
by relying on formalistic modes of reasoning, moves slowly and incre-
mentally, inevitably retarding responsiveness to social change."' 5 Ber-
nard Bailyn has noted that in the post-colonial period, Americans still
appealed to precedent and tradition and assumed that "the accumula-
tion of ages, the burden of inherited custom, contained within it a
greater wisdom than any man or group of men could devise by the
power of reason."2 At the same time, the very notion of relying on
283 Id. at vii.
284 Id. at ix. Horwitz isolates Swift's remarks on the law of evidence: "The rules
of evidence are of an artificial texture, not capable in all cases of being founded on
abstract principles of justice. They are positive regulations founded on policy; and ...
they do not profess to be always able to arrive at the truth .... " Id. at xi, quoted in
M. HORwrrZ, supra note 49, at 25-26. Whether Swift's comment was something that
"no jurist would have perceived a quarter of a century earlier," M. HoRwrrz, supra
note 49, at 25, is hard to say and certainly not supported by Horwitz. It is not at all
clear that Swift was using "policy" as a 20th century lawyer would; in any event, he
was not referring to "all cases" of evidence, and he appeared to assume that many were
"founded on abstract principles of justice." Swift may have focused on the law of evi-
dence since most of the rules in that area were of comparatively recent origin-dating
to the acceptance of juries as factfinders in the sixteenth century. See 9 W. HOLDS-
WORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 126-33 (3d ed. 1944). Important changes in
evidence law came with the reception of proof of mercantile customs by Lord Mansfield
in the late 18th century. See id. at 132-33.
285 See G. CALABRESI, supra note 48, at 75.
286 B. BAILYN, supra note 64, at 33.
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tradition was entirely alien to the Enlightenment rationalists whom the
early Americans quoted, as we still do, "with equal enthusiasm."28
A similar problem for both the 1790's and today was the associa-
tion of judicial lawmaking with ex post facto legislation. The petit jury
charge in Henfield stressed that the defendant was guilty of a crime
that had been recognized for many years. 88  Soon thereafter,
Swift-who hardly had Republican leanings-wrote that punishment
by way of a common-law criminal "proceeding manifestly partakes of
the odious nature of an ex post facto law, and subjects a man to an
inconvenience which he could not possibly foresee, or calculate upon, at
the time of doing the act." '289 Although he could not demonstrate any
abuse of "this discretionary power" in Connecticut, Swift nevertheless
considered it more prudent to leave the task of defining crimes to the
legislature:
There certainly is danger to be apprehended from the exer-
cise of such power in times of convulsions, when the spirit of
party runs high: for then it is very possible that courts, influ-
enced by political prejudice, might punish with great sever-
ity, actions which are very innocent in a moral view. 90
287 Id. An excellent example of the combination of Enlightenment optimism in
human rationality with an appeal to tradition is this excerpt from a 1794 grand jury
charge by Justice Iredell:
We have the happiness to live in an age when human knowledge in all its
branches has been carried to a great perfection. The Law of Nations, by
which alone all controversies between nation and nation can be deter-
mined, has been cultivated with extraordinary success. In its main princi-
ples, as stated by many able writers all civilized nations concur...
Within these few years this law has not only been stated with peculiar
accuracy and conciseness, but all its principles have been traced to their
sources with a power of reasoning which has commanded universal assent,
and with a spirit of freedom and an enlarged liberality of mind entirely
suited to the high improvements the present age has made in all kinds of
political reasoning.
Charge to the Grand Jury for the District of South Carolina (May 12, 1794), supra
note 249.
288 See Henfield, 11 F. Cas. at 1120.
289 2 Z. SWIFT, supra note 265, at 365-66.
2"I Z. SwiFT, supra note 280 at vii. Horwitz is quite right in reading Swift's
argument as indicative of an awareness of the lawmaking powers of judges. See HOR-
wrrz, supra note 49, at 14. Horwitz also correctly cautions that "Swift clearly did not
abandon the natural law framework within which common law crimes traditionally
had been understood." Id. Horwitz, however, thinks that historians have not fully ap-
preciated the underlying change in the conception of law by the early jurists due to "an
excessive preoccupation with the political and constitutional dimensions of the struggle
over common law crimes." Id. at 11. Separating causes from effects is not that easy.
Swift, for example, was obviously concerned with judicial discretion because of its pos-
sibility for political abuse.
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Further complicating the jurisprudential question of retrospective
rulemaking was the uncertainty over the content of American law,2 1 a
difficulty engendered by the lack of case reports 92 and the unresolved
debate over how much English law had been received in the new
country. 93
The dilemma in Henfield is one inherent in a system that is de-
voted simultaneously to consensual politics and rational decisionmak-
ing. In any era, relying solely on majoritarianism will hardly be condu-
cive to the systematic planning and coordination of governmental
functions. Most of the nation's leaders who had lived through the
1780's were not inclined to give the people such a significant voice in
decisions. Nonetheless, the people could not be ignored, and the litera-
ture of the period was rife with tributes to popular governance. Eventu-
ally this conflict advanced to an inquiry into the nature of judicial
power itself. For a citizenry disposed by years of hard experience to
believe that power inevitably corrupted, and that political actors tended
toward conspiracy, the early Americans were especially likely to link a
judicial act with the public affairs of the day. This is certainly what the
opposition press did in reaction to the Henfield prosecution. Arguments
about the degree of connection between the judicial and political
processes have continued to this day. Ordinarily it is the particular ju-
dicial decision, made by a certain group of judges, that provokes public
controversy.
To understand the issue of the common-law jurisdiction of federal
courts, however, attention must not be focused exclusively on the in-
291 See L. KERBER, supra note 146, at 138. See also Hall, The Common Law: An
Account of Its Reception in the United States, 4 VAND. L. REV. 791, 805 (1951) (not-
ing that all of the states adopted the rule that they would recognize only the principles
of common law that were applicable to local situations). A common complaint of judges
in those days was the lack of authoritative guidance. See 2 H. FLANDERS, THE LIVES
AND TIMES OF THE CHIEF JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES 119 (2d ed. 1881) (quoting the preface to Kirby's Reports on the uncertainty of
the state law of Connecticut when Oliver Ellsworth was appointed to the Superior
Court of Connecticut); 1 W. CROSSKEY, supra note 61, at 606 (quoting James Kent on
his career as chancellor in New York: "I had nothing to guide me & was left at liberty
to assume all such English chancery powers and jurisdiction as I thought applicable
under our constitution.").
292 See 2 A. CHROUST, THE RISE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN AMERICA 72-75
(1965); R. ELLIS, supra note 71, at 191; J. SULLIVAN, supra note 276, at 19.
29I See E. BROWN, BRITISH STATUTES IN AMERICAN LAW 1776-1836, at 30-31
(1964); Howe, The Process of Outlawry in New York.- A Study of the Selective Recep-
tion of English Law, in ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF EARLY AMERICAN LAW 433,
433-38 (D. Flaherty ed. 1969); Pope, supra note 265, at 6-7. Zephaniah Swift com-
plained in 1795 that "for want of some general rule" to establish when British law was
received, "[t]he student . . . finds himself forever embarrassed with doubt and uncer-
tainty . . . ." 1 Z. SWIFT, supra note 265, at 2.
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creasing perception that judges were in fact making the rules. The com-
mon-law process would dominate American law until well into the
nineteenth century, notwithstanding the frequent cries for codifica-
tion.29 4 Blackstone would be read widely by lawyers and cited by
judges throughout the century,295 and states continued to prosecute
common-law crimes long after Hudson.296 In so doing, the states were
supported by jurists such as Chancellor Kent, who said in 1826:
It is impossible to define expressly and literally every offence
that ought to be punished; and if you ask me what is the
evidence of its being an offence if not defined in the code, I
answer, the laws of nature, of religion, or morality, which
are written on the heart of every son and daughter of Adam,
declare the offence ....
That the reaction to Henfield was mainly a product of its political
subject matter is further demonstrated by United States v. Ravara.2 98
Joseph Ravara, the consul from Genoa, was indicted in the Circuit
Court in Philadelphia one day before the true bill was returned in
Henfield, and tried a year later on a charge of attempting to extort
money from the British Minister, Hammond.299 While some commen-
tators have assumed that the prosecution was based solely on the com-
mon law,300 a statutory basis for the prosecution could have been found
in a 1790 criminal statute that made it an offense to "assault, strike,
wound, imprison, or in any other manner infract the law of nations, by
24 Representative John Stanley remarked before Congress in 1802 that "[n]ine-
tenths of the decisions in our State courts and Federal courts turn on questions of
common law .... ." 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 573. Many commentators have recognized
that this factor (along with a dislike of the common-law method itself) was behind the
call for codification in the 1820's and later. See F. AUMANN, supra note 151, at 121
n.5; 2 A. CHROUST, supra note 292, at 52-54.
295 See R. SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERIAN LEGAL THEORY 139-
40 (1982).
298 See Anonymous, The Extent to Which the Common Law is Applied in Deter-
mining What Constitutes a Crime, and Nature and Degree of Punishment Consequent
Thereupon (pt. 1), 6 AM. L. REv. 65, 77 (1866); Anonymous (pt. 2), supra note 251,
at 339. Even in the case of statutes that expressly proscribed a crime, such as murder,
the definition of the crime was frequently left to the common law in 19th century
prosecutions. See, e.g., id. at 323-24.
2'7 Letter from James Kent to Edward Livingston (Mar. 13, 1826), reprinted in
16 AM. JURIsT 363 (1837). In his Commentaries, Kent wrote that "the common law,
under the correction of the constitution and statute law of the United States, would
seem to be a necessary and safe guide, in all cases, civil and criminal, arising under the
exercise of [federal] jurisdiction, and not specially provided for by statute." I J. KENT,
supra note 264, at 320-21.
298 27 F. Cas. 713 (C.C.D. Pa. 1794) (No. 16,122).
299 See J. GOEBEL, supra note 59, at 627 & nn. 72-75.
200 See, e.g., L. LEvY, supra .note 52, at 276; Presser, supra note 55, at 56.
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offering violence to the person of an ambassador or other public minis-
ter ."I" The defense objected in part that the act alleged was "not a
crime by the common law, nor is it made such by any positive law of
the United States. 3 0 2 The judges, however, did not hesitate to extend
federal jurisdiction to the case. Justice Wilson and Judge Peters ruled
against a motion to quash the indictment for lack of jurisdiction, and
Justice Iredell dissented on the ground that the case was within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.303 At the trial,
Chief Justice Jay and Judge Peters instructed the jury that "the offense
was indictable," and Ravara was convicted.304 Although Ravara is
most accurately read as a case in which the elements of a broad crimi-
nal statute were particularized through a common-law process, 305 there
seems to have been little adverse comment on the judicial lawmaking
that was occurring in the trial.306 The defense apparently accepted the
necessity to argue that there had been no common-law crime commit-
ted. To the extent that the issue of federal common-law adjudications
became a public issue, it arose when the case itself involved a political
301 Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes against the United States § 28, 1
Stat. 112, 118 (1790); see J. GOEBEL, supra note 59, at 627. The odd thing, however,
is that the prosecutor-William Rawle-later argued in United States v. Worrall, 28
F. Cas. 774, 778 (C.C.D. Pa. 1798) (No. 16,766), that Ravara, "although he held the
office of a consul, . . .was indicted and punished at the common law." Since Rawle
was citing Ravara to support a nonstatutory prosecution, see infra text accompanying
notes 322-23, he at least was insisting to the Worrall court that the earlier case was
entirely a common law prosecution. The district judge-Richard Peters-was the same
in both cases, but in Worrall he made no mention of Ravara. See Worral, 28 F. Cas.
at 779-80. Apparently Rawle meant that the statute required a common-law definition
for the elements of the offense.
302 Ravara, 27 F. Cas. at 714.
303 Id.
304 Id. at 715.
305 For a similar interpretation of Ravara, see Anonymous (pt. 2) supra note
251, at 132-33 (stating that "the question of the national courts having a common-law
jurisdiction where offenses were not otherwise created or declared by the constitution or
by statute, was not one adverted to in Ravara").
101 Another case of a federal common-law prosecution after Henfield that seems to
have provoked little public outcry is United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1147 (C.C.D.
Mass. 179[7]) (No. 16,323). Chief Justice Ellsworth was on the panel with Judge John
Lowell. Smith was an action for counterfeiting bills of the Bank of the United States,
an action which was not covered by a statute. In discussing jurisdiction, the case as
reported seems to indicate that the court based its authority solely on the Constitution:
The Court held ...that by the constitution of the United States the fed-
eral courts had jurisdiction of all causes or cases in law or equity arising
under the said constitution and the laws of the United States; that this was
a case arising under those laws, for those bills were made in virtue thereof,
though there was no statute describing or punishing the offense of coun-
terfeiting them; and therefore to counterfeit them was a contempt of and
misdemeanor against the United States, and punishable by them as such.
Id. at 1147-48.
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controversy.
To be sure, the Henfield judges were preoccupied with justifying
what they were doing. A more important objective, however, was to
articulate a federal role in controlling foreign relations. There was an
interesting convergence of the positions taken by the Administration
and the various federal judges involved in the neutrality prosecutions.
Aside from formal action, Chief Justice Jay took the step (along with
Senator Rufus King) of giving the press a notice to the effect that Ge-
nit had threatened "to appeal from the President to the people.2
30 7
None of this is surprising considering the gravity of the issues involved
and the fact that the country was hardly in a position to take part in
the European war. A primary motivation for calling the constitutional
convention had been the lack of unity in foreign affairs, a critical aspect
of which was the failure of many states to honor the Confederation's
treaty obligations. This had been an extremely serious issue, for many
felt that renewed war was inevitable if the flaws of the Articles of Con-
federation were not dealt with decisively.30 ' There was even a proposal
before the Congress in 1786 to amend the Articles and create a federal
court of appeals to resolve disputes between states and foreign countries
by applying the law of nations.309
As Madison explained to the Virginia Convention, a central pur-
pose of the federal judiciary was to provide "exclusive jurisdiction" over
matters respecting treaties such that they would receive a "uniform"
exposition.310 Since the actions of citizens directly risked involving
America with the European conflict, it was not at all extraordinary for
a Federalist judiciary to assist the Administration through the accepted
route of common-law prosecutions. When the judges asserted that the
law of nations had defined Gideon Henfield's offense before he was
born, they were saying the same thing as George Nicholas had argued
during the ratification debates-"the law of nations was permanent and
general."31
The reaction of the opposition press was consistent with long-
307 See D. MALONE, supra note 115, at 135.
SOS See F. MARKS, INDEPENDENCE ON TRIAL: FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE
MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 1-51 (1973). The Confederation Congress was una-
ble to enforce states' compliance with treaties, as it lacked both the "exclusive control of
foreign relations" and "an independent source of revenue." See id. at 47.
309 See id. at 15.
310 See 3 ELLIoT'S DEBATES, supra note 138, at 532. Hamilton had similarly
identified cases involving "the PEACE of the CONFEDERACY, whether they relate to the
intercourse between the United States and foreign nations, or to that between the States
themselves," as one of the main objects of federal judicial authority. See THE FEDERAL-
IST No. 80, at 534 (J. Cooke ed. 1961)..31 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 138, at 502 (Virginia Convention).
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standing traditions. The court's explicit charge that Henfield was guilty
prompted a flood of ink alleging that "policy" was being introduced
into judicial affairs 31 -an entirely reasonable conclusion. The opposi-
tion's real complaint, however, was with the policy itself, one that in
practice favored what it saw as detrimental to the interests of America's
natural ally, France. That the opposition may have been more con-
cerned with foreign affairs than the role of the judiciary is evidenced by
Republican efforts to advance their own causes in the courts. One of
Henfield's attorneys, Jared Ingersoll, who was also the Attorney Gen-
eral of Pennsylvania, presented a bill of indictment to a Philadelphia
County grand jury in 1797, charging William Cobbett, the editor of the
Federalist (and stridently anti-Jeffersonian) Porcupine's Gazette, with
common-law criminal libel.""3 The Federalist majority on the grand
jury refused to indict, while Republican members asked for a true
bill.3
14
312 See supra text accompanying notes 241-43.
313 See F. WHARTON, supra note 91, at 322, 326 (Pa. Oyer & Terminer 1797)
(Trial of William Cobbett). Cobbett was charged with libel against the Spanish King
and his minister to the United States. Chief Justice Thomas McKean of the Pennsylva-
nia Supreme Court (a leading Republican who was to become the father-in-law of the
Spanish envoy in question) charged the Grand Jury:
Every one who has in him the sentiments of either a Christian or
gentleman, cannot but be highly offended at the envenomed scurrility that
has raged in pamphlets and newspapers, printed in Philadelphia for sev-
eral years past, insomuch, that libelling has become a kind of national
crime, and distinguishes us not only from all the States around us, but
from the whole civilized world. Our satire has been nothing but ribaldry
and Billingsgate: the contest has been, who could call names in the great-
est variety of phrases; who could 'mangle the greatest number of charac-
ters; or who could excel in the magnitude and virulence of their lies.
Hence the honour of families has been stained; the highest posts rendered
cheap and vile in the sight of the people, and the greatest services and
virtue blasted. This evil, so scandalous to our government, and detestable
in the eyes of all good men, calls aloud for redress. To censure the licen-
tiousness is to maintain the liberty of the press.
At a time when misunderstandings prevail between the Republics of
France and the United States, and when our General Government have
appointed public ministers to endeavour their removal, and restore the for-
mer harmony, some of the journals or newspapers in the City of Philadel-
phia, have teemed with the most irritating invectives, couched in the most
vulgar and opprobrious language, not only against the French nation and
their allies, but the very men in power with whom the ministers of our
country are sent to negotiate. These publications have an evident tendency
not only to frustrate a reconciliation, but to create a rupture, and provoke
a war between the sister republics, and seem calculated to vilify, nay, to
subvert all republican governments whatever.
Id. at 324-25.
314 See id. at 329 (Wharton's notes). A libel prosecution was also brought against
Cobbett in federal court, but again the grand jury refused to indict. See id. at 329
(quoting Porcupine's Gazette). For Attorney General Charles Lee's opinion that Cob-
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When Henfield came down, the controversy over federal common-
law jurisdiction was still in an embryonic stage. Yet the suggestion had
been made that the court was exceeding its power under the Constitu-
tion; Federalists responded to the attack, and from there a constellation
of issues began to form. And the players changed roles as the events
unfolded. Thomas Jefferson and Edmund Randolph themselves would
turn against nonstatutory prosecutions, at least by the federal govern-
ment. Jefferson, who had endorsed the trial of privateers such as
Henfield, would react quite differently when subsequent prosecutions
turned toward those more dear to his own interests.
3. Justice Chase and the Worrall Prosecution
The only known dissenting voice among Federalist judges after
1793 to federal common-law jurisdiction was that of Justice Chase.
Chase made his view known in United States v. Worrall,31 5 which
came to the circuit court at Philadelphia in April of 1798. Robert Wor-
rall had been indicted for attempting to bribe Tench Coxe, the commis-
sioner of the revenue, for the purpose of obtaining a contract on a fed-
eral construction project. One of Worrall's defense counsel, Alexander
J. Dallas, contended that the jury's verdict of guilty should be arrested
since there had been no asserted "violation of some constitutional or
legislative prohibition. '"-"e He then anticipated the government's argu-
ment, that the crime was punishable at common law; the Constitution,
Dallas reasoned, contained
no reference to a common-law authority: Every power is [sic]
matter of definite and positive grant; and the very powers
that are granted cannot take effect until they are exercised
through the medium of a law. Congress had undoubtedly a
power to make a law, which should render it criminal to
offer a bribe to the commissioner of the revenue; but not
having made the law, the crime is not recognized by the fed-
eral code, constitutional or legislative; and, consequently, it is
not a subject on which the judicial authority of the Union
can operate.
31 7
bett was indictable in federal court, see Letter from Charles Lee to Philip Fatio (July
27, 1797), reprinted in 1 OFFICIAL OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEYS GENERAL OF THE
UNITED STATES 71-74 (B. Hall ed. Washington, D.C. 1857).
... 28 F. Cas. 774 (C.C.D. Pa. 1798) (No. 16,766). A thorough account of Wor-
rall is found in Presser, supra note 55, at 58-72.
31 Worrall, 28 F. Cas. at 776.
31 Id. at 777-78.
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In response, William Rawle candidly admitted that he was sup-
porting the indictment "solely at common law." '18 The United States
Attorney's address concentrated mainly on the necessity for the prosecu-
tion. Rawle characterized it as a matter that "struck at the root of the
whole system of the national government; for, if opposition to the pure,
regular and efficient administration of its affairs could thus be made by
fraud, the experiment of force might next be applied; and doubtless,
with equal impunity and success."319 With respect to Dallas' constitu-
tional objection, he replied that there was no problem, "for the offence
was strictly within the very terms of the constitution, arising under the
laws of the United States." 2' By this he meant that if the office held by
the commissioner had not
been created by the laws of the United States, no attempt to
corrupt such an officer could have been made; and it is un-
reasonable to insist, that merely because a law has not pre-
scribed an express and appropriate punishment for the of-
fence, therefore, the offence, when committed, shall not be
punished . . . upon the principles of common law
punishment. 21
Rawle cited Henfield and Ravara for authority, claiming that both had
involved punishments imposed under the common law.322 Finally,
without federal competence to proceed via common-law prosecutions,
these cases would go unpunished: they were "not cognizable before any
state tribunal.
'3 23
Justice Chase interrupted Rawle's presentation and launched into
a speech that, as Francis Wharton later recounted, "appear[ed] to have
greatly surprised not only the bar but the community.""24 Chase flatly
denied that the indictment could "be maintained in this court."' 2 5 To
understand Chase's opinion in Worrall, it must be remembered that he
was once a strident Antifederalist who had opposed ratifying the Con-
stitution. 26 Although by the time in question he had turned to the Fed-
318 Id. at 778. The quoted words are actually part of a question from Justice
Chase, which Rawle answered "in the affirmative."
319 Id.
320 Id.
321 Id.
322 Id.
323 Id. Although Rawle cited no authority for this proposition, he was referring to
the provisions for exclusive federal jurisdiction over criminal cases under the 1789 Ju-
diciary Act. See supra note 59.
3 F. WHARTON, supra note 91, at 199 n.*.
325 Worrall, 28 F. Gas. at 778.
121 See J. GozEI., supra note 59, at 368-69 (Chase "was a confederation man
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eralist party, his Worrall opinion reflected a deep-seated states' rights
philosophy.
32 7
Many of Chase's arguments in Worrall would be reiterated by the
Court in Hudson with only slight modification. Chase began with an
account of the narrow sweep of federal authority: "[T]he constitution of
the Union is the source of all the jurisdiction of the national govern-
ment; so that the departments of the government can never assume any
power, that is not expressly granted by that instrument, nor exercise a
power in any other manner than is there prescribed. 3'28 The question
for Chase, then, was "when and how have the courts of the United
States acquired a common law jurisdiction in criminal cases?" '29 Chase
succinctly listed the only ways in which the United States might possess
the common law: "Now, the United States did not bring it with them
from England; the constitution does not create it; and no act of congress
has assumed it."330
While Chase claimed that the United States had no common law
and thus could not maintain indictments at common law, his position
with respect to the states was entirely different. Chase's views on state
because he was passionately devoted to his state. He thought that the difficulties of the
Union . . . could be resolved if the states did their duty." Id. at 369); Presser, supra
note 55, at 73 ("Chase's sensitivity to Maryland popular opinion, or possibly his sin-
cere feelings about concentrated and centralized aristocratic authority, led him to be-
come a vehement opponent of the proposed Federal Constitution on the grounds that it
too tightly constricted the sovereignty of the individual states." (footnotes omitted)). See
generally 5 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 79-91 (H. Storing ed. 1981) (Chase's
speeches at Maryland ratifying convention).
327 See Presser, supra note 55, at 73-74 ("Chase's view in Worrall, then, rather
than highlighting a new conception of jurisprudence, probably reflects Chase's old style
of politics."). A new account of Chase's career by the same author emphasizes his
deeply rooted Southern conservatism and religious convictions as an explanation for the
Justice's siding with the Federalists despite his strong belief in state independence. See
Presser & Hurley, Saving God's Republic: The Jurisprudence of Samuel Chase, 1984
U. ILL. L. REV. 771.
328 Worrall, 28 F. Cas. at 779. The use of the word "expressly" was itself very
controversial. In voting on the proposed tenth amendment, Congress had deliberately
omitted that exact word, which had appeared in the Articles of Confederation. See U.S.
ART. CONFED. art. 4, 1 Stat. 4 (1778). Representative Thomas T. Tucker of South
Carolina moved on August 18, 1789, "to add the word 'expressly,' so as to read 'the
powers not expressly delegated by this Constitution.'" Madison then "objected . . .
because it was impossible to confine a Government to the exercise of express powers;
there must necessarily be admitted powers by implication unless the Constitution de-
scended to recount every minutiae." I ANNALS OF CONG. 761 (J Gales ed. 1789).
Tucker's amendment was defeated without recorded vote. Three days later Representa-
tive Eldridge Gerry made the same motion, and requested the yeas and nays. The
motion lost, 32 to 17. Id. at 767-68. Much the same occurred on the Senate side. See
JOURNAL OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE SENATE or THE UNITED STATES 122 (New
York 1789).
329 Worrall, 28 F. Cas. at 779.
330 Id.
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common law would become a mainstay of Republican arguments in the
near future:
When the American colonies were first settled by our
ancestors, it was held, as well by the settlers, as by the
judges and lawyers of England, that they brought hither, as
a birth-right and inheritance, so much of the common law as
was applicable to their local situation and change of circum-
stances. But each colony judged for itself what parts of the
common law were applicable to its new condition; and in
various modes by legislative acts, by judicial decisions, or by
constant usage, adopted some parts, and rejected others.
Hence, he who shall travel through the different states, will
soon discover, that the whole of the common law of England
has been nowhere introduced; that some states have rejected
what others have adopted; and that there is, in short, a great
and essential diversity in the subjects to which the common
law is applied, as well as in the extent of its application. The
common law, therefore, of one state, is not the common law
of another; but the common law of England, is the law of
each state, so far as each state has adopted it; and it results
from that position, connected with the judicial act, that the
common law will always apply to suits between citizen and
citizen, whether they are instituted in a federal or state
court. 331
In contrast to the specific state receptions of the common law, nothing
similar had transpired at the federal level. "Besides, what is the com-
mon law to which we are referred? Is it the common law entire, as it
exists in England; or modified as it exists in some of the states; and of
the various modifications, which are we to select . . . ?""'
All of the contentions made by Chase in Worrall revolve around a
single conception of the issue presented: the common law was envi-
sioned as a body of unwritten law, which must be received in whole or
in part in order for a court to have jurisdiction over the case. An identi-
cal attitude was to be revealed in subsequent discussions by Republi-
cans about the common law in federal courts.
331 Id.
... Id. It has been contended that Chase reversed his position on common-law
crimes when he presided over United States v. Sylvester, an unreported 1799 prosecu-
tion for counterfeiting. See L. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 278 (1985);
Presser, supra note 55, at 69. But it seems likely that the case was brought under the
newly passed counterfeiting statute, An Act to Punish Frauds Committed on the Bank
of the United States, 1 Stat. 573 (1798).
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Judge Peters in a separate opinion in Worrall offered a competing
view of the nature of the common law. This opinion summarized the
Federalist position:
Whenever a government has been established, I have al-
ways supposed, that a power to preserve itself, was a neces-
sary and an inseparable concomitant. But the existence of the
federal government would be precarious, and it could no
longer be called an independent government, if, for the pun-
ishment of offences of this nature, tending to obstruct and
pervert the administration of its affairs, an appeal must be
made to the state tribunals, or the offenders must escape
with absolute impunity. The power to punish misdemea-
nours is originally and strictly a common law power; of
which I think the United States are constitutionally pos-
sessed. It might have been exercised by congress in the form
of a legislative act; but it may also, in my opinion, be en-
forced in a course of judicial proceeding. Whenever an of-
fence aims at the subversion of any federal institution, or at
the corruption of its public officers, it is an offence against
the well-being of the United States; from its very nature, it is
cognizable under their authority; and, consequently, it is
within the jurisdiction of this court, by virtue of the 11th
section of the judicial act. 3 '
Peters made no mention of Chase's argument regarding the absence of
a federal reception of the English common law. For Peters and other
Federalists this was irrelevant. Rather than distinguish between the es-
sential natures of federal and state governments, Peters maintained that
all governments possessed the inherent power of protecting their inter-
ests-especially when self-preservation was a concern.
These conflicting stances on common-law jurisdiction of the fed-
eral judiciary would be repeated often in subsequent debates, but the
clash in Worrall exposed the basic demarcation. Republicans would
insist throughout the coming era that the federal government and the
states were fundamentally different. They believed that only the states
possessed the attributes of sovereignty necessary for the reception of the
common law. Republicans would concede that state governments could
recognize common-law offenses as incident to the sovereign duty of pre-
serving order and perpetuating the government. Allowing the federal
s Worrall, 28 F. Gas. at 779-80 (Justice Chase and Judge Peters were the only
judges sitting on the case.).
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courts to take similar steps would violate the notion that the national
powers were confined to those that were explicitly listed in the
Constitution.
Republicans such as Alexander Dallas were quick to condemn the
theory of "protective" federal common-law crimes as an illustration of
"the constant disposition of power to extend the sphere of its influ-
ence." 33 If this precedent were established, Dallas predicted, "[a] mere
fiction" could be invoked to expand tremendously the jurisdiction of the
circuit courts. 3 5 Under English practice, "the jurisdiction of the King's
Bench" was made "universal in all personal actions" through the fic-
tion of supposing "that the defendant is in the custody of the mar-
shal." ' 6 Similarly, "[a]nother fiction, which states the plaintiff to be a
debtor of the crown, gives cognizance of all kinds of personal suits to
the exchequer . . . . ,, If a common-law action were permitted in
Worrall, "it may hereafter be sufficient to suggest, that the party is a
federal officer, in order to enable this court to try every species of
crime, and to sustain every description of action." '3 8 Dallas was con-
cerned with something larger than the immediate outcome for his cli-
ent. For him and other Republicans the contest was not an isolated
case, but an ongoing series of events that would continuously test the
respective roles of the state and federal governments.
Chase would never completely align himself with Republicans on
the theory of a radically limited federal government; he was much more
willing than the typical Jeffersonian to imply powers to the national
establishment. In the ensuing years, one imagines that Chase, as a
fiercely partisan Federalist, was somewhat mortified to find his opinion
in Worrall used by the opposition to their advantage-which it soon
was. It would be wrong, however, to surmise that Chase's dissent indi-
cated widespread disagreement among Federalists on the question of
the common law. Once actions were brought on explicitly nonstatutory
grounds after 1793, Chase is the only known Federalist judge to di-
verge from the generally accepted stance that these prosecutions were
proper.33 9
$3 Id. at 777.
335 Id.
336 Id.
337 Id.
338 Id.
131 According to Morton Horwitz, Chase's Worrall opinion was proof that the
issue of federal common-law jurisdiction went beyond partisan politics to encompass a
general "decline in the authority of the common law." M. HORWrrZ, supra note 49, at
11. In support of his position, he stresses Chase's statement "that it was 'essential that
congress should define the offences to be tried, and apportion the punishments to be
inflicted.'" Id. at 12 (quoting Worrall, 28 F. Cas. at 779) (minor discrepancies be-
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As for Worrall, he was sentenced to a fine and imprisonment
when he refused the judges' suggestion that he "put [the case] into such
a form, as would admit of obtaining the ultimate decision of the su-
preme court, upon the important principle of the discussion. '340 Given
that Worrall had little hope of persuading the higher court, his disincli-
nation to seek review is understandable. Moreover, by avoiding the Su-
preme Court, Alexander Dallas also prevented that body from entering
an authoritative precedent on common-law jurisdiction. As fate would
have it, that honor was reserved until Hudson, by which time the
Court's personnel were quite different.
B. Maturing of the Controversy over Federal Common Law: The
Alien and Sedition Acts
In the years between Henfield and Worrall there were a number
of prosecutions for neutrality violations under the common law and law
of nations; 41 others were indicted on charges of treason. 42 And com-
mon-law prosecutions were brought for such offenses as counterfeiting
and seditious libel.3 43 With the passage of the neutrality legislation,
however, the matter of federal common-law crimes seems to have faded
tween Horwitz's text and the original have been corrected)). The context of Chase's
remark, however, indicates that he was not thinking primarily about the dangers of
judicial lawmaking. His reference to congressional control was solely in regard to the
manner in which the Constitution had apportioned powers to the national government.
By underscoring the need for legislative action-which had to be justified under an
"express" power of Congress-he was demonstrating the sharp limitations on federal
sovereignty. In any event, to view Chase as a harbinger of concern for judicial instru-
mentalism is questionable when he was widely despised for purportedly abusing his
authority in Sedition Act cases. See N. SCHACHNER, supra note 162, at 480-81
(describing Chase as "[g]ross of feature, heavy-jowled, a furious Federalist who con-
ceived all Republicans to be the spawn of hell ...[H]is bullying tactics, his violent
and partisan charges, his intimidation of defendants, witnesses, lawyers and jurymen,
made him the most hated judge of the time."). Further, as Professor Presser has
pointed out, Chase's opinion that same year in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386,
386-95 (1798) displays the marks of one who firmly believed in the concept of natural
law as a limiting force on government. See Presser, supra note 55, at 68.
340 Worrall, 28 F. Cas. at 780. Since the court split on a motion to arrest judg-
ment, the imposition of sentence does not mean that Chase agreed with the conviction.
341 See J. GOEBEL, supra note 59, at 626; 1 C. WARREN, supra note 38, at 115
n.2.
32 See, e.g., United States v. Villato, 28 F. Cas. 377 (C.C.D. Pa. 1797) (No.
16,622). Villato was accused of capturing an American vessel; Justice Iredell and
Judge Peters dismissed the charges on the ground that the defendant was not an Amer-
ican citizen. See id. at 378-79. The Whiskey Insurgents had also been charged with
treason, see United States v. Insurgents of Pennsylvania, 26 F. Cas. 499 (C.C.D. Pa.
1795) (No. 15,443), which was a dtatutory offense, see An Act for the Punishment of
Certain Crimes Against the United States, ch. 9, § 1-2, 1 Stat. 112, 112 (1790), but one
that drew heavily on common-law definition.
" See supra note 306 and infra notes 351-52 and accompanying text.
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briefly from the limelight. The grand jury charges from this period
usually refer to statutory offenses or vaguely invoke national law or the
law of nations.3 44 But this was at best a momentary lull, for the federal
judiciary was about to enter its most serious crisis to date.
Following the scandalous XYZ affair, a wave of patriotic fervor
swept the country, and Republicans and their presses became the ob-
jects of verbal and physical abuse.3,45 Even before then, federal grand
jury charges had grown progressively more strident in tone, and bitterly
denounced what was perceived to be a storm of national disunity. "Let
then, the man, or combination of men," said Chief Justice Ellsworth,
"who, from whatever motive, oppose partial to general will, and would
disjoint their country to the sport of fortune, feel their impotence and
error." 4" Nor did they shirk from accusation. Justice Paterson warned
a grand jury:
Our own country, and indeed, all free countries, have exhib-
ited signal and melancholy proofs, how prone the people are
to be seduced, irritated, and convulsed by the misrepresenta-
tions and artifices, the wicked machinations and schemes, or
the open and bold attempts and enterprizes of factions, un-
principled designing and ambitious men. . . . Hence sedi-
tious language, writings, and actions. Hence riots, tumults
and insurrections.
34 7
For Iredell, the very future of the nation was at risk; he saw the parti-
san politics of the times as "inviting some foreign nation to foment and
take advantage of our internal discords, first making us the dupe and
$44 See, e.g., Charge to the Grand Jury for the District of Connecticut (May 12,
1795) (Iredell, J.), reprinted in Connecticut Journal (New Haven), July 29, 1795
(expecting "no . . . important business," and referring generally to the law of nations
and the "laws of the United States"); Charge to the Grand Jury for the District of
Rhode Island (Nov. 7, 1794) (Cushing, J.), reprinted in Providence Gazette and
Country Journal, Nov. 15, 1794 (referring to the crime of treason, acts against treaties,
"violations of the law of revenue," and "murder, piracies, felonies and violences com-
mitted upon the high seas, in prejudice of natural rights, and of the safety of the navi-
gation and commerce, &. &."); Charge to the Grand Jury for the District of Delaware
(Oct. 27, 1794) (Blair, J.), reprinted in The Diary (New York), Nov. 10, 1794 (men-
tioning only federal legislation as grounds for indictment).
345 See L. BANNING, supra note 77, at 253-54.
346 Charge to the Grand Jury for the District of Georgia (Apr. 25, 1796), re-
printed in Columbian Museum (Savannah), Apr. 29, 1796.
'47 Grand Jury Charge, W. Paterson, Paterson Papers (n.p., n.d.), [original in
Rutgers University Library (quoted with permission); copy on file with the University
of Pennsylvania Law Review]. Although it is unclear when or where the charge was
given, or if it was merely a draft, the subject matter of the writing suggests that it dates
from no earlier than 1796.
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then the prey of ambition we excited by our divisions. 3 48 Some judges,
moreover, were convinced that French-inspired insurrection was al-
ready underway, and linked the Whiskey Rebellion to the "inflam-
matory and impudent publications of the democratic societies, set up by
Mr. Gen&t to overthrow the federal union.
' '
5
4
9
One consequence of these Federalist fears was the passage of the
Alien and Sedition Acts. These acts in turn would add another level to
the complexity of the dispute over the relationship of the common law
to the federal courts.
1. The Alien and Sedition Acts in Congress
The precise motivation for passage of the Sedition Act may at first
seem a bit mysterious, since common-law prosecutions would accom-
plish the same end. As was alluded to above, 5' Federalists had been
bringing sedition prosecutions at common law for several years, both in
federal and state courts, against well-known Republican editors, caus-
ing the demise of a number of publications. 5 Only days before the Act
348 Charge to the Grand Jury of the District of Maryland (May 8, 1797), re-
printed in Maryland Gazette (Annapolis), May 18, 1797.
3'9 Charge to the Grand Jury for the District of Virginia (Nov. 23, 1798) (Cush-
ing, J.), reprinted in Federal Gazette (Baltimore), Dec. 6, 1798. Cushing's jury charge
included a review of the history of the French Revolution, and he warned that other
countries had fallen under France's control by "their imprudent listening to artful in-
cendiary intrigues, to false, flattering promises of fraternity and protection held out to
allure all people to revolt from their governments; thus duping them to their own de-
struction." Id.
Other references to the Whiskey Rebellion include: Charge to the Grand Jury for
the District of Pennsylvania (Apr. 12, 1796) (Iredell, J.), reprinted in Claypoole's
American Daily Advertiser (Philadelphia), Apr. 18, 1796; Charge to the Grand Jury
for the District of Pennsylvania (Apr. 11, 1799) (Iredell, J.), reprinted in Claypoole's
American Daily Advertiser (Philadelphia), May 17, 1799; Opinion of Justice William
Paterson, W. Paterson, supra note 243, at 549.
350 See supra text accompanying note 160.
'51 See L. BANNING, supra note 77, at 256-57; J. GOEBEL, supra note 59, at 629,
632-33; N. SCHACHNER, supra note 162, at 477; J. SMITH, supra note 161, at 188-
220, 385-90.
In 1794 Attorney General William Bradford issued an official opinion that the
editor of Greenleaf's New York Journal could be prosecuted for libelling the British
minister. See 1 OFFICIAL OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEYS GENERAL OF THE UNITED
STATES 52-53 (B. Hall ed. 1857). Thomas Greenleaf was first indicted in April 1795
in the circuit court for the District of New York, with Justice Iredell and Judge John
Lawrence presiding; historians have generally assumed that this case was a common-
law proceeding. Iredell's grand jury charge, however, used language from a 1793
charge, where he said that it was "peculiarly proper" for the legislature to define
crimes. Charge to the Grand Jury for the District of New York (Apr. 6, 1795), re-
printed in Gazette of the United States (Philadelphia), Apr. 16-17, 1795. Iredell likely
meant that the 1790 Act used in Ravara was applicable to Greenleaf. See supra note
301 and accompanying text. The 1795 charge does speak of "insult or injury" to a
foreign minister as a violation of the law of nations, which conceivably could bring it
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became effective, the Republican editor Benjamin Franklin Bache was
arrested for criminal libel against President Adams.352 Even Jefferson
did not oppose in principle the concept of seditious libel. 53 Leonard
Levy explains that Jefferson accepted "the dominant view of his gener-
ation that government could be criminally assaulted merely by the ex-
pression of critical opinions that allegedly tended to subvert it by lower-
ing it in the public's esteem."3 54 Indeed, when he became President,
Jefferson suggested the use of state criminal libel prosecutions against
Federalist editors for personal attacks on him.355 Although some
Republicans would articulate libertarian arguments against the Sedi-
tion Act,3 56 Jefferson couched his objections mostly in terms of its inter-
ference with the states' prerogatives.
3 5
1
During the congressional debates on the Act, Republicans taunted
the Federalists on the necessity for its passage. Representative Nathan-
iel Macon asked from the floor: "He knew persons might be prosecuted
for a libel under the State Governments; but if this power exist in full
force at present, what necessity can there be for this bill?""" And there
was something to this: the Sedition Act "did not propose to do more
than the states had already done; nor did it alter in any way the time-
honored common-law definition of sedition." 59 But it was obvious
what the Federalists had in mind by statutorily securing the option of
sedition prosecutions in federal courts. They were worried that in Re-
under the 1790 Act, which required showing that the libel "offer[ed] violence" to a
foreign minister. At a minimum, Iredell's instructions may be seen as a common-law
process of defining a crime from a vague statute. While the records do not indicate the
subsequent proceedings, Greenleaf was indicted a second time in April 1797 for libel-
ling the British Consul General; he was found guilty after a trial conducted by Chief
Justice Ellsworth and Judge Robert Troup. See J. GOEBEL, supra note 59, at 629. For
the 1797 prosecution, the 1790 statute would not have applied since a consul was in-
volved, and the 1790 Act had been construed by the Attorney General to apply only to
foreign ministers and ambassadors. See 1 OFFICIAL OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEYS
GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 41-43 (B. Hall ed. 1857).
352 See D. STEWART, supra note 158, at 467. This arrest may have led to the
introduction of the Sediton bill in its final form. See id. Justice Chase's opinion in
Worrall "was cited almost immediately as a precedent by counsel" for Bache; this was
to no avail as the judge in the case was Richard Peters, who had split with Chase in
Worrall. 1 J. GOEBEL, supra note 59, at 632.
353 L. LEVY, supra note 40, at 46. One example is the Republican attempt to
prosecute William Cobbett. See supra notes 313-14 and accompanying text.
35 L. LEVY, supra note 40, at 46.
155 See N. SCHACHNER, supra note 162, at 464.
$51 See L. LEVY, supra note 40, at 55.
35 See id. at 56. Many states had statutes "affirming the common-law doctrine of
seditious and malicious libels-and this in spite of the strict injunction written into
their constitutions providing for the freedom of the press." J. MILLER, CRISIS IN FREE-
DOM: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION ACTS 80 (1951).
358 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2106 (1798).
359 J. MILLER, supra note 357, at 81.
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publican dominated areas it would be unlikely for actions to be brought
under state law. With the existing controversy over federal common-
law crimes, a situation aggravated by Justice Chase's denial of the ju-
risdiction,36 0 the Federalists insisted upon providing a federal statutory
basis for seditious libel. In one way they were successful at the en-
deavor since the Federalist judiciary-particularly Justice Chase-took
an active part in the enforcement of the Act.3"' Nevertheless, federal
common-law jurisdiction did not fade from the picture. On the con-
trary, the debates, both on the passage of the Act and then during the
aborted attempt to renew it, riveted attention on the matter.
The Sedition Act issue, at least to the extent that the common-law
question became embroiled in it, was dominated by a political clash
over federalism principles. Republicans did charge that the prosecutions
would be prejudicial to the accused: defendants would not be tried in
their vicinity; Federalist marshals would hand-pick juries; judges would
be appointees of the same Administration that the defendants were said
to have acted against.36 2 These arguments notwithstanding, the opposi-
tion legislators and the Republican press would persistently return to
the question of states' rights.
To justify the Sedition Act, Federalists advanced what may have
appeared to be an ingenious argument. Federal courts, they said, al-
ready had jurisdiction over common-law sedition. 8" What the Act ac-
complished was a liberalization of the harsh common-law rule of sedi-
tious libel. Under the statute, intent had to be proved, whereas at
common law the mere act of publication was enough to convict. At
common law punishment was discretionary with the court, whereas the
Act set a definite term. Unlike the common law, truth could be offered
in defense. Juries would decide both law and fact, again a departure
360 See discussion of Worrall, supra, text accompanying notes 315-40.
381 See I C. HAINES, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN Gov-
ERNMENT AND POLITICS, 1789-1835, at 160 (1944); infra text accompanying notes
394-413.
382 See 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2163-64 (1798) (statement of Rep. Gallatin); J.
SMITH, supra note 161, at 140-41; D. STEWART, supra note 158, at 468-70.
363 See J. SMITH, supra note 161, at 139. Robert G. Harper, an erstwhile Repub-
lican who was a rising star among Federalists, qualified his position more carefully
than many in the Federalist party. He thought "that there was no common-law juris-
diction in the Courts of the United States; but he believed the common-law doctrines of
libels as applicable to the Government of the United States as to any other Govern-
ment." 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2141 (1798). In later debates, however, Harper said that
"he never had a doubt" that "the offense of libelling the Government was punishable in
the United States without the aid of a statute." 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 414 (1800). As a
species of common law, "which our forefathers brought with them," he continued, the
offense "arises under the Constitution, and in that view the judiciary power can punish
libels against the Government of the United States." Id. at 414-15.
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from common law.36 4
Phrased in these terms, the Federalist justification for the Act im-
mediately precipitated controversy over whether the common law was
at all applicable to the federal government in the absence of statutory
reception. 65 Federalists took various tacks on this issue, as did their
opponents-none of whom, as Julius Goebel has remarked,
"resembl[ed] a searching inquiry on a professional level into what was
the constitutional warrant for judicial dependence upon the common
law.",
36 6
Throughout the debates on the Act, Federalists labored the Revo-
lutionary argument that the common law was the birthright of the colo-
nists. As to what they meant by common law, Representative Samuel
W. Dana declared-during the later debates on continuing the Act-it
was "[t]hat common law which most undoubtedly secured to every indi-
vidual its most endeared rights, and afforded security against every spe-
cies of legal oppression . *. .."' Without the common law, Represen-
tative James A. Bayard proclaimed, "there is no law," since virtually
all statutes and the Constitution itself were predicated upon its exis-
tence.3 6 He continued:
If we are governed without law, it is despotism, whether
government is by the will of one or many. Were we left to
the will of courts we should be in a state of uncertainty; we
should be liable to suffer from caprice, vice, folly, and every
weakness. The existence of the common law is of immense
importance; without it, the Constitution would be a mere
skeleton, devoid of sinews and nerves, and incapable of
motion.3 69
Federalists pointed to the numerous provisions in the Constitution and
national statutes containing terms that presumed reference to accepted
3" See L. LEVY, supra note 40, at 50-51; J. MILLER, supra note 357, at 81-82.
See also 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 950 (1801) (statement of Rep. Bayard) (claiming that
the Sedition law. "limits and softens the penalties in cases of libels"); id. at 921 (state-
ment of Rep. Griswold) (explaining that the defense of truth was not available at com-
mon law); id. at 940 (statement of Rep. Harper) (stating that the Sedition Act was
more favorable for the press because it did not leave the punishment to the discretion of
the 'court); 9 ANNALS OF CONG. 2989 (1799) (Report of House Select Committee).
365 See D. STEWART, supra note 158, at 470.
J. GOEBEL, suprfa note 59, at 654.
367 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 924 (1801); see also 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2146 (1798)
(statement of Rep. Otis) (characterizing English common law as "birthright" of
Americans).
318 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 949 (1801).
69 Id.
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common-law meanings."'
Republicans conceded part of this argument, which they were
obliged to do. It "had never been denied," responded the House minor-
ity leader, Representative Albert Gallatin, "that the common law is in
-some measure the law of the land. 37 1 Federalists were accused of
"confound[ing] two very distinct ideas-the principles of the common
law, and the jurisdiction over cases arising under it."372 Gallatin in-
sisted that there was no common-law jurisdiction. 73 But in explaining
this point, the Congressman diverted the argument to a peripheral is-
sue. Gallatin asserted that there could be no national common law be-
cause "[t]he common law of Great Britain received in each colony, had
in every one received modifications arising from their situation . . .
and now each State had a common law, in its general principles the
same, but in many particulars differing from each other. 3714 The Con-
stitution could not have adopted the common law, Representative John
Nicholas continued, when it "is so various [among the States],
that . . . no man perfectly knew it at the time . . . .
That the common law differed in content amongst the states was
irrelevant, and Federalists had no trouble rebutting the contention.
Representative Harrison G. Otis responded with the obvious:
We mean not the law of England in its full extent. We know
that a great part of that law does not apply to the nature of
our Government or the circumstances of our country. But we
mean so much of that law as, being applicable to the circum-
stances of this people, has been adopted into practice by con-
stant and immemorial usage.
3 76
To illustrate, he noted that every state had unquestioned authority to
punish crimes. This was
inherent in the people of every State, and had never been
relinquished by any of the United States. It was a principle
of common law essential to the preservation of social order
and of every Government under Heaven. It was the basis of
the present Constitution; a birthright to which we should
370 See, e.g., id. at 949-50 (statement of Rep. Dana); id. at 411-12 (1800) (state-
ment of Rep. Bayard); id. at 417-18 (statement of Rep. Otis); id. at 420-21 (statement
of Rep. Dana).
371 Id. at 951 (1801).
372 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2157 (1798) (statement of Rep. Albert Gallatin).
373 See id. at 2137.
374 Id.
375 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2141 (1798).
376 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 418 (1800).
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cling as a blessing and a privilege, and not abjure as a
curse. 
3
7
Federalists asked what could be the objection to the courts of the
United States using the same process of common-law decisionmaking as
was employed "in the courts of the different States, where they love the
common law? 3 =8 And that pinpointed the source of the division be-
tween the two camps. While Federalists were confident that common-
law decisionmaking was an attribute of every government, Republicans
adamantly held that the federal government had no such characteristic.
The common law "was a complete system," Representative Nicholas
reminded his Federalist opponents, which was designed "for the man-
agement of all the affairs of a country. It regulated estate, punished all
crimes, and, in short, went to all things for which laws are necessary. It
might be more properly considered as the measure of the powers left
with the States. 379 To allow federal courts this authority "was clearly
the same," declared Representative Gallatin, "as setting aside at one
stroke all the restrictions and limitations of power as expressed in the
Constitution."38 0
Republicans insisted on being told which provision in the Consti-
tution gave the federal courts such authority. Surely Congress had no
ability to adopt this "complete system" of laws, which would displace
state power entirely. Neither could a national common law be justified
as "necessary and proper" to constituting the judiciary-unless it was
"intended to give them a power not necessary to their declared pow-
ers."381 Representative Gallatin had earlier denied that article III con-
tained any language that might support a claim that the federal judici-
ary, even with the assistance of enabling legislation, could act as
common-law courts:
[F]or the judicial authority of those courts is, by the Consti-
tution, declared to extend to cases of Admiralty, or affecting
public Ministers; to suits between States, citizens of different
States, or foreigners, and to cases arising under the Constitu-
tion, laws, and treaties, made under the authority of that
Constitution; excluding, therefore, cases not arising under ei-
ther-cases arising under the common law.38 2
17 Id.
378 Id. at 949 (1801) (statement of Rep. Bayard).
371 9 ANNALS OF CONG. 3012 (1799) (statement of Rep. Nicholas).
380 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 413 (1800) (omitted portions of this quote appear supra
in text accompanying note 380).
381 9 ANNALS OF CONG. 3012 (1799) (statement of Rep. Nicholas).
382 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2157 (1798) (emphasis added).
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Gallatin somewhat distorted the text of article III to serve his pur-
pose."' 3 More importantly, in presenting the issue, he revealed the real
sources of contention. "The question was not," Gallatin urged,
"whether the Courts of the United States had, without this law, the
power to punish libels, but whether, supposing they had not the power,
Congress had that of giving them this jurisdiction-whether Congress
were vested by the Constitution with the authority of passing this
bill?"' " There were actually two interrelated issues here, and Gallatin
elaborated on these in a speech less than two years later in which he
argued against extending the Act:
[I]f it was intended to say that certain species of offences,
which had been recognised as offences by the common law
(perhaps) of Great Britain, were within the jurisdiction of
the judiciary of the United States, merely because they were
offences at common law, it was . . . .giving to the judiciary
a legislative power of adopting certain laws not enacted by
Congress as the law of the land. Indeed it was giving a far-
ther power: Congress had no power to legislate on any sub-
ject which was not specially granted to them by the Consti-
tution; but, if the other doctrine was true, the judiciary could
decide on subjects upon which Congress could not
legislate.385
To modern readers, Gallatin's remarks may appear to blend argu-
ments over federalism with those of separation of powers. Republicans
were bothered by the judiciary's role in defining crimes; they were the
ones who had experienced the effects of these prosecutions. Yet the
power of state courts to convict for seditious libel under common-law
authority was conceded by the Republicans, albeit grudgingly at
times. 8" The prime source of dispute was not the scope of judicial
Article III reads: "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under their Authority .... ." U.S. CONST. art. III, §
2, ch. 1. The use of "made" would seem to be a reference to treaties, not to laws. Few,
however, would want to stake a constitutional argument on a comma placement.
as 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2157-58 (1798).
s 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 413 (1800) (The omitted portions of this quote appear
in text accompanying note 360.).
388 See supra text accompanying note 358 (statement of Rep. Macon). Some
Republicans, such as Representative Thomas Claiborne, claimed that "the doctrine of
libels was very unsettled in this country. Prosecutions of this kind have very rarely
happened .... ." 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2135 (1798). Representative Robert G.
Harper responded that the law was well settled, and noted that "[hie had himself been
witness to four or five trials of this kind in the State from which he came, and could not
believe there could remain a doubt as to the power in such cases." Id. at 2136. During
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power, but rather the powers of the federal government itself.
Federalists contended that the federal judiciary was akin to state
judiciaries. "No State has enacted statutes for the punishment of all
crimes which may be committed,""87 observed Representative Otis in
the 1798 Sedition Act debates. Instead, "in every State . . . there was
a Superior Court which claimed cognizance of all offences against good
morals, and which restrained misdemeanors and opposition to the con-
stituted authorities, under the sanction merely of the common law.M
88
Americans, he continued, were "habituated" to the common law when
they adopted their national government, and thus "it will be natural to
conclude that, in forming the Constitution, they kept in view the model
of the common law, and that a safe recourse may be had to it in all
cases that would otherwise be doubtful."' 9 With regard to federal ju-
risdiction, Otis maintained that "one great end of this compact . . -is
the establishment of justice," which he argued was the purpose of arti-
cle 111.390 Otis then committed himself:
Justice, if the common law ideas of it are rejected, is suscep-
tible of various constructions, but agreeably to the principles
of that law, it affords redress for every injury, and provides a
punishment for every crime that threatens to disturb the
lawful operations of Government. Again, what is intended
by 'cases at law and equity arising under the Constitution,'
as distinguished from cases 'arising under the laws of the
United States?' What other law can be contemplated but
common law; what sort of equity but that legal discretion
which has been exercised in England from time immemo-
rial ... ?89
Other Federalist leaders were just as candid in claiming that com-
mon-law jurisdiction existed by virtue of of the judicial powers encom-
the subsequent debates over continuing the Sedition Act, Representative Otis singled
out a favorite Republican example of a notorious libel prosecution to point out that it
had been held "upon that good old wholesome common law," and not the Sedition Act.
See 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 955 (1801). For examples of state libel prosecutions at this
time, see N. SCHACHNER, supra note 162, at 479, 483; Anderson, Contemporary Opin-
ion of the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, 5 AM. HIST. REv. 45, 61-63 (1899).
387 8 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 2146 (1798).
u8 Id.
89 Id.
890 Id.
391 Id. at 2146-47. Otis reminded his listeners and readers of the many federal
common-law prosecutions, and noted the clause in the statutory admiralty jurisdiction
"'saving to suitors in all cases the right of a common law remedy, where the common
law was competent to give it.' " Id. (quoting The Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, 77,
ch. 20, § 9(a)).
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passed by the Constitution."9 2 This reading of the Constitution is what
prompted the remark from Representative Nicholas that the common
law was a "complete system." ' To the Republicans, their opponents
were claiming a federal establishment of vast powers, far exceeding
those enumerated in article I.
2. The Federal Judiciary and the Common Law During the
Sedition Act Controversy
One significant outgrowth of the Sedition Act was the consistent
assertion by federal judges of "competent authority to pass upon [an
Act of Congress], and to decide whether it be const[itutional] or not."' '
Of course, the Act cleared this hurdle; as Justice Paterson said, "[lt [is]
well known, that the circuit courts of the U[nited] States have uni-
formly declared, that Congress were authorized to pass the law in ques-
tion . . . . 95 Federal juidges went beyond these pronouncements; they
helped lead the charge in enforcing the Act, convinced that Republicans
were "by arts of sophistry . . . inflaming the passions of weak minds,
delud[ing] many into opinions the most dangerous, and conduct[ing]
them to actions the most criminal." '96 Perhaps no other series of opin-
ions better reflects the underlying social values of many on the federal
bench. Consider this grand jury charge by Justice Paterson:
Seditious persons are common disturbers of public repose,
and pests to society; they are bad men and worse citizens.
The apostolic rule to mind our own business, and study to be
quiet is an excellent guide in social life. Let us seek peace
and be obedient to the laws; let us fear God, respect our
government, and honor the constituted authorities of our
country. 9
A number of the Federalists' arguments that appeared in the con-
3,, See, e.g., 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 411 (1800) (statement of Rep. Bayard) ("He
had always been of opinion . . . that the common law existed under the Constitution
of the United States .... [A1ll judges united in [this] opinion with the exception of
one."); see also J. MILLER, THE FEDERALIST ERA 232 (1960) (explaining that in the
Federalists' eyes, the Sedition Act was constitutional because the Constitution had "en-
dowed the national government with cognizance over all cases arising under the com-
mon law").
3,, 9 ANNALS OF CONG. 3012 (1799).
3" Opinion of Justice William Paterson, W. Paterson, supra note 243, at 543.
395 Id.
3" Charge to the Grand Jury for the District of Pennsylvania (Apr. 11, 1799),
supra note 349. For an examination of the participation of federal judges in enforcing
the Sedition Act, see supra notes 168-69 & 361 and accompanying text.
'" Grand Jury Charge (n.d., n.p.), W. Paterson, supra note 347.
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gressional debates can also be found in the judicial writings of this pe-
riod. Justice Iredell, for example, quoted extensively from Blackstone
during a grand jury charge to justify his conclusion that the first
amendment prohibited only prior restraints. A government must
through criminal libel prosecutions, Iredell asserted, "censure the licen-
tiousness . . .to maintain the liberty of the press." ' Both Iredell and
Paterson echoed the sentiment heard in Congress that the Sedition Act
was far less restrictive of the press than was the common law.3 "9 This
line of defense was meant not only as an interpretation of the first
amendment; it also introduced the question of whether the federal
courts had jurisdiction over common-law libel prosecutions.
In what appears to have been the draft of an opinion, Justice Pat-
erson addressed the issue of common-law libel actions in federal court:
I have no doubt of its extension. Throughout the con-
stit[utio]n references are made to it ...
The common law extends to every state. Our ancestors
brought it over with them as their birthright. It is somewhat
remarkable, that the common law should extend to the states
individually, and yet not to the states collectively, or in the
aggregate. The const[itutio]n of the U[nited] States was in-
tended . . . to confirm, preserve, and perpetuate these
rights . . . .The result is, that the const[itutio]n is predi-
cated upon the com[mon] law; it assumes it as an existing
rule, and is built upon it as such. 00
So far this quote may seem compatible with the more modest proposi-
tion that the Constitution must be interpreted in light of common-law
usage. This was part of what Paterson and others were maintaining,
but it was only the foundation for a quite larger claim.
Paterson explicitly endorsed common-law prosecutions in federal
courts, saying that "[t]he principle of self defense and preservation,
which pervades nations, as well as individuals, renders the punishment
of offences an indispensible requisite in every government. ' 40 1 For con-
stitutional authorization of the assumption of jurisdiction, Paterson re-
lied upon article III:
"" Charge to the Grand Jury for the District of Pennsylvania (Apr. 11, 1799),
supra note 349 (quoting 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, supra note 254, at
151).
8 See id.; W. Paterson, supra note 243, at 535-37.
40o W. Paterson, supra note 243, at 533-35.
401 Id. at 565.
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The judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and
equity, &c. All cases in law and equity have a clear and
definite meaning, well understood through our whole coun-
try. All cases at law mean all cases at common law arising
under the const[itutio]n.-The common law is the unwritten
law, is recognized in and pervades every state of the Union.
To calumniate the governm[en]t or oppose lawful acts is an
offence at com[mon] law.4°2
During the congressional debates, this type of contention had
drawn the severest of Republican denunciations-that Federalists were
paving the way for a consolidated national government. Paterson did
not shirk from the assault:
The const[itutio]n of the U[nited] States is sui generis; it is a
mixed thing, partly consolidated & partly federal, though in
its prominent features, it has more of the former than of the
latter. It must be agreed, that the United States, under the
existing const[itutio]n, form a complete, sovereign, and inde-
pendent nation, to which the rights of sovereigns and the law
of nations attach . . . . The enumeration [of powers in the
Constitution] is complete, and embraces all the great objects
of national association.403
Nor were Paterson's comments isolated sentiments. Chief Justice Ells-
worth used much the same language before a 1799 grand jury, in a
charge that was widely reprinted throughout the country:
An offence consists in transgressing the sovereign
will . . . . Conduct therefore, clearly destructive of a gov-
ernment, or its powers, which the people have ordained to
exist, must be criminal. It is not necessary to particularize
the facts falling within this description, because they are
readily perceived, and are ascertained by known and estab-
lished rules; I mean the maxims and principles of the com-
mon law of our land. This law, as brought from the country
of our ancestors . . . was the law of every part of the union
at the formation of the national compact; and did, of course,
attach upon or apply to it, for the purposes of exposition and
enforcement. It is true, that the parties acting in their sover-
eign capacity, might have discontinued that law . . . but
that they intended a discontinuance so contrary to usage in
402 Id. at 541.
403 Id. at 555-56.
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similar cases, and so pregnant with mischief, is certainly not
to be presumed; and it is a supposition irreconcilable with
those frequent references in the constitution to the common
law, as a living code.
4 0 4
Ellsworth was presented with the opportunity to apply this philos-
ophy in a case that same year, United States v. Williams.4 05 This was
not a sedition action, but an indictment "on one of the articles of the
British treaty" for various acts of hostility against England, which in-
cluded serving on a French warship and privateering.408 Williams de-
fended on the ground that prior to these actions, to which he admitted,
"" Charge to the Grand Jury for the District of South Carolina (May 15, 1799),
reprinted in Claypoole's American Daily Advertiser (Philadelphia), May 31, 1799;
also reprinted in Virginia Argus (Richmond), Aug. 9, 1799; City Gazette (Charles-
ton), July 15, 1799; Columbian Centinel (Boston), July 7, 1799; Newport Mercury
(Newport, R.I.), June 18, 1799; Farmer's Museum or Lay Preacher's Gazette (Wal-
pole, N.H.), June 17, 1799; Independent Chronicle (Boston), June 13, 1799; Federal
Gazette (Baltimore), June 10, 1799; American Daily Advertiser (Baltimore), June 5,
1799; The Philadelphia Gazette, June 4, 1799; Daily Advertiser (New York), May 29,
1799.
405 29 F. Cas. 1330 (C.C.D. Conn. 1799) (No. 17,708). Ellsworth sat with Judge
Richard Law.
4" 29 F. Cas. at 1331 n.* (quoting Letter from Chauncey Goodrich to Oliver
Wolcott (Sept. 28, 1799), reprinted in 2 MEMOIRS OF THE ADMINISTRATIONS OF
WASHINGTON AND ADAMS 266 (G. Gibbs ed., New York 1846)). In the Trial of Wil-
liam Butler for Piracy 10-11 (1813) [original pamphlet in Harvard Law School Li-
brary; copy on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review], a decision proba-
bly authored by Justice Johnson, it was "suppose[d]" that Williams had been
"punishable under the act of June '94," inasmuch as he could not "think that the
learned Judge [Ellsworth] would have referred this question to the Common Law of
Great Britain, instead of placing it on doctrines of universal law." The author obvi-
ously did not have an accurate report of the case, a fact he conceded. See id. at 10.
Under the statute mentioned, it was a high misdemeanor for a person "within the
territory or jurisdiction of the United States [to] enlist . . . in the service of any foreign
prince or state." Act of June 5, 1794, ch. 50, § 2, 1 Stat. 381, 383. This statute could
not have reached Williams, who was charged in the indictment with accepting a com-
mission from France at Guadaloupe, "without the jurisdiction of any particular state."
Williams, 29 F. Cas. at 1330. The only other wi-y that Williams could have been
indicted under the statute would have been to show that he had "go[ne] beyond the
limits or jurisdiction of the United States with intent to be enlisted in the service" of
another country. Act of June 5, 1794, ch. 50, § 2, 1 Stat. 381, 383. Not only was the
indictment not phrased in these terms, but also this statute was applicable to "any
person," not merely citizens. The sole issue in the case was whether Williams was an
American citizen at the time of enlistment, a point necessary to establish if the crime
were based on the theory used in Henfield. As in Hen field, the indictment avers that
Williams was acting against England, "contrary to . . . the treaty of amity, commerce,
and navigation then existing between Great Britain and the said United States." 29 F.
Cas. at 1330. These allegations were irrelevant to a prosecution under the statute men-
tioned by Johnson. Indeed, Williams' only objection to jurisdiction was that he had
renounced his American citizenship "before the ratification of the treaty." Id. Similarly,
Williams could not have been indicted under § 1 of the June 5th Act because he was
not within the jurisdiction of the United States when he acted.
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he had relinquished American citizenship in favor of French status.
Justice Ellsworth rejected the legal sufficiency of the expatriation
defense:
The common law of this country remains the same as it
was before the Revolution. The present question is to be de-
cided by two great principles; one is, that all the members of
civil community are bound to each other by compact. The
other is, that one of the parties to this compact cannot dis-
solve it by his own act.
40 7
Ellsworth denied that Williams had been granted permission to expa-
triate, and the defendant was convicted, fined, and imprisoned.
Charles Warren wrote of Williams that "[n]o decision by any Fed-
eral Judge had ever aroused so great and widespread resentment."408
Since the case was decided during the undeclared war at sea between
France and the United States, it immediately provoked passionate feel-
ings in the popular press. The court was accused of advocating monar-
chial principles, of resurrecting the principle from feudal times that one
cannot expatriate, and of making Americans once again subjects of
Great Britain by applying its common law. 09
John Marshall saw the matter differently, as he explained to a
correspondent in 1800:
Isaac Williams was prosecuted on two separate indict-
ments-the one for privateering under a French commission
against the British & the other for privateering under the
same commission against his own countrymen. He was
found guilty on both indictments. In the one case he was
guilty of an offence against a public treaty of the United
States & in the other of an offence against the United States
on the high seas. . . .The defence set up, so far as I under-
stand it, was that by taking a commission in the service of
France which was itself a crime, Isaac Williams withdrew
himself from the cognizance of our courts by ceasing to be an
American citizen. ...
In the case of Williams the common law was not relied
on as giving the court jurisdiction, but came in incidentally
as part of the law of a case of which the court had complete
and exclusive possession. I do not understand you as ques-
407 29 F. Cas. at 1331.
408 1 C. WARREN, supra note 38, at 161.
409 See D. STEWART, supra note 158, at 151; 1 0. WARREN, supra note 38, at
161-62.
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tioning the propriety of thus applying the common law, not
of England, but of our own country.410
These sentiments, paralleled by those in Ellsworth's opinion in
Williams, expanded the inquiry over the scope of federal common-law
crimes. No longer was it stated as simply as it was in Henfield, that the
United States could develop its own common law to treat those who
threatened national peace via the accepted route of nonstatutory prose-
cutions. Now the matter was put in a much broader fashion: that the
principles of the common law were directly applicable to the judiciary
of the United States. Marshall might insist that this was the common
law "of our own country," but Ellsworth's opinion reflected the obvi-
ous-any unwritten law would necessarily use the common law of
England as the most important source of reference. Certainly that is
what occurred in Williams. This aspect of Williams was seized upon
instantly by the opposition and turned into a rhetorical weapon of un-
limited possibilities. Peter Du Ponceau would later write about the dis-
tortion of the issue: "Thus a sound doctrine by being mixed with a
doubtful, and, at any rate, an unpopular principle, made a nation
afraid of the common law, which they thought turned their country into
a prison and preventing [sic] them from migrating withersoever they
pleased.'
114
The remarks by Marshall, Paterson, and Ellsworth contain a po-
tent ambiguity that pervaded the congressional discussions as well. Al-
bert Gallatin came closest in exposing the problem when he announced
that Federalists were confusing "two very distinct ideas," those being
"the principles of the common law, and the jurisdiction over cases aris-
ing under it.' 412 Apparently finessing the question, Marshall denied
that the common law gave a federal court jurisdiction; it came in "inci-
dentally" to courts already possessing "complete and exclusive" juris-
diction. But what was the source of that jurisdiction? Those Federalists
who replied "the Constitution" invited the attacks on the Sedition Act
that came out in Congress. Perhaps Marshall and others meant the
only other alternative: that Section 11 of the 1789 Judiciary Act had
4"0 Letter from John Marshall to St. George Tucker (Nov. 27, 1800) [original on
file in the manuscript division of the Library of Congress; reproduced in Appendix A to
Part Two]. For a discussion of Marshall's position on the question of federal common-
law crimes, see Appendix B to Part Two.
411 P. Du PONCEAU, A DISSERTATION ON THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE
JURISDIcTION OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES 93 (Philadelphia 1824). An
equally troublesome aspect of Ellsworth's position was the fact that the British used it
as a justification for the impressment of American sailors. See 1 C. WARREN, supra
note 38, at 162.
412 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2157 (1798).
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given federal courts authority over federal common-law crimes by vir-
tue of its grant of "exclusive cognizance of all crimes and offenses cog-
nizable under the authority of the United States."4 If so, that inter-
pretation turned section 11 into an open-ended provision for common-
law criminal jurisdiction, constrained only by the judges' discretion in
deciding what was "the common law . . . of our own country."
Republicans were scarcely willing to entrust that responsibility to the
likes of federal judges they already knew, much less the future Chief
Justice.
3. Pushed to Extremes: Jefferson and Madison on the Common
Law
It would be an understatement to characterize the Republican re-
action to the Federalist position on national judicial power that
emerged in the late 1790's as vehement or caustic. One consequence of
the enactment of the Alien and Sedition Acts was the Virginia and
Kentucky Resolutions, which in frank terms declared the Union a com-
pact among states that gave the federal government only limited pow-
ers, "and that, in case of a deliberate, palpable, and dangerous exercise
of other powers, not granted by the said compact, the states ...are in
duty bound, to interpose, for arresting the progress of the
evil . . ." Virginia's version insisted that the Alien and Sedition
Acts were beyond the power delegated to the federal government. 15 In
an accompanying document, the House of Delegates advanced the ar-
gument another step, contending that if these acts were constitutional,
"Congress will be endowed with a power of legislation in all cases
whatsoever, and the states will be stripped of every right reserved, by
the concurrent claims of a paramount legislature."4 6 The House went
"13 See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
414 Virginia Resolution of 1798, reprinted in 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note
138, at 528. The Kentucky Resolution also declared that the Constitution was a "com-
pact," the terms of which "each party has an equal right to judge for itself, as well of
infractions as of the mode and measure of redress." Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 and
1799, reprinted in 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 138, at 540. It went on to an-
nounce that the Alien and Sedition Acts were "altogether void, and of no force." Id. A
year later, after Virginia remained the sole state willing to pass a similar resolution,
Kentucky passed a second resolution, protesting "[tihat the several states who formed
that instrument [the Constitution], being sovereign and independent, have the unques-
tionable right to judge of the infraction: and, That a nullification, by those sovereign-
ties, of all unauthorized acts done under color of that instrument, is the righfful
remedy ..... " Reprinted in 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 138, at 545.
415 Extracts from the Address to the People, reprinted in 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES,
supra note 138, at 530.
416 Id. at 531.
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on to a litany of complaints aimed at the two Federalist Administra-
tions, touching on familiar topics: economic regulation, "which keep[s]
a host of commercial and wealthy individuals imbodied, and obedient to
the mandates of the treasury,"'41 7 military appropriations for a perma-
nent army and navy charged with "punishing imaginary insurrec-
tions,"41" "swarms" of federal officers "act[ing] as spies over the free
exercise of human reason,' 14 9 and so on. Interspersed throughout these
objections were the obligatory blasts at consolidation and monarchism.
In addition to drafting the Virginia Resolution, Madison prepared
a report for the House of Delegates that linked the Federalist claims in
support of the Alien and Sedition Acts with the federal common-law
issue. First, Madison observed that "[ijf . . . the common law is estab-
lished by the Constitution, it follows that no part of the law can be
altered by the legislature. . . . [T]he whole code, with all its incongru-
ities, barbarisms, and bloody maxims, would be inviolably saddled on
the good people of the United States.' 4 20 If this understanding of the
common law were rejected, and Congress did have the power to alter
laws, "it then follows that the authority of Congress is coextensive with
the objects of common law . . . . Congress would, therefore, be no
longer under the limitation marked out in the Constitution.' 421 More-
over, Madison charged the Federalists with attempting to incorporate
"part of the unwritten law of England" into the Constitution.2 Fi-
nally, the report warned that "whether the common law be admitted as
of legal or of constitutional obligation, it would confer on the judicial
department a discretion little short of a legislative power. "423
The first of Madison's points-that the common law would not be
modifiable by Congress if it were part of the Constitution-seems hard
to take seriously, but it was frequently made at the time.' 2 ' This argu-
ment illustrates the manner in which the Republicans had strategically
transformed the Federalist position. By insisting that their opponents
were actually incorporating the corpus of English common law, they
powerfully manipulated the symbols of the controversy. In one bold
stroke they drew upon deep anxieties about English domination, made
417 Id.
418 Id.
419 Id.
4 0 Madison's Report on the Virginia Resolutions (1800), reprinted in 4 EL-
iOT'S DEBATES, supra note 138, at 565.
421 Id. at 566.
422 Id.
423 Id.
424 See, e.g., 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2142 (1798) (statement of Rep. Nicholas) ("If
gentlemen say it is adopted by the Constitution, it must remain unchangeable . ,...").
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plausible the claim that Federalists were monarchists, and traded on
fears that the English common law was far too antiquated, intricate,
and technical for republican sensibilities.425
One suspects that these were rhetorical flourishes to garnish the
main item of complaint-that the assertion of common-law powers by
federal courts was tantamount to claiming that the United States was a
consolidated national government. Jefferson reiterated this theme in
1800, warning that if the Federalist position were accepted, then the
general government would be "possesse[d] . . .of all the powers of the
state governments, and reduce[] . . .us to a single consolidated govern-
ment. "42 6 Considering the tameness of modern discussions about federal
common law, and the total lack of public controversy over the subject, it
is difficult to conceive of Jefferson writing the following:
[I]f the principle were to prevail, of a common law being in
force in the US, . . . it would become the most corrupt gov-
ernment on the earth. You have seen the practises by which
the public servants have been able to cover their conduct, or,
where that could not be done, delusions by which they have
varnished it for the eye of their constituents. What an aug-
mentation of the field for jobbing, speculating, plundering,
office-building & office-hunting would be produced by an
assumption of all the state powers into the hands of the gen-
eral government.427
For Jefferson and other Republicans, the issue was a part of a
much larger scheme. With respect to the common law, he had "no
doubt [that Federalists had] decided to cram it down our throats," and
that they were attempting to "accomplish- a monarchy peaceably, or
force a resistance [that] with the aid of any army may end in monar-
chy."14 s2 Jefferson wrote this in October of 1799, when "[tihe late mis-
fortunes of France would probably render the consolidationers more
enterprising and more intolerant than ever."'429 It was in February of
the same year that Hamilton, alarmed at the mood in Virginia and
Kentucky, had proposed raising a sizeable army.4"' Along with these
proposals, Hamilton and other Federalists were planning a significant
425 See 2 A. CHROUST, supra note 292, at 56-57.
428 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Gideon Granger (Aug. 13, 1800), reprinted
in 9 THE WORKS oF THOMAS JEFFERSON 139 (P. Ford ed. 1905).
427 Id. at 139-40.
4"8 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Charles Pinckney (Oct. 29, 1799), reprinted
in 9 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 87 (P. Ford ed. 1905).
420 Id. at 88.
430 See Turner, supra note 160, at 9.
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expansion in the size and scope of the federal judiciary through a legis-
lative initiative that would become the 1801 Judiciary Act.431 Jefferson
expressed his concern over the Federalist plans in a letter to Edmund
Randolph that August:
Of all the doctrines which have ever been broached by
the federal government, the novel one, of the common law
being in force & cognizable as an existing law in their
courts, is to me the most formidable. All their other assump-
tions of un-given powers have been in the detail. The bank
law, the treaty doctrine, the sedition act, alien act, the under-
taking to change the state laws of evidence in the state courts
by certain parts of the stamp act, &c., &c., have been soli-
tary, unconsequential, timid things, in comparison with the
audacious, barefaced and sweeping pretension to a system of
law for the U S, without the adoption of their legislature,
and so infinitely beyond their power to adopt. If this as-
sumption be yielded to, the state courts may be shut up, as
there will then be nothing to hinder citizens of the same state
suing each other in the federal courts in every case, as on a
bond for instance, because the common law obliges payment
of it, & the common law they say is their law.432
There is more than a bit of irony in this correspondence between
two men who had once played key roles in the prosecution of Gideon
Henfield.433 Randolph observed in a letter to Madison at this time that
431 Ch. 4, 2 Stat. 89, repealed by Act of March 8, 1802, ch. 8, 2 Stat. 132. For a
discussion of the politics of the 1801 Judiciary Act, see infra text accompanying notes
454-76.
432 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmund Randolph, (Aug. 18, 1799), re-
printed in 9 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 73 (P. Ford ed. 1905).
433 For a discussion of Henfield, see supra text accompanying notes 221-43. Ran-
dolph offered an explanation for his earlier theory in that case, noting that the "general
question" of common-law jurisdiction "never came into consideration." Letter from Ed-
mund Randolph to James Madison (1799), reprinted in M. CONWAY, OMITTED
CHAPTERS OF HISTORY DISCLOSED IN THE LIFE AND PAPERS OF EDMUND RAN-
DOLPH 185 (2d ed. 1888) (1st ed. New York 1887). Rather, the basis for the indict-
ment, Randolph explained, was Henfield's treaty violation considered in light of Sec-
tion 34 of the 1789 Judiciary Act, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (Sept. 24, 1798) (current
version at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1982)), which made state law the rule of decision: "[T]he
laws of Pennsylvania, within those boundaries the offence was committed, compre-
hending the common law, would aid the treaty . . . . [N]amely, that when a statute
forbids a thing to be done, without annexing a penalty, the common law makes it
indictable and punishable, as a misdemeanor." Letter from Edmund Randolph to
James Madison (1799), supra, at 185. Randolph had, however, signed the govern-
ment's brief in Henfeld, in which it was argued that the defendant's conduct consti-
tuted "an offence against our own country, at common law, because the right of war is
vested in the government only." Henfield, 11 F. Cas. at 1117. These were not "specu-
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the trial had occurred "when party had not taken deep root, and conse-
quences to one or the other side were not foreseen."4 4 This comment
betrays more than the obvious fact that the whole controversy had be-
come associated with the fortunes of partisan players. Looking back
over the previous decade, an observer could appreciate how the dispute
had been recharacterized, with the constitutional argument emerging
ever more sharply as the political contest matured.4 35
Jefferson would soon occupy the highest office, and his constitu-
tional views, as we have seen,4 6 would require some substantial altera-
tions. The constitutional issues of this period must be understood in
terms of the political atmosphere in which the competing interpreta-
tions of the Constitution arose. An additional chapter in the pre-Hud-
son story needs to be added to complete our outline of the essential
political forces that shaped the form in which the issue about the com-
mon law was presented. This was the short-lived-still-born would be
more accurate-1801 Judiciary Act.
437
C. Federal Common Law and the Judiciary Act of 1801
A long-standing assumption about the 1801 Judiciary Act has
lations of the closet," since "we see them carried into effect in England in affirmation
of national common law, i.e. the law of nations." Id. In response to the defense's claim
that there was a lack of precedent in support of the action, the prosecution had said:
"The first answer is, that it is demonstrated that the law of nations is part of the law of
the land. The second answer is, that in numerous other instances, enumerated by
Blackstone, the law of nations is enforced by the judiciary." Id.
43" Letter from Edmund Randolph to James Madison (1799), supra note 433, at
185.
"" Scholars of dispute resolutions have characterized the general pattern exhibited
by such controversies:
[L]anguage is used as a vehicle for transformation .... To expand a
dispute . . . is to change the perspective from which the third party
would ordinarily view the act, person, or relationship involved in the dis-
pute by placing it in a class of objects from which it would normally be
distinguished. This is a political process. Individuals and groups have
vested interests in particular definitions of persons and events; changes in
definition tend to meet with resistance, and thus require some basis of
support if they are to succeed (e.g., linkage to a relevant public with some
political or economic power). It is a linguistic process in that changes in
perspective and definition involve applying new labels to familiar persons
and events. These new labels act as 'a catalyst in the shaping of percep-
tion . . . . [P]eople potentially see an issue in several alternative lights,
and the language form itself evokes some of the potentialities . .. .
Mather & Yngvesson, Language, Audience and the Transformation of Disputes, 15
LAW & Soc. REv. 775, 798-99 (1980) (quoting M. EDELMAN, PoLrrIcs As SYM-
BOLIC ACTION: MASS AROUSAL AND QUIESCENCE 68 (1971)) (emphasis added by
Mather & Yngvesson).
436 See supra text accompanying notes 105-10 & 130-32.
4 Ch. 4, 2 Stat. 89, repealed by Act of March 8, 1802, ch. 8, § 1, 2 Stat. 132.
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been that* it represented a "pure case of a political intrigue, of a de-
feated party striving to retain some semblance of power by intrenching
itself in the Judiciary. '4 8 Republicans charged that Federalists had at-
tempted to "entrench themselves in the event of an unsuccessful issue in
the election, and continue[d] to support those favorite principles of irre-
sponsibility which they could never consent to abandon."4 9 A number
of new offices were created, including sixteen judgeships with lifetime
tenure, and positions for clerks, attorneys, and marshalls to augment
the expanded judicial system.440
Republicans paid less attention to the provisions enhancing federal
subject matter jurisdiction, which effectively gave the federal courts vir-
tually the full scope of powers authorized by article 111.441 Most impor-
tantly, these provisions expanded the jurisdiction of federal courts to
include "all cases in law or equity, arising under the constitution and
laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their authority; and also . . .all actions, or suits of a civil na-
ture, at common law, or in equity, where the United States shall be
plaintiffs or complainants. '442 As if tracking the language of article III
was not enough, the Act also provided the circuit courts with jurisdic-
tion over "all actions, or suits, matters, or things cognizable by the judi-
cial authority of the United States, under and by virtue of the constitu-
tion thereof.
'44
1
There is no explication in the recorded debates of the jurisdiction
for cases "arising under the constitution and laws of the United States,"
or "cognizable by the judicial authority." Moreover, neither of these
clauses appeared in the 1789 Judiciary Act.444 These were particularly
opaque provisions, although no more so than article III itself. Consid-
ering the limited activities of the national government, the immediate
utility of "arising under" jurisdiction could not have been significant.
But, the statutory grant of "arising under" jurisdiction, coupled with
the provision for "all actions . . .cognizable by the judicial author-
ity,"44 5 suggests that the Federalists had some form of common-law
process in mind. On the whole the record provides few clues, certainly
438 Sutherland, Politics and the Supreme Court, 48 AM. L. Ruv. 390, 394 (1914).
413 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 581 (1802) (statement of Rep. Giles).
440 See Farrand, The Judiciary Act of 1801, 5 Am. Hsr. REV. 682, 686 (1900).
44 See Shulman & Jaegerman, Some Jurisdictional Limitations on Federal Pro-
cedure, 45 YALE L.J. 393, 394 n.5 (1936).
442 Judiciary Act of 1801, ch. 4, § 11, 2 Stat. 89, 92.
443 Id.
44 See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (Sept. 24, 1798) (codified in
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
445 Judiciary Act of 1801, ch. 4, § 11, 2 Stat. 89, 92.
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not enough to indicate any understanding of what we would call "fed-
eral common law." Most likely the Federalists were planning ahead by
putting in place a judicial system that possessed all the potential powers
authorized by the Constitution. It is clear that the Federalists meant to
nationalize judicial activity as much as possible. In addition to ex-
panding the subject matter of federal courts, the 1801 Act failed to con-
tain any provision equivalent to section 34 of the 1789 Act, which had
required federal courts to utilize the states' laws "in cases where they
apply."
Other parts of the Act also reflected Federalist ambitions. The en-
forcement of federal criminal laws (including sedition) was made far
more effective by expanding federal court jurisdiction and judicial en-
forcement mechanisms;"4" tax collections, a nagging problem, were sim-
ilarly enhanced;447 and federal jurisdiction over the new uniform bank-
ruptcy system was established. 4  Circuit riding by Supreme Court
justices, long a source of complaint, was eliminated, and it was hoped
that this measure, together with an increase in the number of federal
courts, would encourage suitors to use the federal system.4" By al-
lowing Justices more time to consider appeals, proponents of the Act
expected it to provide for greater uniformity in the laws
administered."10
Federalists actually had been planning the Act for several years,
and they envisioned it as an important aspect of their overall national
program. In late 1799 Hamilton wrote to Speaker of the House
Jonathan Dayton regarding a proposal the former hold made that was
similar to the eventually adopted Act: "This measure is necessary to
give efficacy to the laws the execution of which is obstructed by the
want of similar organs and by the indisposition of the local Magistrates
in some states."45 In claiming the necessity for an efficient program to
446 See Turner, supra note 160, at 21, 31-32.
447 Id. at 31.
448 Judiciary Act of 1801, ch. 4, § 12, 1 Stat. 89, 92.
449 See, e.g., 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 117-18 (1802) (statement of Sen. White); id.
at 621-22 (statement of Rep. Bayard). These statements were made during the repeal
debates, which contain the most extensive recorded discussion of the Act's purpose.
450 See, e.g., id. at 124 (statement of Sen. Chipman); id. at 619-20 (statement of
Rep. Bayard).
451 Letter from Alexander Hamilton to Jonathan Dayton (Oct. or Nov. 1799),
reprinted in 23 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 601 (H. Syrett ed. 1976).
Earlier versions of the 1801 Act had been introduced unsuccessfully in the first session
of the Sixth Congress in 1800. See Turner, supra note 160, at 7-8. For an account of
these events and earlier proposals to expand the federal judiciary, see id. at 8-14. As
Hamilton had suggested to Dayton, the 1800 bill-unlike the 1801 Act-divided the
judicial system into 29 small districts, including multiple districts for some states. A
purported summary of the bill appeared in the Philadelphia Aurora, Mar. 24, 1800; it
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apply federal laws, Federalists made use of an old slogan: that the judi-
ciary was better suited for such purposes than the other alternative,
namely the army.452 This argument could not have been too persuasive,
since the tensions between the United States and France had lessened
by this time, and a powerful military was less justified than in previous
years.
45 3
When the Federalists suffered defeat in the 1800 elections, they
had little time left to take advantage of their congressional majority.
The purpose behind the proposal for alterations in the federal judiciary
promptly changed, and it became a matter of the Federalists preserving
a place in the government to guard against anticipated Republican in-
trigues. John Rutledge, Jr., then a Congressman from South Carolina,
indicated to Hamilton that the Act would "of course greatly widen the
basis of government. We shall profit of our short lived majority & do as
much good as we can before the end of this session.
At the same time as Hamilton was advocating a new judicial bill,
he was urging the continuance and augmentation of the permanent mil-
itary establishment, which he hoped to accomplish by raising a million
dollars in additional tax revenues.455 It was not possible that Republi-
cans would be duped into missing the import of the proposed legisla-
tion. They responded to the proposals with all of their usual theories
about conspiracies and the insatiable tendencies of humans to grasp for
ever more power. Representative Joseph H. Nicholson was particularly
colorful in the repeal debates of early 1802:
Man is fond of power, is continually grasping after it, and is
included a list of new federal circuits and districts. (The original bill is located in the
Library of Congress.) Republicans immediately saw this as a blatant attempt at consol-
idation, and they responded with sharp questions: "Which state's civil law should be
applied when the [circuit] contained parts of two commonwealths?" D. STEWART,
supra note 158, at 456. They also charged that this "might invalidate the elementary
principle that parties should be tried in the state where the crime was committed." Id.
452 At the North Carolina ratification convention, William R. Davie had used the
often heard expression:
For my own part, I know but two ways in which the laws can be executed
by any government. If there be any other, it is unknown to me. The first
mode is coercion by military force, and the second is coercion through the
judiciary .... [C]oercion by force . . .is so extremely repugnant to the
principles of justice and the feelings of a free people, that no man will
support it. . . . [T]here is no rational way of enforcing the laws but by
the instrumentality of the judiciary.
4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 138, at 155.
"5 See Turner, supra note 160, at 32.
'" Letter from John Rutledge, Jr. to Alexander Hamilton (Jan. 10, 1801), re-
printed in 25 THE PAPERS oF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 309 (H. Syrett ed. 1976).
"" See Letter from Alexander Hamilton to Jonathan Dayton (Oct. or Nov. 1799),
supra note 451, at 602-03.
[Vol. 133:1003
ORIGINS OF FEDERAL COMMON LAW
never satisfied . . . .But power, when once surrendered to
independent rulers, instantly becomes a despot, and arms it-
self with whips and chains. While the people retain it in
their own hands, it exalts the character of a nation, and is at
once their pride and their security; if they surrender it to
others, it becomes restless and active, until it debases the
human character, and enslaves the human mind; it is never
satisfied until it finally tramples upon all human rights.
4 58
Due to the Republican electoral victory, that party's fears of Fed-
eralist consolidation were allayed, and the new court system was never
effectively tested.457 Compared to the expansive role of the federal judi-
ciary in modern times, the clamor over the Act is hard for us to fathom.
In order to evaluate fairly the Republican response to the proposed
court system, considerable effort is required, especially if we take into
account some of the more ludicrous (and downright false) claims made
about the new system. 458 Nevertheless, there apparently was reason for
Republicans to smell something foul in the air. Although the program
had been discussed for years, it was tainted by the fact that it was
passed under obvious time pressures. The Federalists deliberately lim-
ited the debate in Congress, and the bill was signed by President Ad-
ams on the very day his successor was being selected by the House of
Representatives. 459 That staunch Federalists were quickly appointed to
posts in the judiciary was understandably a source of resentment. And
the Republicans could not have overlooked the fact that with the Act,
the federal courts' work, which previously had centered on maritime
disputes, was now expected to include "an avalanche of land dis-
putes.' '460 As the Act expanded diversity jurisdiction to include cases
involving land titles regardless of the amount in controversy, a huge
,51 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 830 (1802).
457 Only a few cases went to the new circuit courts before their abolition in 1802.
See G. HASKINS, supra note 38, at 134.
458 See Farrand, supra note 440, at 682.
459 During the repeal debates Republicans made bitter remarks about the legisla-
tive process that led to the enactment of the 1801 Act. See, e.g., 11 ANNALS OF CONG.
597 (1802) (statement of Rep. Giles). Giles complained:
In this state of things, when all confidence amongst the members of this
House was lost, in the highest paroxysm of party rage, was this law
'ushered into existence. And now its advocates gravely tell us to be calm, to
guard against the danger of our passions. They tell us, at the the same
time, that the law they have passed is sacred! inviolable! irrepealable! Does
it merit this extraordinary character from the circumstance which accom-
panied its passage? It does not.
Id.
460 See G. HASKINS, supra note 38, at 134.
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number of contested property claims from the West could be trans-
ferred to federal courts. It seems an unlikely coincidence that a sizeable
number of Members in the Sixth Congress, many of whom were sea-
soned lawyers, speculated in land on a large scale, and were well aware
of state court hostility to their ventures.4 "
Most of the themes and accusations that had crystallized in the
recent past were played out during the debates on the repeal of the
1801 Act. While Federalists spoke of "commerce increasing with great
rapidity, '462 of preventing "moneyed capitals" from being "drawn
off,"' 46 3 and of the need for "confidence as to protect property' 4s4 by
maintaining strong federal courts, Republicans attacked the very idea of
a national economy. Their argument paralleled the old Antifederalist
refrain from ratification days-the territory was simply too large, and
customs too diverse, to permit a general government. 0 5 Senator Abra-
ham Baldwin set the tone:
It is readily conceived, that the Eastern Continent, as well as
this Western, might have often reflected on the practicability
of this vast experiment; the great discouragement which has
probably prevented it, has been, that the immense and un-
wieldy enginery which would be necessary to carry it on, to
administer its laws, and manage its money transactions, with
tolerable intelligence and fidelity, and keep up the great vital
circulation, is not within the compass of human faculties and
481 See Turner, supra note 160, at 28-29. Professor Turner (now Preyer) points
out that not only large speculators, such as Representative Robert G. Harper and Sen-
ator James Gunn, were to profit, but also that many small investors, including the
Yazoo claimants, would be benefitted. See id. at 29-30. Federalists also threw their own
barbs, accusing Virginians of having excessive political influence. Representative Sa-
muel W. Dana asked at the repeal debates, "[i]s it apprehended, that there may eventu-
ally be issued, from the Federal courts, a process which will seriously affect some of
their baronial- estates?" 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 902 (1802).
482 See 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 34 (1802) (statement of Sen. Mason).
481 See id. at 946 (statement of Rep. Tallmadge).
44 See id.
48" Governor George Clinton of New York had urged the New York Convention
to consider that the American people, in "[tiheir habits, their productions, their re-
sources, and their political and commercial regulations, are as different as those of any
nation upon earth." 2 ELLIoT's DEBATES, supra note 138, at 262. The proposed Con-
stitution was dangerous and might act "cruelly," because "[i]n a small territory, malad-
ministration is easily corrected, and designs unfavorable to liberty frustrated and pun-
ished. But in large confederacies, the alarm excited by small and gradual
encroachments rarely extends to the distant members, or inspires a general spirit of
resistance." Id.; see also 3 EuOT'S DEBATES, supra note 138, at 216 (James Monroe,
Virginia Convention) ("Are there not a thousand circumstances showing clearly that
there can be no law that can be uniform in its operation throughout the United
States?").
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endowments.46
Representative Phillip R. Thompson maintained that federal court
jurisdiction was "extremely limited from the true and genuine construc-
tion of the Constitution.14 7 If national laws needed to be interpreted or
enforced, state courts were perfectly competent for the task. "[T]here
never has been an instance," declared Representative Joseph B.
Varnum, "in which a State court has refused or neglected to decide
with their usual promptitude, all actions which have arisen under the
Federal Government . *.".., Was there some problem of "judicial
imbecility or inattention, in the State courts?,"146 9 he demanded. For the
Republicans, the danger was precisely the opposite. They interpreted
the Federalist actions as demonstrating their contemplation of the
"gradual demolition of the State courts, by increasing the number and
extending the jurisdiction of the Federal courts . . .[which were] al-
ready filled with men who had manifested the most indecorous zeal in
favor of their principles."47 0 Opponents of the Act would not even con-
cede the need to eliminate circuit riding, a practice that Senator Bald-
win opined had provided Justices "the opportunity of a full knowledge
of local laws and usages."' 4  Finally, by returning to the old system,
"more than forty thousand dollars annually" would be saved, which
Representative Varnum observed "ought to have some weight with
faithful Representatives of a free people, unless a public debt is in fact
to be considered a public blessing.
47 2
The debate over the 1801 Act quickly became a contest to prove
who was the more faithful to the ideals of the country. Just as Republi-
cans reached back to pluck treasured wisdom from the past, so too did
Federalists accuse their rivals of violating the very premises that under-
lay the call to the Convention in Philadelphia. In words reminiscent of
those spoken by Madison at the Convention,473 Representative Roger
Griswold said that "it is idle to disguise the opinions which are enter-
tained of State judicatures by persons who have a right of trial by the
Constitution in your national courts. Sir, they have no confidence in
466 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 103-04 (1802).
467 Id. at 552.
468 Id. at 979.
469 Id.
470 Id. at 581 (statement of Rep. Giles).
471 Id. at 102. Republicans denied that circuit riding was causing court delays. See
id. at 978-79 (statement of Rep. Varnum). The Federalists, however, thought that this
view was plainly untrue and hotly contested the Republican claim. See id. at 172-73
(statement of Sen. Ogden); id. at 569-70 (statement of Rep. Stanley); id. at 617-18
(statement of Rep. Bayard); id. at 671-72 (statement of Rep. Huger).
472 Id. at 981.
47. See infra Part Two, notes 192 & 199 and accompanying text.
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some of those judicatures . . . 2 "' Before making this remark, Gris-
wold had produced a time-honored observation-"[t]he paper money
systems of some States, and the breach of treaties in respect to the col-
lection of debts in others taught the framers of our Constitution a con-
clusive lesson . . . to provide for the establishment of national
courts. '475 Other Federalists were less polite and associated the repeal
with every other Republican abuse they perceived. Representative Seth
Hastings was in something of a rage:
[W]as . . . this [not the] same party that, for twelve years,
opposed all the most important measures of the Federal ad-
ministration? Was it not this party that assailed, with every
species of calumny and abuse, the illustrious WASHING-
TON for issuing, at the commencement of the late European
war, a proclamation of neutrality to this country? Was it not
this same party that formed and instituted Democratic socie-
ties throughout the Union, to overawe and control the consti-
tuted authorities of our Government? Was it not the spirit of
this party that excited two insurrections in a part of our
country? And had not the spirit of this party been checked, it
would, most undoubtedly, have involved this country in a
war with a powerful foreign nation.7 6
Inevitably the discussion came around to the subject of common
law. The issue slipped into the debate as a natural aspect of the parti-
san controversy. "It is sometime," Representative William B. Giles de-
clared, "since we have seen . . . judicial zeal extending the provisions
of the sedition act, by discovering that it had jurisdiction of the lex non
scripta, or common law!"'4 77 Republicans incorporated the attack on
federal common law into their now matured theory of states' rights.
The Federalists, Representative Nicholson asserted, were claiming the
existence of a law "having a uniform operation over all the extent of
country now contained within the limits of the United States.' 7 8 In
Nicholson's view, this was impossible since the common law had been
received differently at varying times by the several colonies, each of
which "was independent of the other.' 4  With the Revolution, "[tihe
'17 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 770 (1802).
475 Id.
4'76 Id. at 886. Hastings was referring to the Whiskey Rebellion of 1794, see F.
AUMANN, supra note 151, at 177-78, and Fries' Rebellion, see Case of Fries, 9 F. Cas.
826 (C.C.D. Pa. 1799) (No. 5126); Presser, supra note 55, at 83-93.
'7 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 583 (1802).
478 Id. at 806.
479 Id. at 807.
[Vol. 133:1003
ORIGINS OF FEDERAL COMMON LAW
States each became sovereign and independent, and reserved to them-
selves the power of self-government. 480 If a state had adopted the com-
mon law, "it ha[d] been by a solemn and positive act, expressly
recognising it as a part of their code of laws. ' 41 But nowhere in the
enumerated powers given by the states to the national government was
there "any recognition of [the common law] .. . as a law of the
United States.1
482
As they had during the Sedition Act debates, Federalists allowed
the Republicans to define the nature of their dispute, and they at-
tempted to debate the issues on Republican terms. So far apart were
the two sides on the basic assumptions of the argument, however, that
they simply passed each other in the night.
The arguments offered by the Federalists never had a chance of
succeeding. Our judges "have held generally," Representative Bayard
said, "that the Constitution of the United States was predicated upon
an existing common law," which the colonists had left "as the most
valuable inheritance to their children. '483 "Take away the common law
from your courts of law," Representative Hastings added, "and your
courts cannot proceed a step."'484 This line of defense was doubly use-
less. In the first place, Republicans could not have cared less that Fed-
eralist judges had supported forms of common-law jurisdiction for ten
years. These were the same judges, retorted Representative Giles, "who
ought to have been independent," yet had "converted into political par-
tisans, and like Executive missionaries, pronounc[ed] political
harangues throughout the United States! '485 Second, Republicans did
not deny the applicability of the common law where it had been specifi-
cally received by a state. Republicans could point to wide discrepancies
among the various states with respect to the content of their common
law, a consequence of the divergent conditions in the respective jurisdic-
tions and the fact that the colonies were settled at differing times when
English common law itself was changing.46 Representative John Ran-
dolph queried
whether that common law which they have adopted for the
United States, be the common law as it stood modified by
statute in the reign of Elizabeth and James the First, prior
480 Id. at 808.
481 Id. at 809.
482 Id.
483 Id. at 613-14.
484 Id. at 886.
485 Id. at 583.
488 See id. at 806-08 (statement of Rep. Nicholson).
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to the existence of the act of habeas corpus, divested of all
the salutory provisions afterwards introduced at the Revolu-
tion; or, whether it be the common law of the time of George
the Second? Whether we are to be governed by the common
law of Sir Walter Raleigh and Captain Smith, or that which
was imported by Governor Oglethorpe; or on which of the
intermediate periods they have chosen as fixing the common
law of these States ?487
Federalists responded by interjecting a tired rebuttal: without the
common law certain terms in the Constitution were meaningless, and
that some of the provisions-such as the jury trial provision in the sev-
enth amendment for "suits at common law"-expressly recognized the
common law.488 The Republican counter to this position demonstrates
how far apart the two sides were. "That the common law is to settle
the meaning of common law phrases, few will feel disposed to deny, ' '489
was the easy concession made by Republicans. As John Randolph ex-
plained, that was simply not their point:
But because the common law is to be resorted to for an ex-
planation of these and similar terms, does it follow that that
indefinite and undefinable body of law is the irrepealable
law of the land? The sense of a most important phrase, "di-
rect tax," as used in the Constitution, has been, it is be-
lieved, settled by the acceptation of Adam Smith; an accepta-
tion, too, peculiar to himself. Does the Wealth of Nations,
therefore, form a part of the Constitution of the United
States ?490
Like Randolph, other Republicans voiced the odd contention from
prior exchanges, that if the common law was adopted by the Constitu-
tion, it became a part of the Constitution, and could not be altered by
Congress.491 This proposition illustrates the extraordinary variance in
the essential postures of the parties. Federalists were contending,
though not very artfully, that all courts had a recognized function, one
defined by the customs of the land from which most Americans owed
their origin. This was not an alien law-the use of common-law terms
in the Constitution established that much. In providing for courts under
article III, the people could be presumed to have given the federal
487 Id. at 652.
4" See id. at 734 (statement of Rep. Goddard).
489 Id. at 652 (statement of Rep. Randolph).
490 Id. at 652.
491 See id. at 809 (statement of Rep. Nicholson).
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courts the powers ordinarily exercised by judicial bodies, which in-
cluded defining crimes against the government.
Republicans opposed this stance by insisting that governments de-
rive every bit of their authority from the consent of the people. Jeffer-
son had written shortly before these debates that each act of govern-
ment, whether legislative, judicial, or executive, is an expression of a
single sovereign, and "[i]t is the will of the nation which makes the law
obligatory . ". ..",' Where, then, had the people expressed their in-
tention to adopt the common law of England? And "why English law,"
asked Representative Nicholson, any "more than the laws of France,
Spain, Sweden or Holland? 493 If the people had adopted English com-
mon law through ratification of the Constitution, then it must follow
that the common law is a species of constitutional law.
Making sense of these arguments is an exceptionally difficult task,
especially if one is attempting to construct a coherent position for either
side. As will be developed in Part Two of this essay, the views of both
parties suffered fundamental weaknesses. For present purposes, what is
important to consider is whether either camp took seriously the conten-
tions that were being bantered about. Contrary to what Republicans
had suggested, Federalists never claimed that the common law was
equivalent to the Constitution and hence unalterable by legislative act.
On the other hand, for Federalists to allege that the Republican posi-
tion rendered federal courts without any capacity to act, for want of a
substantive law base, was just as absurd. A more reasonable view
would have the federal judiciary authorized to develop common law by
express congressional act, assuming that the statute was within an area
of national legislative competence.
This last point rested at the heart of the matter, since Republicans
and Federalists disagreed over what the national government was per-
mitted to do under the initial constitutional delegation. Some Republi-
cans, such as Senator John Breckenridge, conceded a limited power in
the federal government to punish crimes in the absence of statutory au-
thorization.49'4 These were the crimes specifically mentioned in the
Constitution, which encompassed "but three or four species ... to
wit: treason, piracies, and felonies on the high seas, offences against the
laws of nations, and counterfeiters of securities or coin of the United
States. '49 5 Whether the Constitution conferred upon federal courts the
492 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmund Randolph (Aug. 18, 1799), supra
note 432, at 74.
4*. 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 809 (1802).
494 See id. at 97.
495 Id. Breckenridge continued:
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power to adopt the common law generally was an entirely different
question-even if Congress had provided for the jurisdiction. Led by
Jefferson, Republicans insisted this was "infinitely beyond [the] power"
of Congress, and if "yielded to, the state courts may be shut up. 498
In addition to the federalism issue, Republicans began to raise
with increasing clarity separation of powers concerns. Since no express
authorization could be identified, the Republicans warned that "this
adopting the common law is only another name for legislation. '49,
Representative Macon saw this judicial "power of legislating" as "ex-
tremely dangerous" since judges were not elected by the people.498 "It
is giving to the judges a power infinitely more transcendant than that
vested in any other branch of the Government," added Nicholson-a
type of "extensive discretionary power" exhibiting a "monarchical
tendency.
''
14
9
A comprehensive reading of these debates reveals an interconnec-
tion of reason and unbridled invective. Republicans charged that Feder-
alists were "wild and arbitrary," 500 and characterized their opposition
as voicing "noisy declamations. '"50' From across the aisle Federalists
came out with reminders-of "the horrid scenes which have lately passed
in review before us in France. 850 2 Although the rhetoric of the debate
seems quite inflated, there were serious ramifications involved in the
Republican proposals. They were not merely taking the country back
to the judicial system set up in 1789. Part of the package was the re-
moval from office of federal judges who were supposed to have lifetime
tenure under article III. With some justification, the Federalists saw
their opponents as thorough hypocrites, espousing in one breath the
sacredness of the Constitution and then disregarding the precise lan-
These constitute their powers on the subject of criminal jurisprudence, and
are the sum total of our powers, written or unwritten; unless, indeed, the
gentlemen draw some of their authority for their extensive notions of legis-
lation, from the lex non scripta of Alfred's country, which I am told some
gentlemen consider as attaching itself to our Constitution.
Id.
"" Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmund Randolph (Aug. 18, 1799), supra
note 432, at 73.
491 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 713 (1802) (statement of Rep. Macon).
498 Id.
4" Id. at 806, 805.
500 Id. at 808 (statement of Rep. Nicholson) ("I would have wished that on this
subject, as well as many others, the gentleman had offered us something like an argu-
ment, instead of mere wild and arbitrary assertion.").
50' Id. at 583 (statement of Rep. Giles).
110 Id. at 734 (statement of Rep. Goddard). Representative Goddard recalled:
"They are too recent and too horrible to soon be forgotten. Too horrible indeed to be
mentioned." Id.
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guage of the document in another. They suspected a general conspiracy
aimed at the federal judiciary,503 and they were not far off the mark.
Representative Giles had written Jefferson the past year that "a pretty
general purgation of office has been one of the benefits expected by the
new order of things. ' ' 504 A few months later, as Jefferson recorded,
Giles was more specific: "[N]o remedy is competent to redress the evil
but an absolute repeal of the whole judiciary system [of 1801] terminat-
ing the present offices and creating an entire new system, defining the
common law doctrine, and restraining to the proper constitutional ex-
tent the jurisdiction of the courts.
' 50 5
The repeal of the 1801 Act was only the first shot fired by Repub-
licans in a struggle against the federal judiciary that would rage for
well over a decade. While Justice Chase survived the impeachment
charges brought against him in 1804, the Republican attempt left an
imprint on the Court's work.506 As is evidenced by partisan impeach-
ment attempts at both the state and federal levels, hostility toward
808 See L. KERBER, supra note 146, at 172 ("Those phases of the debate which
concentrated on the 'reception' of the common law went far toward solidifying the Fed-
eralist conviction that their opponents' purpose in espousing repeal was both anti-intel-
lectual . . . and conspiratorial .... ).
504 Letter from William B. Giles to Thomas Jefferson (Mar. 1801), quoted in W.
CARPENTER, JUDICIAL TENURE IN THE UNITED STATES 58 (1918). Jefferson replied
to Giles "in confidence," saying that
all appointments to civil offices during pleasure, made after the event of
the election was certainly known to Mr. A, are considered as nulli-
ties .... Good men, to whom there is not objection but a difference of
political principle, practised on only as far as the right of a private citizen
will justify, are not proper subjects of removal, except in the case of attor-
neys & marshals. The court being so decidedly federal & irremovable, it is
believed that republican attorneys & marshals, being the doors of entrance
into the courts, are indispensably necessary as a shield to the republican
part of our fellow citizens, which, I believe, is the main body of the
people.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William B. Giles (Mar. 23, 1801), reprinted in 9
THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 222-23 (P. Ford ed. 1905). On Jefferson's poli-
cies concerning appointments, see D. MALONE, JEFFERSON THE PRESIDENT: FIRST
TERM 1801-1805, at 69-89 (1970); Prince, The Passing of the Aristocracy: Jefferson's
Removal of the Federalists, 1801-1805, 57 J. Am. HIST. 563 (1970).
505 See W. CARPENTER, supra note 504, at 59 (quoting Jefferson Manuscripts
dated June 1, 1801).
5" See Presser, supra note 55, at 110 (arguing that the impeachment of Chase
caused Marshall to avoid, to the extent possible, "plung[ing] the Court into the political
thicket" (footnote omitted)). There was more than a little irony in article 6 of the
impeachment charges against Chase, which accused him of ignoring Virginia criminal
procedure in a notorious Sedition Aft prosecution. Chase's adversaries alleged that § 34
of the Judiciary Act required that state law should have been applied, even though it
was a federal criminal case. See 14 ANNALS OF CONG. 730 (1804) (article 6 of the
impeachment charges).
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courts of all types was a phenomenon of this era.5" 7 Herbert Johnson
has written that the justices were left "with few illusions concerning
the power of public opinion and political majorities to alter the course
of constitutional development and the role of the Court itself."' ' 8 In
assessing the development of the common-law powers of federal courts
at this critical juncture, it is important to recognize that Republicans
were challenging the basic concept of an independent judiciary. From
the Federalist perspective, this was precisely what was at stake. They
were convinced that "[tihe removal of the judges, & the destruction of
the independence of the judicial department, has been an object on
which Mr. Jefferson has been long resolved." 50 9
Federalists insisted that the judiciary must be free to act without
legislative domination. When the Republicans repealed the 1801 Act,
Federalists were certain that the Congress and the Executive had com-
bined in "the very essence of tyranny." 510 Writing in the New-York
Evening Post in early 1802, one Lucius Crassus (probably Hamilton)
predicted the fall of the country:
'Till the experiment had proved the fact, it was hardly to
have been imagined, that a majority of either house of Con-
gress, whether from design or error, would have lent its
sanction to a glaring violation of our national compact, in
that article, which of all others is the most essential to the
efficiency and stability of the Government; to the security of
property; to the safety and liberty of person. This portentous
and frightful phenomenon has, nevertheless, appeared. It
frowns with malignant and deadly aspect upon our constitu-
tion. Probably before these remarks shall be read, that Con-
stitution will be no more! It will be numbered among the
numerous victims of Democratic phrenzy; and will have
given another and an awful lesson to mankind-the prelude
perhaps of calamities to this country, at the contemplation of
which imagination shudders!
[I]f they are not arrested in their mad career,
[Republicans] will, ere long, precipitate our nation into all
507 See W. CARPENTER, supra note 504, at 111-13 (describing the impeachments
in 1803 of a federal district judge in New Hampshire and of state judges in
Pennsylvania).
50 H. JOHNSON, supra note 54, at 373.
509 W. PLUMER'S MEMORANDUM OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE UNITED STATES
SENATE, 1803-1807, at 101 (E. Brown ed. 1923), quoted in G. HAsKINs, supra note
38, at 205.
51 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 576 (1802) (statement of Rep. Stanly).
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the horrors of anarchy. 51 1
At the repeal debates-while Marbury v. Madison was pend-
ing-Federalists in Congress publicly came out in favor of the judicial
power to declare a legislative act void as unconstitutional.1 2 The Fed-
eralist position on judicial review revealed in these sessions bears a re-
markable resemblance to the eventual opinion for the Court in Mar-
bury. Deprived of a majority in Congress, they had only one card to
play-that the repealing act would be found unconstitutional by the
federal courts. 513 Republicans responded quickly to this suggestion, and
the result was a vehement exchange,5 4 which ranged in tone from rare
eloquence in a legislative chamber to outright threats of impeachment
should the Justices dare such a move.
515
Senator Aaron Ogden argued for the Federalists: "Suppose the
Legislature should pass bills of attainder, or an unconstitutional tax,
where can an oppressed citizen find protection but in a court of justice
firmly denying to carry into execution an unconstitutional law? 516 Re-
publican legislators had a simple answer: "[A]re we not as deeply inter-
ested in the true exposition of the Constitution as the judges can
be?" 517 Although some Republicans were willing to allow that judges
might not be bound to execute laws that they thought were unconstitu-
tional, declaring an act "null and void" was quite another matter, a
511 The Examination No. XII, New-York Evening Post, Feb. 23, 1802, reprinted
in 25 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 529-30 (H. Syrett ed. 1977) For sup-
port that Hamilton was the author, see id. at 444-53.
512 See, e.g., 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 164 (statement of Sen. Ross). As Ross
explained:
Here the written Constitution, established by the people, restrains the leg-
islature to the exercise of delegated power, and finds immutably certain
bounds which it may not pass. If it should rashly exceed the delegated
power, our Judiciary, sworn to support the Constitution, must declare that
the great irrepealable statute made by the people shall restrain and con-
trol the unauthorized acts of agents who have exceeded the limits of a
special authority.
Id; see also R. ELLIS, supra note 71, at 58 (explaining that in the eyes of the Federal-
ists only an independent judiciary could protect the country from a tyrannical legisla-
ture). On earlier statements by federal judges endorsing judicial review of legislation,
see supra notes 394-95 and accompanying text.
51" See R. ELLIS, supra note 71, at 58 ("Samuel Dana of Connecticut threatened
that if the Republicans should pass the repeal act, the Supreme Court would annul it."
(footnote omitted)).
514 See 1 C. HAINES, supra note 361, at 227-35 (describing Federalist and Re-
publican arguments in the debate on the repeal of the 1801 Act).
515 See R. ELLIS, supra note 71, at 58 ("These arguments usually concluded with
the warning that if the repeal act *ere declared unconstitutional, impeachment of the
justices of the Supreme Court was sure to follow."(footnote omitted)).
518 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 175 (1802).
5 Id. at 661 (statement of Rep. Randolph).
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"power [that] rests alone with the Legislature. '"5 18
Federalists responded that the Republican position was "mon-
strous and unheard of."519 "[W]hat possible mode is there to avoid the
conclusion," demanded Senator Gouverneur Morris, "that the moment
the Legislature of the Union declare themselves supreme, they become
so? ' ' 52O This Constitution, the Federalists chided, "is the act of the po-
litical sovereign, the People of the United States.1521 Nevertheless, the
majority in Congress was prepared to commit the unconstitutional act
of displacing federal judges by repealing their offices. The Federalists
warned that "the irresistible consequence is, that whatever law is
passed the judges must carry into execution, or they will be turned out
of office."
5
1
22
Republicans denied that the repeal was unconstitutional. It merely
curtailed jurisdiction, which was unconstitutionally expanded in the
first place, and therefore obviated the need for the judges' services.
Moreover, if the representatives were wrong about this, they could be
sent packing at the next election.523 The bottom line of the Republican
stance was that sovereignty rested with the people, and could only be
expressed through public officials accountable to the electorate. 524 Sena-
tor Stevens T. Mason predicted that if the judges were permitted to
have the final authority, "they will presently become so strong as to
crush and absorb all the others into their solid mass. ' 52 5 "I tremble,"
Representative Thomas T. Davis said, at the idea of permitting federal
courts to "check this House and the Senate. ' 526 He added, "The sooner
we put men out of power, who we find determined to act in this man-
ner, the better; by doing so we preserve the power of the Legislature,
and save our nation from the ravages of an uncontrolled Judiciary." 527
Senator Ogden thought that this fear of the courts was totally un-
founded: "[Wlhere can such power be more safely lodged than in that
branch of the Government, which, holding neither the sword nor the
purse of the nation, cannot have either the ambition or the means of
"I Id. at 558 (statement of Rep. Davis).
519 Id. at 529 (statement of Rep. Henderson).
520 Id. at 181.
521 Id. at 127 (statement of Sen. Chipman).
522 Id. at 529 (statement of Rep. Henderson).
523 See id. at 552 (statement of Rep. Thompson) (Members of Congress "are bi-
ennially responsible to their constituents for the sacred observance of the charter of
their rights.").
524 "The decision of a Constitutional question must rest somewhere," John Ran-
dolph said. "Shall it be confided to men immediately responsible to the people, or to
those who are irresponsible?" Id. at 661.
525 Id. at 63.
528 Id. at 558.
527 Id.
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subverting, to their own benefit, the provisions of our Constitution?"52
This sentiment paralleled that expressed in the 78th Federalist,52 9 and
was no more likely to persuade a Republican than were the original
words of Hamilton. Jefferson's followers were perfectly aware of what
the judiciary was capable of accomplishing. Republicans felt that it was
naive to think that judges were incapable of combining their powers
with those in other branches of government who shared the same parti-
san outlook.
Probably the most important aspects of the issues of this period
were the inability of the political actors to evaluate a single proposal
apart from the larger picture, and the inseparability of the whole from
concerns for abuse of power by known individuals. Consider, for exam-
ple, how Representative Giles could link a series of matters:
[A]I1 men love power, and in general, those love it best who
know best how to use it. Let us apply this remark to the
judges of the United States.
Very shortly after the establishment of the courts, the
judges decided that they had jurisdiction over the States in
their sovereign capacity. Did this, in the judges, seem
unambitious? The States thought it did not. It happened that
during the Revolutionary War, the State of Massachusetts
had issued certain obligatory bills, which were made trans-
ferable, and which were outstanding without any provision
for their payment; suits were instituted on these bills. The
court determined to bring the great State of Massachusetts,
and not Virginia, on its knees, not at the feet of justice, but
policy . . . . The judges have determined that they are
judges in the last resort upon the constitutionality of your
laws. . . . The judges have determined that their jurisdic-
528 Id. at 175-76.
519 See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). Hamilton
wrote:
Whoever attentively considers the different departments of power
must perceive, that in a government in which they are separated from each
other, the judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the
least dangerous to the political rights of the constitution; because it will be
least in a capacity to annoy or injure them. The executive not only dis-
penses the honors, but holds the sword of the community. The legislature
not only commands the purse, but prescribes the rules by which the duties
and rights of every citizen are to be regulated. The judiciary on the con-
trary has no influence over ,either the sword or the purse, no direction
either of the strength or of the wealth of the society, and can take no active
resolution whatever.
Id. at 522-23.
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tion extends to the lex non scripta, or rather to the lex non
descripta, or common law. Does this, in the judges, seem
unambitious? This law pervades the whole municipal regu-
lations of the country. It is unlimited in its object, and indefi-
nite in its character. Legalize this unassuming claim of juris-
diction by the judges, and they have before them every object
of legislation. They have sent a mandatory process, or pro-
cess leading to a mandamus, into the Executive cabinet, to
examine its concerns. Does this, in the judges, seem
unambitious?530
This alleged tie between judicial review and the common-law au-
thority of federal courts sheds light on why. Republicans insisted that
their rivals were claiming the common law to be a species of constitu-
tional law. They were forecasting what they thought a Federalist Su-
preme Court might try to accomplish. Representative Joseph H. Nich-
olson said:
Give them the powers and the independence now contended
for, and they will require nothing more; for your Govern-
ment becomes a despotism, and they become your rulers.
They are to decide upon the lives, the liberties, and the
property of your citizens; they have an absolute veto upon
your laws by declaring them null and void at pleasure; they
are to introduce at will the laws of a foreign country, differ-
ing essentially with us upon the great principles of govern-
ment; and after being clothed with this arbitrary power, they
are beyond the control of the nation, as they are not to be
affected by any laws which the people by their representa-
tives can pass.531
530 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 595-96 (1802). Charles Warren wrote:
Contemporary writings make it very clear that the Republicans at-
tacked the decision [in Marbury], not so much because it sustained the
power of the Court to determine the validity of Congressional legislation,
as because it enounced the doctrine that the Court might issue mandamus
to a Cabinet official who was acting by direction of the President.
1 C. WARREN, supra note 38, at 232. Considering the debates on the repeal of the
1801 Act, Warren's observation may overstate the case. The issues pending in Marbury
had been debated thoroughly, and although there was certainly Republican outrage at
the issuance of process to the Executive (as the quote in text shows), the objection to
judicial review itself was significant in the exchange. What must not be overlooked in
this epoch was the intertwining of issues-one cannot pull a single matter out as pre-
dominant. Republicans saw the issuance of process and the claim of judicial review as
part of a larger attempt by the Court-the one national Federalist institution that re-
mained-to assert supremacy.
531 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 823-24 (1802).
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Republicans were willing to admit that the branches must "be
kept separate and distinct. 532 It was the Federalists who endangered
the doctrine, by giving "to the Judiciary the power to annul your laws,
and contend[ing] that the common law is attached to the
Constitution." 533
SUMMARY OF PART ONE
This half of the essay has presented the political history of the
question of common-law powers for federal courts in the early years of
the American republic. Rather than accept uncritically the Hudson
Court's rendition of this history, we have examined the place of the
issue in the political controversies of the new nation. The problem of
defining the common-law authority of federal courts, though significant
as a technical legal issue, went far beyond the province of the bench
and bar to absorb the attention of the leading public figures as the
country moved into a period of domestic and international turmoil in
the late 1790's. That the question of federal common law became an
object of strident exchanges is an indication of the relationship it bore
to other vital concerns of the day.
Republicans saw this matter as a swatch from a much larger cloth.
For them, the assertion of common-law jurisdiction by federal courts
implicated the very nature of the national Union: the extent to which
powers had been transferred from the states to the federal government.
Federal common law was to Republicans a symbol of a consolidated
national government, the achievement of which seemed the evident goal
of scheming Federalists. As such it was perceived as threatening the
character of a republican society. Not only was the common law being
imposed on the people without their consent, but it was an alien sys-
tem, one appropriate to monarchy. Federal judges, unelected, unac-
countable and yet thoroughly partisan, were seen as using common-law
jurisdiction to transfer the political authority of the states to Federalist
conspirators.
It is unlikely that any Federalist could be fairly accused of the
entire range of Republican charges. There were in fact differences
amongst the Federalists themselves over the common law as it related to
the federal judiciary. Nevertheless, something of a consistent position
seemed to be emerging from the Federalist camp by the end of the
1790's. The coherency of their stance, however, was obscured by the
blending of two different arguments. Federalists first argued that the
632 Id. at 553 (statement of Rep. Thompson).
533 Id. at 554.
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law of the United States, including the Constitution, must inevitably be
formed against the backdrop of the common law of England. They
made the reasonable claim that American law, which was largely a
system of traditional rules, could not be comprehended without taking
into account the vast body of case law from the English past. Further,
the common law was the source of Americans' most important liber-
ties-the foundation of due process and the protection of estate.
But Federalists went beyond these assertions to a second, and
much more ambitious, undertaking. Beginning shortly after the forma-
tion of the national government, they took the view that federal courts
had a type of common-law jurisdiction. This was initially put forth as a
justification for nonstatutory criminal prosecutions, particularly in cases
implicating America's neutrality stance. In a society familiar with such
proceedings, the idea of punishing someone without a legislative decla-
ration of the offense was not especially novel or troublesome. Even Jef-
ferson was confident in resorting to a nonstatutory prosecution for
Henfield's Case. What prompted the controversy over federal common
law was the use of these prosecutions for political purposes during the
crisis period at the close of the decade.
The Federalist position that federal courts had a common-law ju-
risdiction was itself inherently ambiguous. Republicans accurately
pointed out that the common-law courts of England had a national ju-
risdiction, and that the common law itself was a system of jurispru-
dence that encompassed most of the important legal affairs of that
country. Federalists denied any intention to equate the common-law
authority of the English courts with that of the federal courts. Missing
from their assurances, however, was any precise delineation of the lim-
its of federal jurisdiction. Further hampering Federalist efforts to as-
suage Republican fears was the persistent rhetoric from leading Feder-
alists to the effect that the common law was the law of the United
States, and had somehow been adopted by the Constitution.
In the end the Federalists never articulated a theory to explain the
sort of jurisdiction they associated with the federal court system. Their
failure to do so was but one part of Federalists' general inability to
depict the boundaries of the national government. Republicans correctly
perceived that their opponents wanted authority at the Federal level
equal to the task of supporting ambitious national programs. Judicial
power was simply an aspect of these larger aspirations, and no more
clearly deliniated than the others.
Republicans, for their part, were more successful in arguing that
the federal courts, like the rest of the national government, should be
confined to a few narrow areas of competence. If the Republican pos-
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ture made sense as a political program, it did so at the expense of offer-
ing a sound conceptual foundation for federal jurisdiction. It simply
could not be denied that the common law would be the basis for much
of the judicial activity in this country. Nor was it possible to ignore the
fact that article III of the Constitution plainly contemplated that fed-
eral courts would have a national jurisdiction, often exclusive of the
states.
All of the parties in this dispute purported to be adhering to the
true meaning of the Constitution. On the points that were decisive to
the debate, however, the Constitution was strikingly vague. It quickly
became apparent that the adoption of the Constitution was merely the
starting point for a long and eventually violent political battle. While
the Constitution's ratification provided something of an institutional
framework in which the political contest could be held, and resulted in
the initial conferral of important powers on certain individuals, it left
unresolved the crucial issue of the scope of national powers. The parti-
san confrontation over the common-law authority of federal courts was
only a moment in this wider struggle for national definition.
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APPENDIX
Grand Jury Charge of Chief Justice Oliver Ellsworth, Circuit
Court for the District of South Carolina (May 15, 1799)1
Gentlemen of the Grand Jury,
THE matters of delinquency to which your enquiry and present-
ments will extend, are, all offences against the United States, committed
within the district of South-Carolina; or upon the high seas, by persons
found here. Those offences are chiefly defined in the statutes, with
which you are presumed to be acquainted: the residue are, either acts
contravening the law of nations, cases which you will rarely meet with;
or they are acts manifestly subversive of the national government, or of
some of its powers specified in the constitution. I say manifestly subver-
sive, to exclude acts of doubtful tendency, and confine criminality to
clearness and certainty.
An offence consists in transgressing the sovereign will, whether
that will be expressed, or obviously implied. Conduct therefore, clearly
destructive of a government, or its powers, which the people have or-
dained to exist, must be criminal. It is not necessary to particularlize
the facts falling within this description, because they are readily per-
ceived, and are ascertained by known and established rules; I mean the
maxims and principles of the common law of our land. This law, as
brought from the country of our ancestors, with here and there an ac-
commodating exception, in nature of local customs, was the law of
every part of the union at the formation of the national compact; and
did, of course, attach upon or apply to it, for the purposes of exposition
and enforcement. It is true, that the parties acting in their sovereign
capacity, might have discontinued that law, with respect to their new
relations, and the duties thence arising, and have left them to arbitrary
decisions: but that they intended a discontinuance so contrary to usage
in similar cases, and so pregnant with mischief, is certainly not to be
presumed; and it is a supposition irreconcilable with those frequent ref-
erences in the constitution to the common law, as a living code.
By the rules then, of a known law, matured by the reason of ages,
and which Americans have ever been tenacious of as a birth right, you
will decide what acts are misdemeanors, on the ground of their oppos-
ing the existence of the national government, or the efficient exercise of
its legitimate powers.
1 Reprinted in Claypoole's Daily Advertiser (Philadelphia), May 31, 1799. For
other newspapers reprinting this Charge, see supra note 404.
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Such, gentlemen, very briefly, is the written and the unwritten
law, which you will regard; and, by an impartial and faithful applica-
tion, cause to be respected.
Although an indictment is but an accusation, leaving to the party
the right of a traverse; yet it affects too nearly his fame and his liberty,
to be founded upon suspicion; and much less on prepossession. If ju-
ries, instead of being a shield from oppression, would not become the
instruments of it, let them look, not to the opinions of men, but their
actions; and weigh them, not in the scales of passion or of party, but in
a legal balance-a balance which is undeceptive-which vibrates not
with popular opinion; and which flatters not the pride of birth, or en-
croachments of power.
It is not however, the whole design of your institution, to save the
innocent: a less pleasing, but not a less essential part, is, to bring the
guilty to punishment.
Punishment, it is said of the Supreme Being, "is his strange
work;" and it certainly is so of every human being, who retains his
social impressions. But till avarice and ambition, shall cease to progress
with society, or become capable of a nobler restraint than fear, penal
justice will be salutary. And we shall continue to admire that organiza-
tion of inquests for its certainty, which combines with means of infor-
mation and motives of arraignment, independency of condition and
weight of character.
Unmoved by the misconception of severity of laws, you will also, I
trust, be unembarrassed with the policy of them. Whether they are wise
or not, are to be sure, questions of responsibility with those who enact
them: though frequently dependent so much on a knowledge of the past
and of the future, as well as of the present; so much on opinion, in
reconciling domestic interests; and so little on calculation, in managing
those which are foreign, as not to be easily decided. Admitting, how-
ever, that the purity and the patriotism of our legislators, still leave
them liable to error; it does not impair, at all, the obligation of the
citizens to obey, or of the magistrate to execute. 'Till they overleap the
constitution, which guarded as they are by revisionary checks, and de-
pendent as they are on public confidence, is not to be expected; and,
certainly not to believed to have happended, while a saving construc-
tion still remains: till then, the laws they proscribe are sacred and
should be resistless. Neither the judicial, or executive department, can
for a moment, refuse them effect. It violates, together with their oaths,
that distribution of power, without which civil liberty amounts to little,
and republican hopes to nothing. It is, under our constitution, a mutiny
of authorities; and, in our condition, a mutiny is a tempest!
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To this sketch of your duty, gentlemen, it cannot be necessary to
add persuasion. Youfeel that you have a country, and believe there is a
God.
